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PREFACE
Fol l owi ng World War I I  the Uni t ed St a t es  Government  
made wor ld commitments which were no l ess than r e v o l u t i o n a r y .  
Sooner or  l a t e r  P r e s i d e n t  Har ry  S. Truman had to come to a 
showdown wi t h  his c r i t i c s ,  f o r  the con s e r v a t i ve s  and pr e -  
World War 11 i s o l a t i o n i s t s  never  r e a d i l y  accepted Amer i ca ' s  
new pos i t i  on i n  wor l d a f f a i  r s . As f r u s t r a t i  on mounted, 
r i g h t  wing elements' ,  of  the Republ i can Par t y  combined wi t h  
a few di ssi  dent  Democrats to chal  l enge the Admini  s t r a t i  on 
in i t s  handl i ng  of  f o r e i g n  a f f a i r s .  The f a l l  of  China 
f o l l owed  a s hor t  t ime 1 a t e r  by aggress ion in Korea s o l i d ! -  
f i e d  the Truman c r i t i c s  and opened what  amounted to a major  
di scuss i on  of  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  goals and t he  means of  
achi ev i ng  those ends.  The debate a t t r a c t e d  the a t t e n t i o n  
o f  a growing A i r  Force lobby and,  a t  the same t i me ,  l e n t  
i t s e l f  to p o l i t i c a l  gain f o r  a pa r t y  long absent  from the  
White House. L i k e  the va r i ous  opi ni ons  expressed a t  the  
t i m e ,  the i m p l i c a t i o n s  were w i d e - r a n g i n g .
There have been many "Great  Debates" in t h i s  c ount r y ,  
but  in r e f e r r i n g  to t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  one I wish to make i t  
c l e a r  the issue is  t h a t  o f  Truman's de c i s i o n  to deploy  
American ground f or ces  to Europe.  Wr i t e r s  of  t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  
era o f t e n  use the term "Great  Debate" to i nc l ude  a v a r i e t y
i  v
o f  dates and eve nt s ,  The n a t i o n a l  press of  1950-1951  
normal l y  c a l l e d  the t r o o p s - f o r - E u r o p e  i ssue the "Great  
Debat e" ;  however,  a number of  h i s t o r i a n s  l a t e r  r e f e r r e d  
to the "Great  Debate" as t h a t  per i od  cover i ng from the f a l l  
o f  China thruugh the MacArthur  c on t r ov e r s y .  I t  i s an 
a r b i t r a r y  d e l i m i t a t i o n  and I have so l i m i t e d  t h i s  study.
At  the same t i me ,  however ,  I have at tempted i n  a meager way 
to r e l a t e  the l a r g e r  i m p l i c a t i o n s  as they apply  to events  
p r i o r  to and a f t e r  the ■■■.troops-for-Europe episode.
In a d d i t i o n  I wish to s t r e s s  t h a t  t h i s  study is 
b a s i c a l l y  an a n a l y s i s  of  American f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  and the 
domest ic i n f l u e n c e  upon i t  as seen by those who p a r t i c i p a t e d  
i n the debate and by subsequent  American w r i t e r s .  Whi le  
some European views have been i nc l u d e d ,  i t  would take  
t wi ce  agai n as many pages to d e t a i l  the European scene and 
the i n d i v i d u a l  r e a c t i o n s  by those governments.  The ma t t e r  
of  i n c o r p o r a t i n g  German army u n i t s  i n t o  an i n t e g r a t e d  
European defense is an e n t i r e  study by i t s e l f .
Most of  the concl us i ons reached i n  t h i s  work were 
not  foregone concl usi ons s imply because I en t e r ed  the 
p r o j e c t  w i t h  a minimal  knowledge of  the i ssues .  Whi le the 
p a r t i s a n  aspects mani f es t ed  themselves r a t h e r  q u i c k l y ,  the  
n e c e s s i t y  o f  an i n t e g r a t e d  European army i s  s t i l l  surrounded  
wi t h  some qu e s t i o n .  On the l a t t e r  p o i n t ,  the problem a r i s e s  
when one looks c l o s e l y  a t  the t o t a l i t y  of  World War I I  and 
Cold War diplomacy.  S t a l i n  may not  have been the most
amenable c h a r a c t e r ,  but  he and His count ry  did have some
I e g t t t m a t e  secur i  t y  c ons i der a t i ons ' . '  At  the same t i me ,  i t  
i sssaggest ed t h a t  the Truman A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  cannot  be 
absol ved :of  a l l  blame f o r  the i n t e n s i t y  of  the Cold War.
In e f f e c t ;  what  my pr e se nt  r esear ch has done is to open 
anot her  Pandora' s  Box r egar d i ng  the Cold War. I f  nothing  
e l s e . the Grea t  Debate has r a i s e d  more quest i ons f o r  me than
I I  have- answer ed .
Spec i a l  thanks are due to Dr.  Harl  A. Dal st rom not  
o n l y y f o r  suggest i ng the study but  f o r  readi ng the manuscr i pt  
and c o f f e r i n g  p e r t i n e n t  a d v i c e ,  w i t h o u t  which I could not  
haveccompleted the work.  For those few senators  and publ i c  
o f f i c t a t s  who saw f i t  to answer my l e t t e r s  and the s t a f f s  
o f ~ t h e - P r e s i d e n t i a l  l i b r a r i e s  a d d i t i o n a l  c r e d i t  should be 
g i v e n . .  Most i m p o r t a n t l y ,  I thank my w i f e ,  C a r o l ,  who made 
ascmany s a c r i f i c e s  as anyone to see t h i s  through.
Gary L. Ruppert  
A p r i 1,  1971
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CHAPTER I
The E v o l u t i o n  o f  Fore ign P o l i c y ,  P a r t i s a n s h i p ,
And Speci a l  I n t e r e s t  Groups A f t e r  
World War I I
Har ry  S. Truman,  in assuming the Pres i dency  in 1945,  
did not  h e s i t a t e  to f u l f i l l  F r a n k l i n  D. R o o s e v e l t ' s  d e s i r e  
to form a new c o l l e c t i v e  s e c u r i t y  o r g a n i z a t i o n .  By 
suppor t i ng  the Uni t ed  Nat i ons Char t e r  the new P r e s i d e n t  
moved a step c l o s e r  in t y i n g  the n a t i o n a l  i n t e r e s t s  to the  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o r d e r .  The Uni ted Nat i ons was not  c rea t ed  to 
c o n f r o n t  any p a r t i c u l a r  aggressor  but  r a t h e r  sought  the  
maintenance of  wor l d peace so g e n e r a l l y  d e s i r e d .
Two pr ov i s i o ns  in the Uni t ed Nat i ons  Ch a r t e r  were of  
major  si  g n i f i c a n c e  in the e v o l u t i o n  of  Arnerican f o r e i g n  
p o l i c y .  The f i r s t ,  c o l l e c t i v e  s e l f - d e f e n s e  on a r eg i ona l  
b a s i s ,  was embodied in A r t i c l e s  51 and 52.  Senator  A r t h u r
H. Vandenberg,  Republ i can Senator  from Mi ch i ga n ,  a t  the  
San Franc i sco Conference supported the L a t i n  and South 
American de s i r e s  f o r  a hemi spher i c  defense pact  and,  t h e r e ­
f o r e ,  was f o r c e f u l  i n  g e t t i n g  the p r o v i s i o n s  f o r  r eg i ona l
agreements i n c o r p o r a t e d  i n t o  the C h a r t e r . ^  The immediate
r e s u l t  was the Rio de J a n i e r o  Pact  s igned in 1947.  The
second p r o v i s i o n ,  A r t i c l e  43,  a l l owed f o r  the e s t a b l i s h m e n t
o f  an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  army should i t  be needed.  These a r t i c l e s
set  precedents which were cons i dered in the c r e a t i o n  and
i mpl ement a t i on  o f  the North A t l a n t i c  T r e a t y .
Whi le  seeking s e c u r i t y  in t he  Uni t ed N a t i o n s ,  the
Uni t ed  S t a t es  i mmedi a t e l y  a f t e r  the war d e m o b i l i z e d .  Nine
months a f t e r  V-J day the Uni t ed  S t a t es  Army reduced i t s
2
manpower f rom 8 m i l l i o n  to 1 . 8  m i l l i o n  men. On V-E day t he
Uni t ed S t a t es  had 3.1 m i l l i o n  men in Europe;  one y e a r  l a t e r
3onl y  391 , 000  men remained.  By 1947 the Army A i r  Force was 
on e - e i g h t h  i t s  war t ime s t r e n g t h ;  l i k e w i s e ,  p r od u c t i o n  of  
m i l i t a r y  a i r c r a f t  d e c l i n e d  f rom 9 6 , 0 00  planes in 1944 to
4 . .
1 , 00 0  a i r c r a f t  in 1946.  B r i t a i n  and the o t h e r  western  
a l l i e s  demobi l i zed  in  a s i m i l a r  manner.  Only Russia
^Ar t hur  H. Vandenberg,  J r . ,  e d . ,  The P r i v a t e  Papers
of  Senator  Vandenberg (Boston:  Houghton M i f f l i n  Company,
1 9 5 2 ) ,  pp. 174,  1 8 6 - 9 8 .  H e r e a f t e r  c i t e d  as Vandenberg,  
P r i v a t e  Pap er s .
2
Henry Bamford Parkes and V i n c e n t  P. C a r r o s o , Recent  
America:  A H i s t o r y , Book Two: Since 1933 ( 5th e d . ;
New York:  Thomas Y. Crowel l  Company, 1 9 6 9 ) ,  p.  289.
3 "North A t l a n t i c  T r e a t y  O r g a n i z a t i o n ,  NATO Facts and 
Fi gures ( Br u s s e l s :  NATO I n f o r m a t i o n  Servi  c e , 1969)  , pT 14.
H e r e a f t e r  c i t e d  as NATO, Facts and F i g u r e s .
^Kenneth L.  Mo 11,  " Nuclear  S t r a t e g y , 1 945-1 949 : 
Amer i ca ' s  F i r s t  Four Years" ( unpubl i shed  M.A.  t h e s i s ,  
Muni c i pa l  U n i v e r s i t y  of  Omaha, 1 9 6 5 ) ,  pp.  65,  80.  H e r e a f t e r  
c i t e d  as M o l l ,  "Nuc l ear  S t r a t e g y . "
3mai n t a i ned  a r e l a t i v e l y  l a r g e  m i l i t a r y  f o r c e  of  some 4
m i l l i o n  men, a l though t h i s  was nowhere near  i t s  es t i mat ed
5peak s t r eng t h  of  1-2.-5. mi 1 l i o n  ' du r i n g  the war.  In the  
Uni ted St a t es  a v i a t i o n  and the nu c l e a r  bomb had added a new 
dimension to n a t i on a l  power;  however ,  r e l i a n c e  upon a nuc l e a r  
s t r i k e  f o r ce  was u n r e a l i s t i c  in t h a t  the atomic s t o c k p i l e  
was "abysmal l y  smal l "  and the l onges t  range bomber,  the  
B-29,  could not  be e f f e c t i v e  w i t h o u t  forward bases l oc a t ed  
on f o r e i g n  soi  l . ®
Hi s t o r i e a l l y , a 1arge peacet ime mi 1 i t a r y  e s t a b l i  sh-  
ment in the Uni t ed St a t es  had been the except i on  r a t h e r  than 
the r u l e ;  bes i des ,  many env i s i oned a g r e a t e r  cooper a t i on  
wi t h  the So v i e t  Union than had h i t h e r t o  e x i s t e d .  However,  
in r e a c t i o n  to Sov i e t  expansion and p o l i t i c a l  pressure and 
the postwar  s e t t l e m e n t  problems the Truman A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  
e v e n t u a l l y  assumed, r i g h t l y  or  wr ongl y ,  a much t ougher  l i n e  
in de a l i n g  wi t h  the Russi ans.  Lord Ismay,  f i r s t  Se c r e t a r y  
General  o f  NATO, po i n t ed  out  t h a t  " f o r  a l l  p r a c t i c a l  purposes  
the Moscow Conference of  1947 marked the end of  post - war  
c o - o p e r a t i o n  between Russia and the democr a t i c  count r i es- . "?
5
St .  Louis P o s t - D i s p a t c h , January 3,  1951,  p. 1C; 
NATO, Facts and F i g u r e s , p. 14.
^ M o l l ,  "Nucl ear  S t r a t e g y , "  pp. 8 4 - 8 5 .
^Hast ings Ismay,  NATO, The F i r s t  Five Years ,  1949- 
1 954 (The Ne t her l ands :  Bos ch.- U t rech t  f o r  the North  
A t l a n t i c  T r e a t y  O r g a n i z a t i o n ,  1 9 5 4 ) ,  p. 5. H e r e a f t e r  c i t e d  
as Ismay,  F i r s t  F i v e - Y e a r s . Some a na l y s t s  now c l a i m the  
Cold War was i n i t i a t e d  much e a r l i e r ,  in p a r t ,  due to
4Fol l owi ng  the Uni t ed Nat ions C h a r t e r ,  the Truman 
Do c t r i ne  became the f i r s t  of  severa l  b u i l d i n g  blocks in the  
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y .  In pledgi ng American eco­
nomic and m i l i t a r y  resources to a i d  Greece and Turkey and 
r e s i s t  aggress i on elsewhere in  Europe,  P r e s i de n t  Truman 
noted " t h a t  w i t h o u t  American p a r t i c i p a t i o n  t her e  was no 
power capable o f  meet ing Russia as an e q u a l . . . . This  was 
the t ime to a l i g n  the Uni ted St a t es  o f  America c l e a r l y  on
o
the s i d e ,  and the head,  o f  the f r e e  w o r l d . "  S e c r e t a r y  of  
S t a t e  George.C.  Mar sha l l  u n v e i l ed  the next  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  
b u i l d i n g  b l o c k ,  the European Recovery Program,  which even­
t u a l l y  did much to r e h a b i l i t a t e  Europe' s  economy. A year  
and a h a l f  l a t e r  Truman's Po i n t  Four program expanded econom­
ic  a s s i s t a n c e  to underdeveloped areas t hr oughout  the wor l d .
Upon p u b l i c a t i o n  in 1947,  George F. Kennan's "Mr.  X 
A r t i c l e "  began to pervade American t h i n k i n g .  Such phrases  
as the " f i r m  and v i g i l a n t  conta i nment  o f  Russian expansive  
t endenc i es"  were q u i c k l y  i n t e r p r e t e d  by many to mean the
American a c t i o n s .  See Gar A l p e r o v i t z ,  Atomic Di p l omacy: 
Hi roshima and Potsdam: The Use of  the Atomic Bomb and the
American C o n f r o n t a t i o n  wi t h  So v i e t  Power (New York:  Simon
and Schust e r ,  1 9 65 ) ;  D. F. F l eming,  The Cold War and i t s  
O r i g i n s  1 91 7-1 9 6 0 , V o l . I :  1 91 7-1 950 (Garden C i t y , New
York:  Doubleday & Company, I n c . ,  1 961 ) ;  Wi11 iam Appleman
W i l l i a m s ,  The Tragedy of  American Di p l omacy , A De l t a  Book 
(New York:  Del l  Pub l i s h i ng  Company, I n c . ,  1962) .
^Har ry  S. Truman,  Memoi r s , Vo l .  I I :  1 946^1 952:
Years of  T r i a l  and Hope (Garden C i t y ,  N . Y . :  Doubleday & 
Company, I n c . ,  1 9 5 6 ) ,  p . 102.  H e r e a f t e r  c i t e d  as Truman,  
Memoirs .
containment  o f  Russia by m i l i t a r y  means and m i l i t a r y  t h r e a t .
Kennan responded saying he had not  meant mi l  .i tary"  contain' - ' ■
ment but  r a t h e r  p o l i t i c a l  cont a i nment .  As much as Kennan
at tempt ed to c o r r e c t  the d e f i c i e n c i e s  o f  the a r t i c l e ,
m i l i t a r y  conta i nment  cont i nued to be a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  the
9
Truman f o r e i g n  p o l i c y .
The 1948 Communist coup in Czechos l ovak i a  did not
lessen f e e l i n g s  toward the So v i e t  Union.  A few months l a t e r
the Western powers r ea c t e d  q u i c k l y  to the B e r l i n  bl ockade
by i n i t i a t i n g  an a i r l i f t . The p o s s i b i 1i t y  of  being
conf r ont ed  by armed c o n f l i c t  caused the Uni ted St a t e s  to
i ncr ease  i t s  m i l i t a r y  might  by sending to Europe se v ent y -
10f i v e  j e t  f i g h t e r s  and s i x t y  B - 2 9 ' s .  The B e r l i n  c r i s i s  
“ exposed the shocking m i l i t a r y  weakness o f  Western Europe. "  
According to Dean Acheson the S o v i e t  Union had t h i r t y  
Russ ian d i v i s i o n s  in i t s  East  European sa t e l l i  tes w h i 1e the  
Uni ted S t a t e s , B r i t a i n ,  France ,  and the Benelux c o u n t r i e s  
could not  muster  more than e i g h t e e n  d i v i s i o n s . ^  The
^George F. Kennan,  Memoirs,  1925-1950  (Boston:  
L i t t l e  Brown and Company, 1 967)  , pp . 3 5 4 - 6 7 .  H e r e a f t e r  
c i t e d  as Kennan,  Memoi r s .
^ M o l l  , “Nuc l ear  S t r a t e g y , "  p. 174.
The aut hor  i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  p r i o r  to t h i s  a c t i o n  the  
Uni t ed  S t a t es  only  had s i x t e e n  j e t  f i g h t e r s  and t h i r t y  
bombers in Europe.
^ D e a n  Acheson,  Pr esent  a t  the C r e a t i o n :  My Years
in the S t a t e  Department  (New York:  W7~ W. Norton & Company,
1969)  , pT 308.  H e r e a f t e r  c i t e d  as Acheson,  Pr esent  a t  the  
C r e a t i  on .
Western European na t i ons  r ecogni zed t h e i r  s i t u a t i o n  t h r e e  
months bef or e  B e r l i n  when they signed the Brusse l s  T r e a t y .
That  a l l i a n c e ,  which pr ov i ded f o r  j o i n t  de f e n s e ,  n e i t h e r  
i nc l ude d  the Uni t ed S t a t e s  nor had i t  been implemented to 
any e x t e n t  by the s i g n a t o r y  na t i ons  a t  the o u t s e t  o f  the  
B e r l i n  c r i s i s .
In the Uni t ed S t a t e s ,  Congress expressed much
unhappiness over  the S o v i e t  use o f  the veto in the Un i t ed
Nat i ons and sought  to remedy the problem.  In 1948 numerous
Senate r e s o l u t i o n s  f a v o r i n g  the r e v i s i o n  o f  t he  Un i t ed
Nat i ons  Ch a r t e r  were i n t r o d u c e d ,  but  i t  took the c o l l a b o r a t i o n
of  Senator  Vandenberg and Un de r se c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e  Rober t  A.
L o v e t t  to come up wi t h  a s o l u t i o n  to t he  i n e f f e c t i v e n e s s  of
12the C h a r t e r  and the c o n t i n u i n g  weakness o f  Western Europe.  
Based on A r t i c l e s  51 and 52,  the Vandenberg R e s o l u t i o n  aimed 
a t  ( 1 )  " Pr ogr e ss i ve  development  of  r e g i o n a l  and o t h e r  
c o l l e c t i v e  ar rangements f o r  i n d i v i d u a l  and c o l l e c t i v e  s e l f -  
defense . . . " and ( 2 )  " As s o c i a t i o n  o f  the Un i t ed  S t a t e s  by 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  pr ocess ,  w i t h  such r e g i o n a l  and o t h e r  
c o l l e c t i v e  ar rangements . . ." On June 11 ,  1948 the Senat e ,  
a f t e r  on l y  e i g h t  hours o f  de b a t e ,  approved the r e s o l u t i o n  by 
a vote o f  s i x t y - f o u r  to s i x .  Less than a month l a t e r  the
12 M i l t o n  0.  Gust a f son,  "The Vandenberg R e s o l u t i o n :
A Study in B i p a r t i s a n s h i p "  ( unpubl i shed M.A.  t h e s i s ,  U n i v e r ­
s i t y  o f  Nebraska ,■ .1 963.) , pp. 8 ,  15.  H e r e a f t e r  c i t e d  as 
Gust a f son ,  "Vandenberg R e s o l u t i o n . "
St a t e  Depar tment  began p r e l i m i n a r y  d i scuss i ons  which l ed to 
the Nor th A t l a n t i c  P a c t . ^
In l ess than f o u r  years  the American n a t i o n  moved 
f rom the c o l l e c t i v e  s e c u r i t y  of  the Uni t ed Nat i ons to 
c o l l e c t i v e  defense o f  the North A t l a n t i c  A l l i a n c e .  Thi s  
s h i f t  o f  emphasis now meant t h e r e  was an i d e n t i f i a b l e  
a ggr e ss or ,  a t  l e a s t  by i m p l i c a t i o n .  Dur ing the North A t l a n t i c  
T r e a t y  hear i ngs  S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e  Acheson sa i d  the Pact  
was not  aimed a t  any p a r t i c u l a r  na t i on  but  r a t h e r ,  was 
aimed a t  armed aggressi on in the A t l a n t i c  a r e a .  However,  
a t  anot her  p o i n t  in his t es t i mony he s a i d ,  "Western  
European c o u n t r i e s  have seen t he  basi c  purposes and p r i n c i ­
ples o f  the [ U n i t e d  Na t i o n s ]  Ch a r t e r  c y n i c a l l y  v i o l a t e d  by
the conduct  o f  the So v i e t  Union wi t h  the c o u n t r i e s  o f
14East ern Europe. "
Accordi  ng to proponents , the o b j e c t i  ve of  the T r e a t y  
was the maintenance of  peace and s e c u r i t y ,  and i t  was 
i nt ended to f u l f i l l  the o r i g i n a l  aims o f  the Uni t ed  Nat i ons  
since t h a t  o r g a n i z a t i o n  had been made i n e f f e c t i v e  by one 
power.  As an i n h e r e n t  r i g h t  o f  s e l f - d e f e n s e  in the case of  
armed a t t a c k ,  the North A t l a n t i c  community sought  p r o t e c t i o n  
through c o l l e c t i v e  e f f o r t s .  Americans were to j o i n  the
13 Vandenberg,  P r i v a t e  Pa p e r s , pp.  407,  411.
14 U . S . ,  Congress,  Senat e ,  Committee on Fore i gn  
R e l a t i o n s ,  North A t ! a n t i c  T r e a t y  Hear t r i gs , Pa r t  I :  Admi n-
i s t r a t i  on Wi t n e s s e s , 8 1 s t  Cong. , 1s t  s e s s . ,  1 949,  pp. 7,  17.  
H e r e a f t e r  c i t e d  as Senat e ,  North A t l a n t i c  T r e a t y  H e a r i n g s .
8a l l i a n c e  not  on l y  because the member na t i ons  had a common
h e r i t a g e  and s i m i l a r  i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  bu t ,  more i m p o r t a n t l y ,
because the s e c u r i t y  of  the North A t l a n t i c  was " v i t a l  to
1 5the n a t i o n a l  s e c u r i t y  of  the Uni t ed St a t es  . . From
a m i l i t a r y  v i e w p o i n t  the o b j e c t i v e s  were to de t e r  war o r ,  
be m i l i t a r i l y  e f f e c t i v e  i f  war could not  be p r e v e n t e d . ^
The most t roublesome po i nt s  of  the T r e a t y  were 
A r t i c l e s  5 and 3. By a ccept i ng  A r t i c l e  5 the p a r t i e s  agreed  
" t h a t  an armed a t t a c k  a g a i n s t  one or  more o f  them in Europe 
or North America sha l l  be cons i dered an a t t a c k  a g a i n s t  them 
a l l ;  . . . " ^ 7 Th i s  a r t i c l e  was c a r e f u l l y  w r i t t e n  to a l l ow  
member na t i ons  to r e a c t  i n d i v i d u a l l y  or in c o n c e r t ,  t her eby  
l e t t i n g  each na t i on  decide s e p a r a t e l y  as to what  course of  
a c t i o n  i t  would f o l l o w .  There were two i m p l i c a t i o n s  in 
t h i s .  F i r s t ,  na t i ons  did not  want  to be bound to a 
p a r t i c u l a r  m i l i t a r y  response s ince i t  i mp l i e d  a c e r t a i n  loss  
of  s o v e r e i g n t y .  Second,  as f a r  as the Uni t ed  St a t es  Senate  
was concerned,  A r t i c l e  5 n e i t h e r  i ncr eased nor decreased  
the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  powers o f  the Pr e s i de n t '  or  Congress,  nor
15 U . S . ,  Congress,  Senat e ,  Committee on Foreign  
R e l a t i o n s ,  Ex ec ut i v e  Repor t  No. 8 , 81s t  Cong. ,  1st  s e s s . ,  
1949,  as quoted in Congressional  Recor d, XCV. 9816- 24 .  
H e r e a f t e r  c i t e d  as Senate ,  Execut i ve  Report  No. 8 .
16 Senate ,  North At l  a n t i c  T r e a t y  Hear i  ngs , p. 147.
17U . S . ,  Depar tment  of  S t a t e ,  American Foreign  
P o l i c y  1950 - 1 9 55 :  Basic Documents, Vo l .  I ,  Pubn. No. 6446
[195 7 j , pT 813.  H e r e a f t e r  c i t e d  as: Department  of  S t a t e ,
Basic Documents.
did i t  change the r e l a t i o n s h i p  between them. In o t h e r  words,
18Congress clung to i t s  r i g h t  to de c l a r e  war.
The o t h e r  c o n t r o v e r s i a l  p r o v i s i o n  was the ambiguously
w r i t t e n  A r t i c l e  3.  I t  provi ded:
In or der  more e f f e c t i v e l y  to achieve the o b j e c ­
t i v e s  o f  t h i s  T r e a t y ,  the P a r t i e s ,  s e p a r a t e l y  and 
j o i n t l y ,  by means o f  cont inuous and e f f e c t i v e  s e l f -  
help and mutual  a i d ,  w i l l  ma i n t a i n  and develop t h e i r  
i n d i v i d u a l  and c o l l e c t i v e  c a p a c i t y  to r e s i s t  armed 
a t t a c k . 19
Senators c a r e f u l l y  s c r u t i n i z e d  the p r o v i s i o n ,  a f r a i d  o f  what  
i t  might  mean. What kind of  a i d was i n v o l v e d - - m o n e y , arms,  
s u p p l i e s ,  manpower? How bi ndi ng was the o b i i g a t i o n - - w a s  
each na t i on  f r e e  to det ermi ne  i t s  c o n t r i b u t i o n ?  A d m i n i s t r a ­
t i o n  wi tnesses  f e l t  t h a t  any American a i d  should not  exceed 
o n e - s i x t h  or one-seventh of  the t o t a l  e f f o r t .  Opponents,  
however,  po i nt ed out  t h a t  since the end of  the war the
Uni t ed St a t es  had f u r n i s h e d  f i v e - s i x t h s  or s i x - s e v e n t h s  of
20a l l  the a i d r ece i ve d  by Western Europe.  Was t h i s  to be 
another  l a r g e  sca l e  Marsha l l  Plan? Whi le  the T r e a t y  was 
being debated the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,  in f a c t ,  proceeded to 
prepare  a separ a t e  arms aid program.
Senator  Vandenberg and Texas Democrat  Tom Connal l y  
sought  to a l l a y  the s e n s i t i v e  f e e l i n g s  over  arms aid by
18 Senate ,  Execut i ve  Report  No. 8 ,
19 Depar tment  o f  S t a t e ,  Basic Documents, p. 813.
20 Claude Byram Cross,  "The Uni t ed  S t a t es  and the  
A t l a n t i c  T r e a t y "  (unpubl i shed Ph . D . d i s s e r t a t i o n  , S t a t e  
U n i v e r s i t y  of  Iowa,  1 9 5 3 ) ,  p. 76.  H e r e a f t e r  c i t e d  as Cross,  
" A t l a n t i c  T r e a t y . "
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contendi ng t h a t  no s p e c i f i c  o b l i g a t i o n  e x i s t e d  e i t h e r  as to
the k ind or  amount of  a i d .  The S t a t e  Depar tment  concur red
i n  t h e i r  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .  Both Senators placed emphasis on
the r i g h t  o f  Congress to implement  a m i l i t a r y  a i d  program;
Co nn a l l y  d e c l a r e d ,  "Congress i s  where the C o n s t i t u t i o n  puts
21the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ,  and t h a t  is where we s h a l l  put  i t . "
Most Senators f avored some kind o f  m i l i t a r y  a i d  program but
were wary o f  t r e a t y  o b l i g a t i o n s .  The mere e x i s t e n c e  o f
A r t i c l e  3,  the S e c r e t a r y  of  S t a t e  ma i n t a i n e d ,  d e f i n i t e l y
i mp l i e d  an o b l i g a t i o n  to help develop the c a p a c i t y  to r e s i s t  
?2a ggr ess i on .  However,  beyond t h a t  the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  
avoided being too s p e c i f i c ,  perhaps out  o f  f e a r  t h a t  they  
would l ose  the T r e a t y  over  t h i s  one i ssue .
Throughout  the Nor th A t l a n t i c  Pact  hear i ngs  the  
emphasis placed on A r t i c l  e 3 r evol  ved around arms a i d .  
M a t e r i a l  a i d  appeared to be the 1og i c a l  s o l u t i o n , and t h i s  
was suppor ted by the f a c t  t h a t  Truman was p r e p a r i n g  such a 
b i l l  a t  t h a t  very t i me .  However ,  A r t i c l e  3 i n  no way 
s p e c i f i e d  a p a r t i c u l a r  form of  a s s i s t a n c e .  There was,  of  
course ,  the p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  f u r n i s h i n g  manpower,  t h a t  i s ,  
ac t ua l  m i l i t a r y  f o r c e s .  Senat or  F o r r e s t  C. D o n n e l l ,
Republ i can from Missour i  , t hought  he saw the han d wr i t i n g  on
21 U. S . ,  Congress , 8 1 s t  Cong. ,  1s t  s e s s . , Congres- 
s i ona l  Re c or d , XCV, 9193,  9894,  9896.  H e r e a f t e r  c iLed as 
Congress i ona l  Recor d , XCV.
22 Acheson ,  P r e s e n t  a t  t h e  C r e a t i o n,  p.  283.
n
the wal l  and pursued his i n t u i t i o n .
Again and again dur i ng the hear i ngs Donnel l  qu i zzed
the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s  wi tnesses  as to the need f o r  s t a t i o n i n g
American t roops in Europe p r i o r  to any aggress i ve  move by
Russia .  W. A v e r e l l  Ha r r i ma n , then Speci a l  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e  in
Europe f o r  the Economic Cooperat ion A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,  suggested
t h a t  member na t i ons  in Europe would probabl y  r e s i s t  any
American army of  occupat i on permanent ly  s t a t i o n e d  t h e r e .
However,  Harr iman noted t h a t  he was not  a m i l i t a r y  e x pe r t
and t h e r e f o r e  could not  t e s t i f y  on his own regard i ng the
m a t t e r .  When Se c r e t a r y  of  Defense Louis Johnson t e s t i f i e d
he avoided the issue by saying he did not  t h i n k  the best
i n t e r e s t s  of  the count ry  would be served by answering the  
23q u e s t i o n .  v
General  Omar N. Br a d l e y ,  then Army Ch i e f  of  S t a f f ,  
spent  more t ime t a l k i n g  about  the m a t t e r  but  in the end 
onl y  c o n t r i b u t e d  to the vagueness of  the ot her  t es t i mony .
He did admi t  t h a t  a m i l i t a r y  a s s i s t a n ce  program could wel l  
i nc l ude  mi 1 i t a r y  " a d v i s e r s " ;  but  in r egard to mass 
manpower c o n t r i b u t i o n s  he s a i d ,  " I  do not  see t h a t  i t  [ t h e  
North A t l a n t i c  T r e a t y ]  excludes or i nc l udes  [ p r i o r  t roop  
commitments] .  I do not  see how i t  is i nvo l ved  a t  a l l . "
When asked what  kind of  mi 1 i t a r y  f o r c e  would be needed to 
stop Russia he said he knew of  no such study ever  being
23 Senate ,  North A t l a n t i c  T r e a t y  Hear i ngs ,  pp. 183,
213.
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made by the Uni t ed St a t es  m i l i t a r y  s i mpl y  because too many
24v a r i a b l e  f a c t o r s  e x i s t e d .  I t  seems s t r a nge  f o r  a m i l i t a r y
o r g a n i z a t i o n  about  to subscr i be  to such an a l l i a n c e  to have
l i t t l e  or  no i dea  o f  what  i t  would take to e s t a b l i s h  an
e f f e c t i v e  def ense.
The most s i g n i f i c a n t  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  the t r oop i ssue
took place between S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e  Acheson and Senat or
Bourke B. H i c k e n l o o p e r , Republ i can f rom Iowa.  That  exchange
did more than anyt hi ng to a l l a y  Congressi onal  f e a r s  t h a t
A r t i c l e  3 i mp l i e d  the use of  American ground f o r c e s .
H i c k e n l o o p e r : In o t h e r  words,  are  we going to
be expected to send s u b s t a n t i a l  numbers o f  t roops  
o v e r - t h e r e  as a more or  l ess permanent  c o n t r i b u t i o n  
to the development  o f  these c o u n t r i e s '  c a p a c i t y  to 
r e s i  s t?
Acheson:  The answer to t h a t  q u e s t i o n ,  S e n a t o r ,
i s  a c l e a r  and abso l u t e  "No."
H i c k e n l o o p e r : That  i s  s u f f i c i e n t .  That  is
a l l . 25
Acheson l a t e r  a d m i t t e d ,  "Even as a s h o r t - r a n g e  p r e d i c t i o n
t h i s  answer was d e p l o r a b l y  wrong.  I t  was a lmost  e q u a l l y
s t u p i d .  But i t  was not  i n t ended to d e c e i v e . "  His i n t e n t
had been to a f f i r m  t h a t  t roop c o n t r i b u t i o n s  were not  an
o b l i g a t i o n ;  however ,  he a l so  wished to i mpl y  t h a t  A r t i c l e  3
did not  exclude the p o s s i b i 1 i t y  o f  ground f or c es  being a
26form o f  mutual  a s s i s t a n c e .  A y ear  and a h a l f  l a t e r
24 I b i d . , pp.  289 ,  291 , 308.
2 5 1b i d . , p. 47.
Acheson ,  P r e s e n t  a t  t he  C r e a t i o n , p.  285.
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A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  opponents used Acheson's seemi ngl y  c l e a r
t e s t i mony  to a t t a c k  the t roops - f o r - E u r o p e  program.
One f u r t h e r  p r o v i s i o n  o f  the T r e a t y  e v e n t u a l l y
confused at tempt s  to implement  the pac t .  A r t i c l e  11 c a l l e d
f o r  t he  T r e a t y  to be " c a r r i e d  out  by the P a r t i e s  in a c c o r -
27
dance wi t h  t h e i r  r e s p e c t i v e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  p r oc e s s e s . "
Senator  C o n n a l l y ,  whi l  e- 'cl  aimi  ng- a u t h o r s h i p  o f  the
phr aseo l ogy ,  l a t e r  found the ambiguous wording was an open
*28i n v i t a t i o n  to s t r u g g l e .  The Fore i gn R e l a t i o n s  Committee  
in r e p o r t i n g  .out  the T r e a t y  i n s i s t e d  t h a t  the d i v i s i o n  of  
a u t h o r i t y  between Congress and the P r e s i d e n t  would i n  no 
way be a l t e r e d .  Senat or  Vandenberg spoke f o r  the m a j o r i t y  
o f  Senators when he s a i d ,  "Thi s  q u a l i f y i n g  phrase r e f e r s  
not  on l y  to the process o f  r a t i f i c a t i o n  but  to the process  
o f  i mp l e m e n t a t i o n . "  In e f f e c t  he de c l a r e d  any implemen­
t a t i o n  o f  the Pact  would r e q u i r e  the a p p r o p r i a t e  approval
29
by Congress—the T r e a t y  was not  s e l f - e x e c u t i n g .
Republ i can Sena t or s  Rober t  A. T a f t  o f  Ohi o ,  A r t h u r  
V. Watkins of  Utah and Kenneth S. Wherry o f  Nebraska r a l l i e d  
to a t t a c k  the Pact .  They o f f e r e d  t h r e e  amendments — one
27 Depar tment  o f  S t a t e ,  Basic Documents , p.  814.
OO ......
Tom C o n n a l l y ,  My Name is  Tom Conr ia l l y  (New York:  
Thomas Y. Crowel  1 Company, 1 9 5 4 ) ,  p . 333.  H e r e a f t e r  c i t e d  
as Co n n a l l y ,  My N am e i s Tom C o n n a l l y .
^  C o n g r e s s i o n a T Re c o r d , XCV, 8893,  9818 ,  9 8 2 1 - 2 2 .
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a f f e c t i n g  A r t i c l e  3 and two a f f e c t i n g  A r t i c l e  5.  T h e i r
i n t e n t  was to mi n i mi ze  any o b l i g a t o r y  i m p l i c a t i o n s ,  t he r eby
30almost  r ender i ng  those A r t i c l e s  us e l e s s .  Senat or  T a f t  
had hoped to avoi d  compl e t e l y  such an a l l i a n c e  by s u b s t i t u t ­
ing a r e s o l u t i o n  which would have si mpl y  extended the
31
Monroe D o c t r i n e  to Western Europe.  T a f t ' s  idea was not
o r i g i n a l  as John Fos t e r  Du l l e s  had proposed s i m i l a r  a c t i o n
in 1948 w h i l e  Vandenberg and L o v e t t  worked on Senate
3?Re s o l u t i o n  239.  Whi le T a f t  approved the warning gi ven to
Russia by the T r e a t y ,  he a l so f e l t  t h a t  i t  commit ted the
Uni t ed  S t a t es  to rearming Western Europe,  whi ch,  i n  t u r n ,
33would e v e n t u a l l y  l ead to anot her  war .  He r e v e a l e d  his
d i s t a s t e  f o r  ground combat when he s a i d ,  "At  l e a s t  by
i m p l i c a t i o n ,  i t  [ t h e  T r e a t y ]  commit ted the Uni t ed  S t a t e s  to
the p o l i c y  o f  a l and war in Europe,  when we might  f i n d  t h a t
3 4
a t h i r d  wor ld war could b e t t e r  be f ought  by o t h e r  means."
On J u l y  21,  1949,  a f t e r  r e j e c t i n g  the c r i p p l i n g  
amendments,  the Senate by a vote o f  e i g h t y - t w o  to t h i r t e e n  
over whe l mi ngl y  accepted the Nor th A t l a n t i c  T r e a t y .  Senat or
3QI b i d . , pp. 9 9 1 5 - 1 6 .
^  New York T i me s , J u l y  1 5,  1 949,  p. 1.
^ G u s t a f s o n ,  "Vandenberg R e s o l u t i o n , "  p. 24.
^ Congressi onal  Recor d , XCV, 9 2 0 5 - 0 6 .
34 Rober t  A. T a f t ,  A Fore i gn P o l i c y  f o r  Americans  
(Garden C i t y  , N. Y . :  Doubleday & Company, I n c . , 19 51 ) ,
p. 89.  H e r e a f t e r  c i t e d  as T a f t ,  A Fore i gn P o l i c y  f o r  
Amer icans.
15
Vandenberg had worked hard w i t h  the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  to secure
approval  of  the a l l i a n c e ;  however,  he was d i s g r u n t l e d  wi t h
the " l i t t l e  band of  GOP i s o l a t i o n i s t s "  who had opposed his  
3 5
e f f o r t s .  As a f ou nd at i on  o f  his f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  Har ry
Truman pr oc l a i me d ,  "Wi th the North A t l a n t i c  T r e a t y  . 
we gave pr oof  o f  our d e t e r m i n a t i o n  to stand by the f r e e
oc
c o u n t r i e s  to r e s i s t  armed aggressi on f rom any q u a r t e r . "
The a l l i a n c e  was formed out  o f  f e a r  o f  the S o v i e t
Union but  beyond t h a t  i t  was a very l o o s e l y  drawn document
open to many. i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s . Claude B. Cross in his study
of  NATO noted the c o n t r a d i c t o r y  a t t i t u d e s  o f  the n e g o t i a t i n g
n a t i o n s .  They wanted to g i ve  the s t r o n g e s t  p o s s i b l e  warning
to Russi  a y e t  assume the mi nimum o b i i g a t i o n  commensurate
wi t h  the warn i ng .  Each wanted the maximum assurance o f
c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  wh i l e  r e t a i n i  ng the f reedom of  i ndi vi  dual  
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a c t i o n .  The American people held these same a t t i t u d e s ,  y e t
the Truman A d m i n i s t r a t i  on a p p a r e n t l y  wanted the a l l i a n c e  a t  
whatever  c os t s .  Hoping to secure maximum s u p p o r t ,  the  
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s  wi tnesses  were indeed equ i voca l  when 
di scuss i ng  the o b l i g a t o r y  c lauses o f  such p r o v i s i o n s  as 
A r t i c l e  3.  A d m i t t e d l y ,  Senator  Donnel 1 r a i s e d  what  seemed 
to be a remote p o s s i b i l i t y  a t  the t i me;  however ,  he was
35 Vandenberg,  P r i v a t e  P a p e r s , pp. 5 0 0 - 0 1 .
^ T r u m a n ,  Memo i rs , I I ,  250.
^ C r o s s ,  " A t l a n t i c  T r e a t y , "  p. 45.
asking l e g i t i m a t e  q u e s t i o n s ,  quest i ons  the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  
pl ayed down.
Whi le  suppor t i ng  the North A t l a n t i c  Pact  the e d i t o r s
o f  the New York Times f e l t  t h a t  i t  would not  get  f a r  w i t h o u t
38the enactment  o f  an a i d  program.  Four days a f t e r  the
Senate consented to the T r e a t y ,  P r e s i d e n t  Truman pr esent ed
Congress wi t h  the m i l i t a r y  a id program he had been p r e p a r i n g .
In i t  he asked f o r  $ 1 , 4 5 0 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0  to pr ov i de  arms to f o r e i g n  
39n a t i o n s .  Senator  Vandenberg i mmedi a t e l y  had qualms and 
came out  i n  o p p o s i t i o n  to the o r i g i n a l  b i l l  because i t  was 
"a l most  u n b e l i e v a b l e  i n  i t s  g r a n t  o f  u n l i m i t e d  power to the  
C h i e f  E x e c u t i v e .  I t  would per mi t  the P r e s i d e n t  to s e l l ,  
l e a s e ,  or  g i ve  away any t h i ng  we' ve got  a t  any t ime to any 
count ry  in any way he w i s h e s . "  He concluded t h a t ,  " I t  
would v i r t u a l l y  make him the number one war l o r d  of  the  
e a r t h . "  Vandenberg was,  however,  i n t e r e s t e d  i n  some kind of  
arms program and was w i l l i n g  to accept  an i n t e r i m  b i l l  
u n t i l  the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  submi t ted a program c l e a r l y  c o o r d i ­
nated w i t h  the A t l a n t i c  T r e a t y .  Truman's o r i g i n a l  b i l l  was 
a s epa r a t e  measure and l acked the recommendat ions o f  the  
as y e t  i n o p e r a t i v e  Nor th A t l a n t i c  C o u n c i l ,  p r ov i ded  f o r
^ E d i  t o r i a l  , New York Times , J u l y  10,  1 949,  sec.  IV ,
P .  8 .
39 U . S . ,  P r e s i d e n t ,  Pu b l i c  Papers o f  the P r e s i d e n t s  
of  the Un i t ed  St a t e s  (Washington,  D . C . :  O f f i c e  o f  the
Federal  R e g i s t e r , Na t i o n a l  Ar ch i ves  and Records S e r v i c e ,  
1 9 4 5 - ) ,  Har ry  S. Truman,  1949,  pp. 3 9 5 - 4 0 0 .  H e r e a f t e r  c i t e d  
as U . S . ,  Truman Pub l i c  P a p e r s .
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i n A r t i c l e  9 of  the T r e a t y . 40 Senator  Vandenberg and
Republ i can Senator  John Fos t e r  Dul l es  o f  New York secured
the adopt i on o f  an amendment which r e q u i r e d  i n t e g r a t e d
defense plans to be f o r mu l a t e d  be f or e  funds in excess of
$100 m i l l i o n  could be r e l e a s e d .  Senator  Connal l y  found the
m i l i t a r y  a i d  b i l l  the most d i f f i c u l t  p iece of  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y
l e g i s l a t i o n  to enact  s ince the Lend-Lease Ac t .  The b i p a r t i s a n
■foreign' .pol  i'c.y which had hung t o g e t h e r  f o r  sever a l  years
began to come a p a r t  when the House cut  the a p p r o p r i a t i o n  in  
41h a l f .  Democrat i c  l eader s  were abl e  to salvage the b i l l ,
and P r e s i d e n t  signed the f i r s t  Mutual  Defense As s i s t ance  Act
42on October  6,  1949.  By February 1950 e i g h t  European
nat i ons  had signed agreements w i t h  the Uni t ed  St a t es  f o r  a
4 3
b i 11ion d o l 1ars in arms and equipment .
Impl ement i ng the North A t l a n t i c  Pact  proceeded  
s l o w l y ,  but  a d e f e n s i v e  s t r a t e g y  was q u i c k l y  f o r m u l a t e d .  In 
c o n t r a s t  to his  evasi veness a t  the T r e a t y  h e a r i n g s ,  General  
Br adl ey  came to the m i l i t a r y  a i d  program hear i ngs b e t t e r  
pr epar ed .  I t  was t her e  t h a t  Bradl ey  ennunci a ted the i n t e ­
gr a t ed  defense s t r a t e g y .  In the event  of  aggressi on the  
Uni t ed St a t es  would f u r n i s h  the a i r  power to d e l i v e r  the
4 0 Vandenberg,  P r i v a t e  P a p e r s , pp.  5 0 3 - 0 4 ,  507.
^ A c h e s o n ,  Present  a t  the C r e a t i o n , pp. 3 0 9 - 1 2 ,  352.
42 U.S.  , Truman Pu b l i c  Pa p e r s , 1949,  pp . 50 0 - 0 1 .
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New York T i mes , January 28,  1950,  p. 1.
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atomic bomb and would supplement  the B r i t i s h  i n  c o n t r o l l i n g
the seas.  Members on the European c o n t i n e n t  would f u r n i s h
the "hard core" of  the ground f or ces  to meet  the i n i t i a l
a s s a u l t .  He i mp l i e d  t h a t  the Uni t ed  S t a t es  would f u r n i s h
44t roops subsequent  to an a t t a c k .  The purpose of  the plan
was to pr e v ent  e x t e n s i v e  ■ . dupl i ca t i on of  f o r c es  by each n a t i o n .
Six months l a t e r  in January ,  1950,  the North A t l a n t i c  Counci l
approved the s o - c a l l e d  i n t e g r a t e d  defense p l a n ,  thus a l l o w i n g
P r e s i d e n t  Truman to r e l e a s e  nine hundred m i l l i o n  d o l l a r s  of
4 5
m i l i t a r y  a i d  - funds.
The North A t l a n t i c  na t i ons  now had an a l l i a n c e  and
t he basis  o f  a s t r a t e g y  but  did not  e x e r t  themselves to
expand t h e i r  n a t i o n a l  a r mi es .  Europe cont i nued t o  d i r e c t
i t s  a t t e n t i o n  to economic r e c o v e r y - - e x t e n s i v e  rearmament
proved d e t r i m e n t a l  to t h a t  rehabi  1 i t a t i o n ' .  Moreover ,  rumors
t h a t  Russia possessed 175 d i v i s i o n s  aroused only academic
i n t e r e s t .  Europeans s i mpl y  r e f used to b e l i e v e  t her e  was
any genuine danger  o f  armed c o n f l i c t  wi t h  Russia and t h e r e -
46f o r e  cont i nued to i gnor e  the warn i ngs .  One year  a f t e r  the  
Pact  was signed the New York Times r e p o r t e d  t h a t  t went y - t wo
d i v i s i o n s  were a t  the d i sposa l  of  NATO, but  onl y  about
4 4 1 b i d . , J u l y  30,  1949,  p. 1.
45
NATO, Facts and F i g u r e s , p. 197.
46 Barbara Ward,  P o l i c y  f o r  the West (New York:  W. W.
Norton & Company, I n c . ,  1951 ) , p.. 56.  H e r e a f t e r  ci  ted as
Ward, P o l i c y  f o r  the West .
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t we l ve  d i v i s i o n s  were a v a i l a b l e  f o r  immediate a c t i o n .  Great
B r i t a i n ,  France,  and the Net her l ands  were a l l  i nv o l v e d
elsewhere  in the wor l d -and t h e r e f o r e  did not  have s i z e a b l e
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armies a t  home.
In the Un i t ed  S t a t e s ,  f o l l o w i n g  the enactment  of  the  
Na t i ona l  S e c u r i t y  Act  o f  1947,  the A i r  Force emerged as a 
sepa r a t e  branch of  the m i l i t a r y ,  and dur i ng the next  few 
years  i t  made e f f o r t s  to expand through the a i d  o f  powerful  
a l l i e s  in Congress.  The A i r  Force t out ed i t s  r o l e  in World 
War I I ,  and wi t h  the postwar  r e d u c t i o n  o f  the Army more of  
the defense burden f e l l  upon the a i r  branch o f  the m i l i t a r y .
P r e s i d e n t  Truman in 1948 appoi nt ed Thomas F i n l e t t e r  
to head the newl y- formed A i r  Pol i cy  Commission. The 
Commission members concluded t h a t  an A i r  Force of  12 , 400  
pl anes or gani zed i n t o  70 combat groups was the minimum
48f o r c e  which could c a r r y  out  the mi ssion assigned to i t .
To f u l f i l l  the s o - c a l l e d  70-Group plan the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n
would have had to i nc r e a s e  the defense budget  by about
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1 . 5  b i l l i o n  a n n u a l l y  f o r  up to f i v e  y e a r s .  Whi le the plan  
had suppor t ers  in Congress,  i t  l acked Whi te House a p p r o va l .  
Truman announced his  1950 f i s c a l  y ea r  budget  in January 1949.
4 7 New York T i mes , A p r i 1 10,  1950,  p . 1.
48 Congressi onal  Recor d , XCV , 1 230-1 .
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H. Br adf ord W e s t e r f i e l d ,  Fore i gn P o l i c y  and Par t y  
P o l i t i c s :  Pear l  Harbor  to Korea (New Haven,  Conn. :  Ya 1e 
U n i v e r s i t y  Press ,  1 9 5 5 ) ,  p . 334.  H e r e a f t e r  c i t e d  as 
W e s t e r f i e l d ,  Pol i cy  and Pa r t  y Po l i  t  i c s .
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The def ense budget  of  $1 5 . 9  b i l l i o n  was evenl y  d i v i d e d
among the t h r e e  m i l i t a r y  s e r v i c e s ;  however,  the A i r  Force
was humbled because Truman was reduci ng i t  from the e x i s t i n g
5058 groups to 48 groups.
I n t e r - s e r v i c e  r i v a l r i e s  c o n t r i b u t e d  to the unhappi ­
ness.  S e c r e t a r y  of  the A i r  Force W. S t u a r t  Symington 
cont i nued to se t  his personal  goal  a t  70 groups.  General  
Hoyt Vandenberg,  A i r  Force C h i e f  o f  S t a f f ,  c l a imed a 48-group  
a i r  wing could do no more than guarantee  " p r e v e n t i o n  of  an 
e a r l y  d e f e a t "  and br i ng hope o f  " e v e n t ua l "  v i c t o r y .  The 
f e a r  t h a t  naval  a v i a t i o n  would e v e n t u a l l y  be absorbed by the  
A i r  Force prompted the Navy to s t r i k e  back.  A Navy c a p t a i n  
r e p o r t e d  t h a t  James F o r r e s t a l  , f ormer  S e c r e t a r y  of  Defense  
and a Navy man, had t o l d  him the A i r  Forces'  " w i l d  s t at ements"  
were undermining the s e c u r i t y  o f  the c o u n t r y .  S e c r e t a r y  
o f  the Army Kenneth Royal l  and General  Bradl ey  were w i l l i n g  
to accept  a 70-group A i r  Force i f  the Army were l i k e w i s e  
i n c r e a s e d . ^
The House of  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ,  where A i r  Force  
advocates were s t r o n g e s t ,  i n s i s t e d  on a 70-group a i r  branch 
and acted a c c o r d i n g l y .  They i ncr eased the o v e r a l l  defense  
budget  by $630 m i l l i o n  and gave both the Army and Navy a 
s m a l l e r  si i c e  o f  the p i e  than Truman had recommended. The
5 0New York T i me s , January 11,  1949,  p.  1.
5 1 1_b_i_d. , January 1 1 , 1 949,  p. 1; May 2,  1949,  p.  15;  
September 1 1 , 1 949 , p. 1; March 22,  1 949,  p. 8.
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House money b i l l  provided a p p r o p r i a t i o n s  f o r  the r e t e n t i o n  
of  on l y  a 58 -group a i r  wing,  but  i t  e s t a b l i s h e d  a f u t u r e  
goal  o f  70 groups.  The Senate b i l l  l i k e w i s e  approved a 
70-group f o r c e ,  but  i t  f u r n i s h e d  onl y  enough money to main­
t a i n  48 groups,  t he r eby  a c c e p t i ng  the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s  
budget .  S h o r t l y ,  a House-Senate Conference commit tee worked 
out  a compromise g i v i n g  the A i r  Force i t s  58 groups.  The 
Chairman o f  the House Armed Ser v i ces  Commit tee,  Car l  Vinson,  
Democrat  f rom Ge or g i a ,  became enraged when P r e s i d e n t  Truman 
pr ompt l y  impounded the a d d i t i o n a l  $615 m i l l i o n  Congress had 
approved f o r  more a i r c r a f t .  Truman reasoned t h a t  such 
e x p e n d i t u r e  would be an unnecessary economic burden and i t
would unbalance the e q u i l i b r i u m  he wished to ma i n t a i n  among
. i . 52the s e r v i c e s .
Russian exp l os i on  o f  an atomic device in 1949 gave
g r e a t e r  impetus to the A i r  Force arguments.  Car l  Spaa t z ,  a
r e t i r e d  but  vocal  A i r  Force G e n e r a l , c a l l e d  f o r  a b u i l d  up
of  the n u c l e a r  s t o c k p i l e  plus the development  o f  the w o r l d ' s
5 3
most powerful  A i r  Force.  W. S t u a r t  Symington placed  
s pe c i a l  emphasis on a long range bomber f o r c e  as the only  
means of  c o u n t e r b a l a n c i n g  the enormous S o v i e t  ground f o r c e s .  
Such a f o r c e  i mp l i e d  the use o f  atomic bombs to d e f e a t  an
5 2 I b i d . ,  March 17,  1949,  p. 1; A p r i l  14,  1 949,  p. 1;  
August  18,  1949,  p.  23; Auyust  28,  1949,  p. 38;
October  18,  1949 , p . 1; October  30,  1949,  p. 1.
5 3
Car l  Spaat z ,  "Atomic Monopoly Ends," Newsweek, 
October  3 ,  1949 ,  p. 22.
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54enemy. The Hi r oshi ma- Nagasak i  bombing r a i d s  had produced
a seemi ngly  s imple  s o l u t i o n  in t h a t  i t  was r e l a t i v e l y  l ess
e x p e n s i ve ,  plus i t  supposedly r e q u i r e d  l ess  manpower.
Y e t ,  t h e r e  were t hose ,  e s p e c i a l l y  in the s c i e n t i f i c
communi ty,  who were having second t hought s .  General  C u r t i s
LeMay, who had made his r e p u t a t i o n  as a bombing e x p e r t
dur i ng World War I I  and e v e n t u a l l y  headed the S t r a t e g i c  A i r
Command, found h i ms e l f  to be the t a r g e t  o f  these m o r a l i s t i c
a t t a c k s .  The news commentator ,  Chet  Hu n t l e y ,  expressed t h i s
t hought  one n i g h t  on a r ad i o  br oadcast  when he asked,  "Just
what  r e p u t a b l e  atomic s c i e n t i s t  has t o l d  General  LeMay t h a t
we can drop atomic bombs wi t h  such gay and r e c k l e s s  abandon
5 5
w i t h o u t  s i gn i ng  our own death war r ant s?"  Others quest ioned  
the adequacy o f  s t r a t e g i c  bombing,  a s t r a t e g y  aimed at  
i n c a p a c i t a t i n g  an enemy's p r od uc t i ve  and t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  
f a c i l i t i e s .  The New York Times publ i shed a d i s s e n t i n g  l e t t e r  
f rom the f a c u l t i e s  o f  Harvard and Massachuset ts  I n s t i t u t e  
of  ■■■Technology — among the s i gner s  were McGeorge Bundy,  John 
Kenneth G a l b r a i t h ,  and A r t h u r  M . S c h l e s i n g e r ,  J r .  They 
poi nt ed out  t h a t  as a r e s u l t  of  the nuc l ea r  s t r a t e g y  the 
Uni t ed  S t a t es  was i l l - p r e p a r e d  to deal  w i t h  l i m i t e d  aggres­
sion or  l i m i t e d  war .  The maintenance of  such a s t r a t e g y  
i mp l i e d  the acceptance o f  mass d e s t r u c t i o n  o f  human l i f e ,
5^New York T i m e s , A p r i l  23,  1950,  p.  30.
55 .....................
Congressional  Recor d , XCV.AI74 1 - 4 2 .  R e p r i n t  of
H u n t l e y ' s  br oa dca s t .
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whi ch ,  in t u r n ,  weakened European morale and c on f i d e nc e .
They de c l a r e d  t h a t  the e x i s t i n g  s t r a t e g y  gave the Uni t ed
St a t es  on l y  two choi ces:  "mass s l a u g h t e r  on both sides or
o u t r i g h t  m i l i t a r y  d e f e a t . "
P r e s i d e n t  Truman wished to ma i n t a i n  a balanced
m i l i t a r y ,  and the A p r i l ,  1950 appoi ntment  o f  Thomas F i n l e t t e r
as the new S e c r e t a r y  of  the A i r  Force did not  mean a change
o f  emphasis.  Congress did not  back away from a 70 - g r oup  A i r
Force when f i r s t  d i sc u s s i n g  the 1951 f i s c a l  y ea r  budget ;
y e t  Har ry  Truman,  sounding l i k e  a f i s c a l  c o n s e r v a t i v e ,
opposed an a i r  arm which the count ry  could not  a f f o r d .  The
Korean c r i s i s ,  however,  caused the P r e s i d e n t  to make an
a b o u t - f a c e .  He asked f o r  an a d d i t i o n a l  $ 1 0 . 5  b i l l i o n  f o r
p a r t i a l  m o b i l i z a t i o n  and gave $4 . 5  b i 11 ion o f  t h a t  to the
A i r  Force f o r  b u i l d i n g  towards a 69-group go a l .  Lobbying
f o r  the expansion of  a i r  power,  the A i r  Force As s o c i a t i o n
sai d 69 groups were too few not ing t h a t  273 groups were
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r e q u i r e d  in World War I I .
Despi t e  some o f  Truman's successes,  c e r t a i n  members 
of  t he  Republ i can Pa r t y  i n c r e a s i n g l y  a t t a c k e d  the b i p a r t i s a n  
f acade o f  American f o r e i g n  p o l i c y .  Some of  the c r i t i c i s m  
was j u s t i f i a b l e  d i sc u s s i o n  of  what  the goals should be;
^ New York T i me s , A p r i l  30,  1950,  sec.  I V ,  p. 8 .
5 7 I b i d .  , A p r i l  5 ,  1950,  p.  1; June 22,  1950,  p. 1;  
June 23,  1950,  p. 2; J u l y  28,  1950,  pp. 1,  10;
August  27,  1950,  p. 45.
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much o f  i t ,  however ,  was to c r e a t e  p o l i t i c a l  c a p i t a l  f o r  a 
p a r t y  long out  o f  power.
Tom Conna l l y  marked the Korean War as the end of
CO
b i p a r t i s a n s h i p  in f o r e i g n  p o l i c y .  A c t u a l l y ,  a mixed group 
o f  Republ i cans began the break long be f or e  t h a t .  The House 
r e v o l t  over  the m i l i t a r y  a id program in 1949 has a l r e a d y  
been ment ioned,  but  an even o l d e r  i ssue was China.  H i s t o r ­
i c a l l y ,  Republ i cans had i n t e r e s t s  in the Far  East  going back 
to the t ur n  of  the c e n t u r y .  Truman c o n t r i b u t e d  to his own 
v u l n e r a b i l i t y  by f a i l i n g  to a s s o c i a t e  any promi nent  
Republ i cans wi t h  China p o l i c i e s .  However,  one cannot  pl ace  
a l l  the blame on the P r e s i d e n t  because i t  was not  a w i l l f u l  
a c t i o n  on his  p a r t .  I mmedi a t e l y  f o l l o w i n g  the war ,  as 
dur i ng the c o n f l i c t ,  China held a secondary p o s i t i o n  on 
American p r i o r i t y  l i s t s .  A sense of  urgency nor mal l y  was 
not  p r es e nt  in the f o r ma t i on  of  our  China p o l i c y ,  but  by 
1947,  as a Communist conquest  of  t h a t  count r y  loomed immi nent ,  
Republ i cans began to appl y  more and more pr e s s ur e .
H. Bradf or d  W e s t e r f i e l d  in his  study of  p a r t y  p o l i t i c s  and 
f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  c r e d i t s  c e r t a i n  Republ i cans wi t h  w e l l - t i m e d  
moves.  When these GOP members became aware t h a t  Chiang 
Kai - shek  could not  be saved,  they i mmedi a t e l y  c a l l e d  f o r  more 
a s s i s t a n c e  than the Democrat i c  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  was w i l l i n g  to 
g i v e .  " N o n i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  and economy-minded Republ icans
58 " ......  .......
C o n n a l l y ,  My Name is Tom C o n n a l l y , pp. 3 5 0 - 5 1 .
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could r eassure  themselves wi t h  the a lmost  c e r t a i n  knowledge
t h a t  the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  i t s e l f  wo-u'ld- u l t i m a t e l y  block any
59heavy aid program."  The f a l l  o f  China in  1949,  a l though  
n e a r l y  beyond the c on t r o l  of  Truman,  ushered in a new wave 
of  f r u s t r a t i o n ,  a f r u s t r a t i o n  the Republ i can Pa r t y  could  
and did use to i t s  advantage .  The American people became 
even more uneasy when the Uni t ed Nat i ons f or ces  bogged-down 
in Korea.
A one t ime i s o l a t i o n i s t ,  Senator  Vandenberg dur ing  
Wor1d War I I -  became t he  l e a d i n g  Republ i can espousi  ng g r e a t e r  
i nvo l vement  in wor l d a f f a i r s ,  and he played a maj or  r o l e  in  
secur i ng his  P a r t y ' s  suppor t  f o r  the Truman f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  
a f t e r  the war .  S h o r t l y  a f t e r  passage of  the North A t l a n t i c  
T r e a t y  Vandenberg could not  c a r r y  on hi s  work due to i l l n e s s .  
Truman a dmi t t ed  he depended upon Vandenberg in a subsequent  
l e t t e r  to him in which he s a i d ,  "You j u s t  d o n ' t  r e a l i z e  what  
a vacuum t h e r e  has been in the Senate and in the o p e r a t i o n  
of  our f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  s ince you l e f t . " ^
At  f i r s t  the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  a t tempt ed to br i dge  the 
gap by working w i t h  Senator  John Fo s t e r  Du l l e s  and Senator
CO .......... ...........
W e s t e r f i e l d ,  P o l i c y  and Pa r t y  P o l i t i c s ,  pp. 2 4 5 - 4 6 ,  
249,  259,  268,  343.
6 0Har ry  S, Truman to Ar t h u r  H. Vandenberg,
M a r c h . 31,  1950,  O f f i c i a l  F i l e  386,  Truman Papers ,  Truman 
L i b r a r y .
John Sherman Cooper ,  a Kentucky R e p u b l i c a n . ^  Truman 
a p p a r e n t l y  made a t a c t i c a l  e r r o r  in want ing D u l l e s '  s ena t o ­
r i a l  sea t  f i l l e d  by a Democrat  and,  a t  the same t i me ,  
r e t a i n i n g  Du l l e s  as a t i e  to the Republ i can P a r t y .  The 
e r r o r  was not  in want i ng anot her  Democrat ic Se na t or ,  but  
r a t h e r  the manner i t  was c a r r i e d  out .  Du l l es  was to run 
f o r  r e - e l e c t i o n  in 1950;  however ,  Truman,  seeking suppor t  
f o r  h i s  domest ic po1 i c i e s  , v i g o r o u s l y  endorsed He r be r t  H. 
Lehman. Assuming Vandenberg would e v e n t u a l l y  r e t u r n  to his  
pos i t i on- - and. hopi ng-  to p a c i f y  D u l l e s ,  the Whi te House 
o f f e r e d  Du l l e s  a p o s i t i o n  as p o l i c y  a d v i s e r  to the S e c r e t a r y
to
of  S t a t e  which he accept ed.  The blow came when 
Vandenberg was unable to r e t u r n  and hi s f o r e i  gn p o l i  cy 
l e a d e r s h i p  among Republ i cans g r a d u a l l y  passed to a l e s s -  
t h a n - a v i d  i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s t ,  Rober t  A. T a f t ,  who had 
P r e s i d e n t i a l  ambi t i ons  o f  his own. The c o n s e r v a t i v e  f a c t i o n  
of  the Republ i can Pa r t y  a t tempt ed to a s s e r t  c o n t r o l  over  the  
GOP l e a v i n g  the more i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s t - m i n d e d  members,  such 
as Du l l e s  and Lodge,  to fend f o r  themsel ves .  These l a t t e r  
men si mpl y  did not  have the s t a t u r e  o f  Vandenberg.  In the  
eyes o f  t he  c on s e r v a t i v e s  Du l l es  had l e f t  t h e i r  ranks.
^Nor man A. Graebner ,  The New Is o 1 a 1 1o n i s m: A
Study in P o l i t i c s  and Fore i gn P o l i c y  Since 1950 (New York:  
The Ronald Press Company, 1 9 5 6 ) ,  pp. 17 - 18 .  " H e r e a f t e r  
c i t e d  as Gr aebner ,  New I s o l a t i o n i s m .
^ W e s t e r f i e l d ,  P o l i c y  and Pa r t y  P o l i t i c s ,  pp.  371,
378.
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The e l e c t i o n  o f  1948 had p r e v i o u s l y  added to
p a r t i s a n  f e e l i n g s .  Senator  T a f t ,  expr ess i ng his P a r t y ' s
s e n t i m e n t ,  did not  understand how the count ry  could "send
63t h a t  roughneck ward p o l i t i c i a n  back to the Whi te House."  
E q u a l l y  s i g n i f i c a n t ,  the Democrats e l e c t e d  m a j o r i t i e s  and 
t h e r e f o r e  or gan i z ed  the new Congress.  Senate Democrats  
poured s a l t  i n t o  the Republ i can wounds when they changed the  
p a r t y  r a t i o  on the Fore i gn Re l a t i o n s  Committee f rom s e v e n - t o -
64s i x  to e i g h t - t o - f i v e . Senator  Vandenberg i n s i s t e d  the  
move was " i m p l i c i t  w i t h  h o s t i 1 i t y " and c a r r i e d  the i m p l i c ­
a t i o n  t h a t  the Republ i can senat or s  were "not  q u i t e  
t r u s t w o r t h y ."
Whi l e  Truman was u l t i m a t e l y  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  his own 
f o r e i  gn p o l i  c y , Republ icans q u i c k l y  thought  t h a t  they had 
found a scapegoat - - Dean Acheson.  W e s t e r f i e l d  perhaps has 
gi ven the best  c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n  of  Acheson:
His p r e s e n t a t i o n  possessed a t e c h n i c a l  b r i l l i a n c e  
which was i n t e l l e c t u a l l y  overwhelming.  . . . In 
v o i c e ,  manner ,  d r e s s ,  and suspected sympathies he 
was f a r  too " E n g l i s h . "  He found i t  d i f f i c u l t  to 
r e s t r a i n  h i m s e l f  from demol i sh i ng the arguments of  
congr ess i ona l  opponents wi t h  a s w i f t  i n c i s i v e n e s s  
which seemed i n s u l t i n g . 6 °
His o p p o s i t i o n  in Congress began when Senator  Kenneth Wherry
^  E r i c F . Goldman, The C r u c i a l  Decade- -And A f t e r : 
Amer i ca ,  1 9 4 5 - 1 9 6 0 ,  V i n t age  Books (New York:  Random House,
1 9 6 0 ) ,  p. 90:
64 ........... .....  ...... ....................W e s t e r f i e l d ,  P o l i c y  and Par t y  P o l i t i c s , p. 326.
65 ..................................
Vandenberg,  Pr i  vate  Pa p er s , p. 468.
^ W e s t e r f i e l d ,  P o l i c y  and Par t y  P o l i t i c s , p. 328.
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cast  the on l y  vote a g a i n s t  h i s  nomi nat i on as Under  
S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e  in 1 9 4 5 . 67 In the.  i n t e r v e n i n g  years  
Acheson gave the GOP p o l i t i c a l  ammuni t ion by his a s s o c i a t i o n  
wi t h  A l g e r  Hiss whose l o y a l t y  was q u e s t i o ne d .  When Acheson 
was nominated as S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e  i n  1949 s i x  Senators
t  p
d i s s e n t e d  f rom his c o n f i r m a t i o n .  The o p p o s i t i o n  soon 
r e a l i z e d  t h a t  he was the major  a r c h i t e c t  o f  the Truman 
f o r e i g n  p o l i c y ,  and prompt l y  c r e d i t e d  Acheson wi t h  the f a l l  
of  Ch i n a - - s ome t h i ng  over  which he had l i t t l e  c o n t r o l .
Senator  Joseph McCarthy cont i nued the a s s a u l t  in 1950 when 
he d e c l a r e d  t h a t  he had found the S t a t e  Depar tment  i n f e s t e d  
wi t h  Communists.  Such r e v e l a t i o n s ,  r e g a r d l e s s  o f  t h e i r  
v a l i d i t y ,  served onl y  to unnerve an a l r e a d y  uneasy p o p u l a t i o n .  
Acheson' s r e l a t i o n s  wi t h  Republ i can Congressmen cont i nued to 
d e c l i n e .
The 1950 e l e c t i o n s  added to Republ i can s t r e n g t h  in  
Congress and a t  a Pa r t y  caucus a f t e r  t he  e l e c t i o n  a p e t i t i o n  
was ci  r c u l a t e d  aski  ng f o r  Acheson1s r e s i g n a t i o n .  Truman 
a n g r i l y  r e j e c t e d  t he  p a r t i s a n  move, and Acheson l a t e r
6 7Acheson,  P re sent  a t  t  h e C re a t  i o n , pp. 1 26 - 27 .
Senat or  Wherry and Acheson had a running feud f o r  severa l  
y e a r s .  In 1945 Wherry opposed Acheson because the nominee 
had,  accor di ng to the Nebras ka Sena t o r  , 1 1 bl i gh ted the
name' o f  General  MacAr t hur . "  (Acheson,  Pr esent  at  the  
'C r e a t i o n » p. 1 2 6 . )  Fi ve years  l a t e r  the two n e a r l y  came 
to blows in a Senate a p p r o p r i a t i o n  h e a r i n g .  [Dean 
Acheson,  Sketches f rom L i f e  o f  Men I Have Known (New York:  
Harper  & B r o t h e r s ,  1 9 6 1 ) ,  pp. 1 3 3 - 3 4 . ]
6 8 1 b i d » , p . 253 .
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r e v e a l e d  ev i dence t h a t  Senator  Wherry was pr epared to
69i n i t i a t e  impeachment proceedings a g a i n s t  him.  The Omaha
World H e r a l d , suppor t i ng  the GOP cause,  suggested t h a t
Congress h e n c e f o r t h  assume g r e a t e r  watchdog r e s p o n s i b i 1 i t y
70f o r  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y .  On the o t h e r  hand,  the Wash i ngton 
Post  e x p l a l n e d  t h a t  such r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  o b l i g e d  the R e p u b l i ­
cans to produce an a l t e r n a t i v e  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y ,  something they  
had f a i l e d  to do. An u n i d e n t i f i e d  Democrat ,  who had not  
been an Acheson s u p p o r t e r ,  warned his GOP f r i e n d s ,  "Jus t  as 
s u r e l y  as Republ i cans t r y  to f i x  a l l  the blame on Acheson,  
Democrats w i l l  break t h e i r  s i l e n c e  on MacAr t hur .  Some of  
us are  prepared to document a case t h a t  the genera l  exceeded 
his i n s t r u c t i o n s . " ^  MacArthur  had not ab l e  suppor t  among 
Republ i cans because he quest i oned the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s  p o l i c y  
i n  the Far Ea s t .  U l t r a c o n s e r v a t i v e  Rober t  McCormick in 
his Chicago D a i l y  T r i bune  sought  not  onl y  the removal  of  
Acheson but  a l s o  Har ry  S . Truman. A Tr i bune  e d i t o r i a l  
suggested t h a t  t he r e  were s igns o f  "mental  d e t e r i o r a t i o n "  in
the P r e s i d e n t  and t h a t  he should "confess his  inadequacy  
72and r e s i g n .  " The besiegement  o f  Mr.  Acheson i n  p a r t i c u l a r
6 9 I b i d .  , pp.  366,  485.
E d i t o r i a l ,  Evening M o r l d - H e r a l d  (Omaha) ,
December 20 ,  1950,  p.  24.
^  E d l t o r i  a l , Was hi ngton P o s t , December 9 , 1 950,  
p. 12;  December 1 0,  1950 , p . 1B.
72 E d i t o r i a l ,  Chicago D a i l y  T r i b u n e , December 19,
1950,  s e c . 1 , p . 16.
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was u n j u s t i f i e d  in the sense t h a t  he was n e i t h e r  s o l e l y
r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  the n a t i o n ' s f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  nor ab l e  to
conform the r e s t  of  the wor l d to i t .  I t  can be said t h a t
the S e c r e t a r y  possessed immense stamina in wardi ng o f f  what
7 3
he c a l l e d  the " a t t a c k  o f  the ■ p r i m i t i v e s
Congressmen under took a second p a r t i s a n  move i n  
December when Prime M i n i s t e r  Clement  A t t l e e  came to Washing­
ton f o r  d i s c u s s i o n s .  A t l e e  asked f o r  the meet ing s h o r t l y  
a f t e r  Truman had done some s a b e r - r a t t l i n g  w i t h  n u c l e a r  bombs.  
The B r i t i s h  Prime M i n i s t e r  wanted c l a r i f i c a t i o n  o f  the
American i n t e n t i o n s  in the Far  East  and on European defense  
74measures.  T we n t y - f o u r  Republ i can Senators  proceeded
"wi t h  the ' 1000 per  c e n t  s up po r t '  o f  Senator  Wherry" to
prepare  a r e s o l u t i o n  demanding t h a t  Truman come to the
Senate f o r  i t s  advi ce  and consent  on any agreement  or  under -
7 5
st andi ng  made wi t h  A t t l e e .  N e i t h e r  Truman nor the n a t i o n a l  
press responded k i n d l y  to t he  r e q u e s t .  Most e d i t o r s  agreed  
t h a t  major  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  mat t e r s  r e q u i r e d  P r e s i d e n t i a l  
c o n s u l t a t i o n  wi t h  Congress but  r e j e c t e d  the r e s o l u t i o n  
because i t  went  beyond t h e  t r e a t y - m a k i n g  process and i n v o l v e d  
Congress in areas o f  a u t h o r i t y  r eser ved p r i m a r i l y  f o r  the  
e x e c u t i v e  branch.  The Washington Post  c a l l e d  the Republ i can
^ A c h e s o n ,  Pr esent  a t  the C r e a t i o n , p.  364.
7 4 1 b l d . ,  pp. 4 7 8 - 7 9 .
75
Truman,  Memoirs , I I ,  410.
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76t a c t i c  more "mischievous than c o n s t r u c t i v e . "
A f t e r  Senate approval  of  the North A t l a n t i c  Pact  in  
1949 l i t t l e  was sai d about  sending new American ground f or ces  
to Europe.  Ta l k  of  such a c t i o n  o c c a s i o n a l l y  made the news­
papers ,  but  i t  was not  f r o n t  page m a t e r i a l .  Some i n t e r e s t  
was genera t ed when a m i l i t a r y  a n a l y s t  and Uni t ed S t a t e s  Army 
C h i e f  of  S t a f f  J . Lawton C o l l i n s  c a l l e d  on the A i r  Force to 
f u r n i s h  a d d i t i o n a l  t a c t i c a l  a i r  suppor t  f o r  the Uni t ed  
St a t e s  Army and the meager Western European ground f o r c e s . ^
However,  Europeans r a t h e r  than the Truman Admi n i s ­
t r a t i o n  made the e a r l y  c a l l s  f o r  American t r oops .  Even 
be f or e  the s i gn i ng  o f  t he  A t l a n t i c  a l l i a n c e  European l eader s  
asked f o r  more American t roops over  and above those serv i ng  
occupat i on duty in Germany.  Unnamed "European defense  
e x pe r t s "  a y e a r  l a t e r  in A p r i l ,  1950,  suggested t h a t  Uni t ed  
St a t e s  ground f or c es  be sent  to Europe under the a l l i a n c e .  
V i c e - P r e s i d e n t  Alben Bar k l ey  gave the onl y  h i n t  t h a t  the  
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  might  do so.  He l a t e r  c l a r i f i e d  i t ,  say i ng ,
" I  did not have in mind any ex t e ns i on  o f  our occupat i on  
f o r c e s ,  w i t h  the po s s i b l e  e x c ept i on  t h a t  some of  the c o u n t r i e s  
in the Nor th A t l a n t i c  Pact  might  ask f o r  some American  
f o r c es  to be s t a t i o n e d  w i t h i n  them to help round out  t h e i r
7^Edi  t o r i  al  , Dal l as Morning News, December 9,  1950,  
sec . I l l ,  p. 2;  E d i t o r i a l ,  S t . Lou i s P o s t - D i s b a t c h ,
December 8 , 1950 , p . 2C; E d i t o r i a l , Washi ngton Pos t ,
December 8 , 1950,  p. 26.
^ New York T i me s , May 22,  1950,  p. 7; Hanson Bal dwi n,  
"Flaw in Pact  De f ense , "  New York T i me s , A p r i l  1 3,  1 950,  p. 2.
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de f e ns e s . "  At  the May,  1950,  meet ing of  the Nor th A t l a n t i c  
Counci  1 , s o - c a l l e d  a u t h o r i t a t i v e  sources r e p o r t e d  t h a t  the  
Uni ted S t a t e s  would not  i ncrease the si  ze of  i ts  army f o r
*7 Q
the defense pac t .
In f a c t ,  j u s t  p r i o r  to the Korean a t t a c k ,  opt imism
f o r  peace a c t u a l l y  grew.  P r e s i d e n t  Truman d e c l a r ed  the
wor l d  was c l o s e r  to peace than a t  any t ime s i nce 1945.
T e s t i f y i n g  i n  b e h a l f  o f  t he  second mi 1 i t a r y  a i d  program
General  Br adl ey  a f f i r m e d  t h a t  Western European defenses had
improved t h e . l a s t  y e a r .  S e c r e t a r y  o f  Defense Johnson
b e l i e v e d  t h a t  a smal l  European ground f o r c e  was s u f f i c i e n t
to c o n t a i n  Russia i n  the e a r l y  phases o f  an i n v a s i o n ,  and
S e c r e t a r y  of  S t a t e  Acheson t o l d  Congress t h a t  "huge standi ng
armies"  were not  necessary  f o r  the defense of  Western
Europe.  In c o n t r a s t ,  the famed m i l i t a r y  a f f a i r s  w r i t e r ,
Hanson Ba l dwi n ,  po i nt ed g l o omi l y  to the " t i s s u e  paper"
7 9
defense of  Europe.
Nor th Korea doused the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s  opt imism on 
June 25,  1950.  Two days l a t e r  the Uni t ed Nat i ons  asked f o r  
an immediate c e a s e - f i r e  and wi t hdr awa l  of  North Korean 
f o r c e s  f rom south o f  t he  38th p a r a l l e l .  Truman ordered  
American a i r  and naval  f o r c e s  i n t o  Korea,  and on June 30,
7 8 1b i d . , A p r i l  11 , 1949,  p. 1 ; A p r i l  10 ,  1950,  p. 1 ;
May 23,  1 950,  p. 4;  May 1 9,  1 950,  p. 1.
79Tbj_d. , June 6 , 1950,  p.  3; June 7,  1950,  p. 1;
Hanson Bal dwi n ,  "Defenses o f  the West , "  New York T i me s ,
June 8 , 1950,  p . 6 .
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Uni t ed  S t a t es  ground f o r c e s  were thrown i n t o  the b a t t l e .
The P r e s i d e n t  q u i c k l y  drew an a s s o c i a t i o n  which may 
or  may not  have been c o r r e c t :
From the very  beg i nn i ng of  the Korean a c t i o n  I 
had always looked a t  i t  as a Russian maneuver ,  as 
p a r t  of  the Kr e ml i n ' s  plan to dest r oy  the u n i t y  of  
the f r e e  wor l d .  NATO, the Russians knew, would 
succeed on l y  i f  the Un i t ed  St a t es  took p a r t  in the  
defense of  Europe.  The e a s i e s t  way to keep us f rom 
doing our share in NATO was to draw us i n t o  m i l i t a r y  
c o n f l i c t  in A s i a . 80
Throughout  the e a r l y  years  o f  the Cold War the press
i mp r i n t e d  on the American mind the m o n o l i t h i c  na t ur e  o f  the
Communist wor l d .  Readers could not  help but  t h i n k  Joseph
S t a l i n  was the o r c h e s t r a t o r  o f  e ve n t s .
Europe responded i mme d i a t e l y ,  v o c a l l y  but  not  
mi 1 i t a r i l y . General  Char i  es de Gaul 1 e vi  ewed the ■.■Communi-s.t 
a t t a c k  on Korea as a p r e p a r a t i o n  f o r  an a t t a c k  on Europe and 
c a l l e d  upon the Western wor l d  to prepare  f o r  war .  Winston  
C h u r c h i l l  induced more f e a r  wi t h  his a n a l y s i s  t h a t  Western  
European defenses were a t  a lower  l e v e l  than South Korea ' s  
had been.  There was n o t ,  however ,  u n i v e r s a l  b e l i e f  t h a t  a 
S o v i e t  t h r e a t  to Europe e x i s t e d .  John J.  McCloy,  Un i t ed  
St a t e s  High Commissioner  in Germany,  wh i l e  d e s i r i n g  more 
t r o o p s , did not  be 1 i eve  Western Germany would be a t t a c k e d .  
Acheson c a l l e d  a NATO Counci l  meet ing in an e f f o r t  to 
i n c r e a s e  the European c o n t r i b u t i o n  o f  f o r ces  on the
o n  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Truman,  Memoi rs , I I ,  437.
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81c o n t i n e n t .  He l a t e r  r e mi n i s c e d ,  "When the r e p l i e s  were 
t a b u l a t e d ,  even i n c l u d i n g  s u b s t a n t i a l  B r i t i s h  and French 
e f f o r t s ,  the t o t a l  a v a i l a b l e  on the c e n t r a l  f r o n t  in Europe 
f e l l  f a r  shor t  of  any candid mi 1 i t a r y  view of  an adequate  
de f e nse . " ®^
On September 8 , 1950,  Senator  Henry Cabot  Lodge,
Republ i can f rom Massachuset t s ,  proposed an A t l a n t i c  Pact
m i l i t a r y  f o r c e  c o n t a i n i n g  one d i v i s i o n  of  Uni t ed St a t es
t roops f o r  every  two European d i v i s i o n s  f u r n i s h e d .  Lodge
had some knowledge o f  mi 1 i t a r y  o p e r a t i o n s , and he,  l i k e  some
o t h e r s ,  a r r i v e d  a t  a f i g u r e  of  s i x t y  d i v i s i o n s  as the t o t a l
s t r e n g t h  needed to r e s i s t  a gg r e s s i o n .  He opted f o r  such a
m i l i t a r y  ar rangement  because i t  would improve the s p i r i t  o f
Europe and i t  would be cheaper  than a l l o w i n g  the c o n t i n e n t
83to be over run and then l i b e r a t e d .  Senator  T a f t  supported  
the Lodge proposal  to i nc r e a s e  the s t r e n g t h  o f  t he  Uni t ed  
St a t e s  Army to t h i r t y  d i v i s i o n s  but  was r e l u c t a n t  to send any 
o f  them to E u r o p e . ^
In August ,  1950 the Pentagon submi t t ed  a "one package"
* ^ New York T i me s , J u l y  12,  1950,  p. 14;
J u l y  28,  1 950,  p. 5; J u l y  8 , 1 950,  p. 5;  and J u l y  16,  1 950,
s e c . I V , p . 3.
op .......... ......  .........
Acheson,  Present  a t  the C r e a t i o n , p. 436.
83 U . S . ,  Congress , 8 1 s t  Cong. ,  2nd sess . , Congress i o -  
na1 Re c o r d , XCVI , 14396- 98 .  H e r e a f t e r  c i t e d  as Congressional  
R e c o r d , XCV I .
^ New York T i me s , September 1 0 ,  1 950,  p. 11.
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proposal  which c a l l e d  f o r  "bee f i ng  up" European defense w i t h
American t roops and more m i l i t a r y  a i d ,  the i n c l u s i o n  o f  a
85German Army,  and a u n i f i e d  command over  a l l  NATO u n i t s .
On September 9,  1950,  P r e s i d e n t  Truman,  a f t e r  c o n s u l t i n g  
wi t h  the J o i n t  Ch i e f s  o f  S t a f f ,  r e l e a s e d  a s t a t ement  i n  which 
he announced " s u b s t a n t i a l  i nc r eases  in the s t r e n g t h  of  
Uni t ed  S t a t es  f o r c e s  to be s t a t i o n e d  in Western Europe in 
the i n t e r e s t  o f  the defense of  t h a t  a r e a . "  He expected the 
European p a r t n e r s  to make s i m i l a r  t roop i ncr eases  in good
o c
f a i t h .  The d e c i s i o n  evoked l i t t l e  immediate response,
e i t h e r  f a v o r a b l e  or  u n f a v o r a b l e .  The New York Times
acknowledged the a c t i o n  as mere l y  a r eassurance  to Europeans
o  7
t h a t  Korea had not  removed our commitment to them.
S e c r e t a r y  Acheson a few days l a t e r  o f f e r e d  the one-  
package proposal  to the Nor th A t l a n t i c  C o u n c i l .  The f o r e i g n  
m i n i s t e r s  welcomed the t roops and a i d and began to work out  
plans to br i ng  the i n t e g r a t e d  f or ces  under one command. The 
quest i on  o f  German p a r t i c i p a t i o n  was anot her  m a t t e r .
B r i t a i n  agreed in p r i n c i p l e  but  held many r e s e r v a t i o n s ;
France could not  even agree in p r i n c i p l e .  Truman and the  
Congress prov i ded - a n ' a d d i t i o n a l - - f o u r / b i l l  ion d o l l a r s  in
85 ...............
Acheson,  Pr esent  a t  the C r e a t i o n , p. 437.
^ U . S . ~ ,  Truman Pu b l i c  Pa p e r s , 1 950,  p. 626.




m i l i t a r y  a i d  l a t e  in September .
Uni t ed  Nat i ons f o r c es  r e c o i l e d  a month l a t e r  when 
Chi nese Communi s t  d i v i s i o n s  i n t e r v e n e d  in Kor e a . The 
Chinese c o u n t e r - o f f e n s i v e  s t a l emat ed  the e a r l  i er'  mi 1 i t a r y  
successes and e v e n t u a l l y  c o n t r i b u t e d  to an ever  growing  
f r u s t r a t i o n  wi t h  the war and the Truman f o r e i g n  p o l i c y .
When, on December 1,  the P r e s i d e n t  asked Congress f o r  
a d d i t i o n a l  defense a p p r o p r i a t i o n s  the Washington Post  
d e c l a r e d  t h a t  a " w a i t - a n d - s e e  p o l i c y "  was no l on ge r  a c c e p t ­
a b l e .  "We must be prepared f o r  the w o r s t , "  sa i d  the P o s t ,
"and t h a t  i mp l i e s  something a ppr ox i mat i ng  a l l  out
89m o b i l i z a t i o n . "  The more a r d e n t  suppor t ers  o f  the Truman
p o l i c i e s  c a l l e d  f o r  d r a s t i c  measures.  E d i t o r s  o f  the
A t l a n t a  C o n s t i t u t i o n  wanted a " r ea l  armed f o r c e "  and the
90d e c l a r a t i o n  o f  a s t a t e  of  emergency;  Denver Post  e d i t o r s  
demanded passage o f  a u n i v e r s a l  m i l i t a r y  t r a i n i n g  law and
g l
new taxes to c r e a t e  the necessary  war machine.  Even the  
more moderate Dal l as News suppor ted immediate p r i c e  and
^ ^ 1b i d . , September 1 9,  1 950,  p. 14;
September 27,  1950,  p. 12;  September 28,  1950,  p.  12.
89
E d i t o r i a l ,  Washington P o s t , December 3,  1950,
p . 8B.
90
E d i t o r i a l  , A t l a n t a  C o n s t i t u t i o n , December 6 , 1950,  
p. 12;  December 13,  1950 ,  p. 16.
91 E d i t o r i a l ,  Denver  P o s t , December 8 , 1950,  p. 20.
37
92wage c o n t r o l s .
At  mid-December the P r e s i d e n t  proc l a i med a n a t i o n a l
emergency,  no t i n g  t h a t  the danger  e x i s t e d  i n  Europe as wel l
as in Korea.  The l e a de r s  of  the S o v i e t  Union had c r e a t e d
the s i t u a t i o n ,  but  the P r e s i d e n t  would "not  engage in
appeasement"*,  i n s t e a d ,  he proposed e n l a r g i n g  the m i l i t a r y .
Bef ore  the Korean a t t a c k  1 .5 m i l l i o n  men were in the Army,
Navy,  and A i r  F o r c e - - t h e  P r e s i d e n t ' s  goal  was to i nc r e a s e
93
t h a t  to 3 . 5  m i l l i o n  men. The n a t i o n a l  emergency brought
out  Truman' s _more a ggr es s i v e  o p p o s i t i o n .  Colonel  Rober t
McCormick' s paper ,  the C h i c a g o D a i 1y T r i b une , a t t a c k e d  the
C h i e f  Ex e c u t i v e  saying t h a t  he was " l e a d i n g  the na t i on
toward a d d i t i o n a l  g i g a n t i c  d e f e a t s  on o t h e r  f o r e i g n  b a t t l e -  
94f i e l d s . "  The Omaha World Her a l d  saw the n a t i o n  being  
t ur ned i n t o  a g a r r i s o n  s t a t e  in which " i n d i v i d u a l  f reedom of
95a c t i o n  w i l l  be s u s p e n d e d - - f o r  how many y e a r s ,  nobody knows."
Meanwhi1e , i n  December S e c r e t a r y  Acheson a t t ended  
a Nor th A t l a n t i c  Counci l  meet ing in Br us s e l s .  The 
Conference marked the change from a paper  a l l i a n c e  w i t h  a 
somewhat vague s t r a t e g y  to a f u l f l e d g e d ,  s t r u c t u r e d  m i l i t a r y
92 E d i t o r i a l , Da l l a s  Morning News, December 6 , 1950,  
s e c . I l l ,  p. 2.
q q ......
U . S . , Truman Publ i c  P a p e r s , 1 950 ,  pp.  7 4 1 - 47 .
g4 ...................... ......
E d i t o r i a l  , Chicago D a i l y  T r i b u n e , December 1 7,  1 950,  
s e c . I , p . 14.
QC  ""■■■
E d i t o r i a l ,  Evening Wo r i d - H e r a  1d (Omaha)
December 18,  1950,  p. 12.
o r g a n i z a t i o n  w i t h  f o r c e s  in be i ng.  I t  was no l onger  a
ma t t e r  o f  n a t i o n a l  armies working i n d e p e n d e n t l y ;  i t  was now
an i n t e r n a t i o n a l ,  or  European army,  composed of  u n i t s  f rom
the n a t i o n a l  a r mi es .  Regarding the s t r u c t u r e  and t r oop
composi t i on of  t h a t  army Acheson s a i d ,  " A l l  o f  those mat t e r s
were d e a l t  w i t h  . . . and a l l  . . w e r e  acted upon" at  
96Br u s s e l s .  L a t e r ,  many Congressmen quest i oned what kind
o f  commitment Acheson had made a t  the c on f e r e nce .  In his
memoirs Acheson noted t h a t  t roops were "assigned"  but  did
not  c l a r i f y  f u l l y  whet her  they were c o n t r i b u t i o n s  in
p r i n c i p l e  or  were in f a c t  commitments of  s p e c i f i c  numbers 
97o f  t r o o p s .  The Brussel s  Conference was unable to s e t t l e
the qu e s t i on  o f  German p a r t i c i p a t i o n ,  a ma t t e r  t h a t  was
prol onged f o r  se v er a l  y e a r s .  L a s t l y ,  the Counci l  asked
98Dwight  D. Eisenhower  to serve as Supreme Commander.
Dwight  Eisenhower  a t  t h a t  t ime was P r e s i d e n t  of
Columbia U n i v e r s i t y .  He had had a l i m i t e d  a s s o c i a t i o n  w i t h
99the newl y- formed Commit tee on the Present  Danger ,  but  
was very  a c t i v e  on the Counci l  on Fore ign R e l a t i o n s .
Q£
New York T i m e s , December 23,  1950,  p.  3.
97 Acheson,  Pr esent  a t  the C r e a t i o n , p.  487.
q o
New York T i m e s , December 20,  1 950,  p.  10.
99 The Commit tee on the Pr esent  Danger was formed by 
a group o f  u n i v e r s i t y  p r e s i d e n t s ,  newspaper e d i t o r s ,  and 
business l e a d e r s .  I t  was c r e a t e d  because o f  S o v i e t  
aggress i veness  and c a l l e d  f o r  such t h i ng s  as the j o i n t  
def ense o f  Europe and u n i v e r s a l  m i l i t a r y  s e r v i c e .
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Eisenhower  was aware t h a t  he was being cons i der ed f o r  the  
p o s i t i o n  of  Supreme Commander and was a f r a i d  t h a t  he might  
command an army of  no substance .  Before his appoi ntment  
the Counci l  on Fore i gn R e l a t i o n s  submi t ted a l e t t e r ,  through  
W. A v e r e l l  Har r i man,  to the P r e s i d e n t .  O s t e n s i b l y  the  
l e t t e r  was a product  of  the C o u n c i l ,  but  in essence i t  was 
Eisenhower  a i r i n g  his  personal  v i ews.  The s i gner s  of  the  
l e t t e r  saw the wor ld f a l l i n g  a p a r t  in the f ace  of  S o v i e t  
imper i  a l i  sm , and they made s ever a l  recommendat i  o n s .
The on l y  way in which we and our  f r i e n d s  can 
make the Sov i e t s  r e s p e c t  our  peacef ul  i n t e n t  and 
moral  purposes w i l l  be by r a p i d l y  producing powerful  
mi 1 i t a r y  f o r c es  .
The U.S.  must n o t ,  under any c i r c u ms t a n c e s ,  
accept  n a t i o n a l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  m i l i t a r y  command 
i n  Europe except  as a consequence o f  the mutual  
conf i dence  engendered by a concr e t e  program f o r  the  
mobi1 i z a t i o n  of  f o r c es  in Nor th America and in West  
European c o u n t r i e s  backed by government  pledges of
prompt e x e c u t i o n . ‘ 00
When the t r o o p s - f o r - E u r o p e  i ssue broke i n t o  the open 
P r e s i d e n t  Truman sent  General  Eisenhower  to Europe in  
J a nu a r y ,  1951 on a f a c t - f i n d i n g  t o u r  to de t ermi ne  i f  Amer i ­
can t roops were indeed necessary .  From the above l e t t e r  i t  
i s  c l e a r  where Eisenhower  stood a l r e a d y  in December.  His 
f a c t - f i n d i n g  mi ss i on in no way changed his  mind.
Memorandum by Henry M. Wr i s t o n ,  "Eisenhower  Study  
Group l e t t e r  to P r e s i d e n t  Truman December 12,  1950 , "
A p r i l  22,  1968,  Wr iston Memorandum F i l e ,  Eisenhower  P a p e r s , 
Dwight  D. Eisenhower  L i b r a r y .
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For such l e a de r s  as Truman and Acheson the events  
o f  the postwar  years  came f a s t  and u n p r e d i c t a b l y . The 
opt imism o f  Un i t ed  Nat i ons  c o l l e c t i v e  s e c u r i t y  soon gave way 
to r e t r enc hme nt  in c o l l e c t i v e  defense through a r e g i o n a l  
a l l i a n c e .  No m a t t e r  how r e a s s u r i n g  the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  
sounded,  t h e r e  was a c reep i ng  f r u s t r a t i o n  e a t i n g  away 
c o n f i d e n c e .  Fore i gn p o l i c y  r e v e r s a l s  c o n t r i b u t e d  to t h i s ,  
but  t he r e  a l so  were those who were y e t  u n w i l l i n g  to assume 
l e a d e r s h i p  and r espons i b i l - i t y . - on-  t h e - I n t e r n a t i o n a l  scene.
For those o r i e n t e d  towards i s o l a t i o n i s m  a i r  power and the  
n u c l e a r  bomb appeared to be a s imple  y e t  d e c i s i v e  s o l u t i o n .  
The n e w l y - e s t a b l i s h e d  A i r  For ce ,  f i n d i n g  s u b s t a n t i a l  
s u p p o r t ,  not  on l y  accepted i t s  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  but  d e s i r e d  
t o  e n l a r g e  i t .  I ncr eased defense du t i e s  a t  the expense of  
t he  o t h e r  s e r v i c e s  meant A i r  Force expansi on.  The n e c e s s i t y  
o f  b i p a r t i s a n s h i p  to pr osecute  World War I I  had g i ven way 
to the needs o f  the i n d i v i d u a l  p a r t i e s .  Republ i cans yearned  
to r e g a i n  c o n t r o l  of  the Whi te House,  and the c o n s e r v a t i v e  
f a c t i o n  o f  the GOP condemned the "me- too" approach of  the  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s t  wing o f  the p a r t y .  More than anyt h i ng the  
Korean War bred f r u s t r a t i o n  and gave Truman's foes the 
impetus to change the n a t i o n ' s  d i r e c t i o n .  Truman had p r o ­
duced a near  r e v o l u t i o n  in American f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  and many 
now f e l t  i t  was t ime to r e - exami ne  t h a t  p o l i c y .
CHAPTER I I
The Re- exami na t i on  o f  the Truman 
Fore ign P o l i c y  Begins
C o n s e r v a t i v e s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  the r i g h t  wing elements  
of  the Republ i can P a r t y ,  were the main opponents o f  Truman's  
f o r e i g n  p o l i c i e s .  Among these a smal l  but  m i l i t a n t  f a c t i o n  
hammered i n s i s t e n t l y  at  the P r e s i d e n t ' s  programs.  The 
a n t i - A d m i n i s t r a t i  on group was r e l a t i v e l y  smal1 in number 
and r e l i e d  h e a v i l y  upon a handful  o f  t h e i r  most vocal  
members.  That  i s  not  to say t her e  were no Democrats oppo­
sing the P r e s i d e n t ,  f o r  he had suppor t  and o p p o s i t i o n  on 
both s i des of  t he  a i s l e .
No one i n c i d e n t  or  event  spont aneousl y  touched o f f  
t he deba t e ;  r a t h e r ,  as noted in the l a s t  c h a p t e r ,  i t  was an 
accumul a t i on  o f  growing a n x i e t i e s .  Besides the p a r t i s a n  
moves,  the Korean War,  e s p e c i a l l y  a f t e r  the m i l i t a r y  
r e v e r s a l s  in November,  pr ov i ded the d i s s i d e n t s  an opening.  
Joseph Kennedy and Thomas Dewey se t  the tone of  the debate  
i n  s e p a r a t e  speeches on December 12 and 14,  1950,  r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  
when they se t  f o r t h  d i v e r g e n t  p o l i c i e s  f o r  the c ount r y .
Joseph Kennedy,  a Democrat,  businessman, and f ormer  
ambassador dur i ng  F r a n k l i n  Roosevel  t ' s admi ni  s t r a t i o n s , openly  
broke w i t h  his p a r t y ' s  P r e s i d e n t  i n  a speech be f or e  the
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U n i v e r s i t y  o f  V i r g i n i a  Law School .  As e a r l y  as 1946 he 
began advoca t i ng  an i nc r e a s e  in the n a t i o n ' s  m i l i t a r y  
s t r e n g t h  w h i l e  r e f r a i n i n g  f rom making f o r e i g n  commitments 
which could not  be f u l f i l l e d .  By 1950 he viewed economic 
a i d  as unpr oduc t i ve  and the Western European armies as 
mi 1 i t a r i 1y i n c o mp e t e n t . He compared t h i s  s i t u a t i o n  w i t h  the  
a l l e g e d  s t r e n g t h  of  the S o v i e t  Union and d e c l a r e d  t h a t  any 
engagement  of  Russian f o r c es  would be " s u i c i d a l . "  The 
money spent  in Europe,  he contended,  could have been put  to 
b e t t e r  use in t h i s  hemisphere.  He c a l l e d  f o r  the Uni ted  
St a t e s  to r e t u r n  to his  1946 f undament a l s .  In doing so,  
the Un i t ed  St a t es  would ge t  out  of  Korea,  " i nd e e d ,  . 
g e t  out  of  every  p o i n t  in Asia which we do not  plan r e a l i s ­
t i c a l l y  to hold i n  our own d e f e n s e . "  Thi s  same p o l i c y  was 
to be a p p l i e d  to Europe. ^
Response to the Kennedy speech was by no means
voluminous.  The Truman c r i t i c s  noted i t  but  d i d  not
i mme d i a t e l y  use i t .  The Wal l  S t r e e t  Journal  and Sea111e
Post  I n t e l l i g e n c e r  agreed wi t h  Kennedy t h a t  the n a t i o n ' s
2f o r e i g n  commitments should be r ev i ewed and reduced.  On the 
o t h e r  hand,  col umni s t s  Joseph and St ewar t  Alsop condemned
^Joseph P. Kennedy,  " Pr esent  P o l i c y  is P o l i t i c a l l y  
and M o r a l l y  Bankrupt ;  Un i t ed  Nat i ons  Not a V e h i c l e  to 
Enforce Peace, "  V i t a l  Speeches of  the Day,  XV11 
( January  1,  1 9 5 1 ) ,  1 7 1 - 7 2 .
^ E d i t o r i a l  , Wal l  S t r e e t  Journal  , December 14,  1 950,  
p. 10;  E d i t o r i a l ,  S e a 1 1 1e Post  In t e l  1 Tge n c e r ,
December 26,  1950,  p. IB.
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the f or mer  d i p l oma t  f o r  want ing to g i ve  the wor ld to the
Communists.  They w r o t e ,  "Under normal  c i r c ums t a nce s ,  t h e r e
would be no g r e a t  i n t e r e s t  in the p o l i t i c a l  views of  a
successf u l  stock market  s p e c u l a t o r  who makes i t  a h a b i t  to
3
propose s ur r en der  whenever  sur r e nde r  i s  f e a s i b l e . "
Two days a f t e r  the Kennedy speech Governor  Thomas E.
Dewey of  New York present ed his  plan of  a c t i o n .  He l i k e ­
wise po i n t ed  to Ru s s i a ' s  a l l e g e d  m i l i t a r y  s t r e n g t h ,  but  
i n s t e a d  o f  r e t r e a t  he c a l l e d  f o r  n a t i o n a l  m o b i l i z a t i o n  in  
the Un i t e d  S t a t es  t he r eby  p r o v i d i n g  the l e a d e r s h i p  f o r
Western Europe to rearm.  Not i ng the Uni t ed  St a t e s  Army had
onl y  ten a c t i v e  d i v i s i o n s ,  he demanded an Army of  "not  l ess
than 100 d i v i s i o n s "  and an A i r  Force o f  " a t  l e a s t  80 gr oups . "
Only through mi 1 i t a r y  s t r e n g t h  could the Uni t ed  St a t es
e f f e c t i v e l y  n e g o t i a t e  w i t h  S t a l i n .  Europe,  not  the Far
4E a s t ,  was,  in his words,  the r ea l  p r i z e .
The opening round of  debate thus ended wi t h  a 
c o n s e r v a t i v e  Democrat  r e j e c t i n g  Truman f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  and 
a "me- too" Republ i can backing the P r e s i d e n t ' s  f or t hcomi ng  
c a l l  f o r  a n a t i o n a l  emergency.  The Kennedy-Dewey speeches 
aroused scant  pu b! i c  a t t e n t i o n  when compared to an address
3
Joseph & S t e w a r t . Alsop ,■ "Kennedy Plan Would Hand
World to Reds, "  St .  Louis Post  D i s p a t c h , December 26,  1950,
p . IB.
4Thomas E. Dewey,  " N a t i o n a l  M o b i l i z a t i o n ;  A Plan of  
A c t i o n , "  V i t a l  Speeches o f  the Day,  XVI I  (January  1,  1 9 5 1 ) ,  
167 - 70 .
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which H e r b e r t  Hoover made a week l a t e r .
The f or mer  P r e s i d e n t ,  w h i l e  a c t i n g  on his p r e v i o u s l y
e s t a b l i s h e d  p r i n c i p l e s *  gave the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s  c r i t i c s  a
shot  in the arm. He had long opposed f o r e i g n  i nvo l vement
which might  l ead to war because i t  undermined the economic
s t a b i l i t y  o f  the c o u n t r y . In 1938 he s a i d ,  "We should not
engage ours e l ves  to use m i l i t a r y  f o r c e  in endeavor  to
5
pr event  or  end o t h e r  p e o p l e ' s  wars . "  He o b j e c t e d  to
m i l i t a r y  a l l i a n c e s  because they promoted the s t a t u s  quo,
caused opponents to form c o u n t e r - a l l i a n c e s ,  and c r e a t e d  a
f e a r  which induced g r e a t e r  armament.  As a r e s u l t  m i l i t a r y
fia l l i a n c e s  "produced many wars but  never  a l a s t i n g  peace. "  
Fo l l owi ng  World War I I  he beseeched the na t i on  to conserve  
i t s  r esources and end i t s  r o l e  as Santa C l a u s . ^  In 1945 
Truman asked Hoover to r e t u r n  to government  s e r v i c e  and help  
sol ve  the food problem i n Europe.  A c l ose  personal  f r i e n d ­
ship developed between Truman and Hoover ,  a r e l a t i o n s h i p  
which could never  have been r e a l i z e d  between Rooseve l t  and 
Hoover .  Hoover was t h a n k f u l  f o r  being brought  back to 
5H e r b e r t  Hoover ,  Addresses Upon the American Road, 
1933-1 938 (New York : Char i es  Ser i  b n e r 1s Sons , 1 9 3 8 ) ,
p . 306.
^ He r b e r t  Hoover ,  Addresses Upon the American Road,
1941 - 1945  (New York:  D. Van No s t r and  Company, I n c . ,  1 9 4 5 ) ,
pp . 9 7 - 1 0 2 .
^He r be r t  Hoover ,  Addresses Upon the American Road, 
1945- 1948  (New York:  D. Van Nostrand Company, I n c . ,  1 9 4 9 ) ,
p. 21 .
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p u b l i c  s e r v i c e ,  but  h i s  p r i n c i p l e s  did not  change.  In
f o r e i g n  a f f a i r s  he f avor ed  j o i n i n g  the Uni t ed  Nat i ons  but
was u n w i l l i n g  to ge t  too deepl y  i nv o l v e d  in o t her  
8commitments.  He b e l i e v e d  a war w i t h  Russia would br i ng  
about  the e x t i n c t i o n  o f  Western c i v i l i z a t i o n ,  and t o l d  
Truman he "had no p a t i e n c e  wi t h  people who f o r mu l a t e d
9p o l i c i e s  in r e s p e c t  to o t h e r  na t i ons  ‘ shor t  of  w a r . * "
A c t u a l l y ,  Hoover was one o f  the f i r s t  to c o n f r o n t  
openl y  the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s  plan f o r  sending American  
t roops  to Europe.  He di d  so l a t e  in October  be f o r e  the  
n a t i o n a l  e l e c t i o n  buoyed Republ i can s p i r i t s  and be f o r e  the  
r e v e r s e s  i n  Korea.  At  t h a t  t ime he r e s i s t e d  the i dea of  
shor i ng  up Western European defense w i t h  American t roops  
because in the event  o f  war i t  would r e s u l t  in the  
" s l a u g h t e r  o f  American boys . . . “ He wanted no American  
ground f o r c es  on the c o n t i n e n t  u n t i l  a " s u f f i c i e n t "
European army was i n  s i g h t . ^
I t  was a f t e r  the Kennedy-Dewey addresses ,  however ,  
when the na t i on  gave Hoover i t s  f u l l  a t t e n t i o n .  On a 
na t i o n w i d e  r a d i o  b r o a d c a s t ,  December 20,  1950,  he ennunci a ted  
what  p o p u l a r l y  became known as the F o r t r e s s  Ameri  ca t he s i  s .
8 I b i d .
9Memorandum by H e r b e r t  Hoover on meet ing w i t h
Har r y  S. Truman,  May 28,  1945,  H. S. Truman F i l e  - ( 1 9 4 5 - 1 9 4 6 ) *
P o s t - P r e s i d e n t i a l  Papers ,  H e r b e r t  Hoover P r e s i d e n t i a l  
Li  b r a r y .
^ New York T i m e s , October  20 ,  1950,  p.  12.
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Communist m i l i t a r y  s t r e n g t h ,  accor di ng to the f or mer  
P r e s i d e n t ,  was "pr obab l y  over  300 t r a i n e d  and equipped  
combat d i v i s i o n s . "  How he a r r i v e d  a t  t h a t  f i g u r e  is u n c l e a r  
but  he a dmi t t e d  i t  i nc l uded  the Communist f o r c es  in Europe 
and A s i a .  He then observed t h a t  a NATO f o r c e  o f  s i x t y  
d i v i s i o n s  could never  reach Moscow. Aga i n ,  he never  
e x p l a i n e d  who was proposing to invade Russia and a t t e mpt  t o  
t ake  Moscow, but  by i n t e r j e c t i n g  such an idea he i m p l i e d ,  
u n j u s t l y ,  t h a t  the s t r a t e g y  emanated f rom e i t h e r  the Truman 
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  or  the A t l a n t i c  Pact  n a t i o n s .  As an a l t e r ­
n a t i v e ,  he o f f e r e d  his  own plan as f o l l o w s .  F i r s t ,  e s t a b l i s h  
a "Western Hemisphere G i b r a l t a r "  in the Americas to pr eser ve  
west er n  c i v i l i z a t i o n .  Second,  hold the A t l a n t i c ,  i n c l u d i n g  
B r i t a i n ,  and the P a c i f i c ,  i n c l u d i n g  Japan,  Formosa,  and the  
Phi 1 i p p i n e s ,  by means of  a i r  and naval  f o r c e s .  T h i r d ,  arm 
the A i r  Force and Navy " to the t e e t h . "  F o u r t h ,  having b u i l t  
the needed a i r  and naval  f o r c e s ,  the n a t i o n  could reduce  
e x p e n d i t u r e s  and bal ance the budget ,  t he r eby  av o i d i ng  
"economic d e g e n e r a t i o n . "  F i f t h ,  he wanted no more appease­
ment ,  "no more Teherans and no more Y a l t a s . "  S i x t h ,
Europeans were to c a r r y  t h e i r  own defense burdens.  Western  
Europe was to o r g a n i z e  an army " o f  such huge numbers as 
would e r e c t  a sure dam a g a i n s t  the red f l o o d .  And t h a t  
be f or e  we land anot her  man or  anot her  d o l l a r  on t h e i r  shores.
4 7
0 t h e r wi s e  we s h a l l  be i n v i t i n g  anot her  Kor ea . ^
P r e s i d e n t  Truman looked upon the proposa l s  as
12not hi ng but  " i s o l a t i o n i s m . 1 Many i n t e r p r e t e d  the speech 
in the same manner ,  y e t  Hoover d i f f e r e d  wi t h  those who 
sai d he wanted the Un i t ed  S t a t es  to wi thdr aw t o t a l l y  from 
Europe and As i a .  He f e l t  the As soc i a t ed  Press m i s r e p r e ­
sented his p o s i t i o n  and i n d i c a t e d  he was in f a v o r  o f
w i t h h o l d i n g  t roops and a i d  onl y  u n t i l  Western Europe had
13b u i l t  up i t s  own def enses .  In a p r i v a t e  l e t t e r  to Anne 
O' Hara McCormick o f  the New York Times he, r e i t e r a t e d  t h a t  
he had proposed t h r e e  l i n e s  of  de f ense .  The f i r s t  
i nc l ude d  Western Europe i f  those c o u n t r i e s  would "do 
something r e a l "  to e s t a b l i s h  a de f ense .  The second l i n e  
i nc l uded B r i t a i n ,  Japan,  Formosa,  and the P h i l i p p i n e s .
The t h i r d  1 ine was the two oceans— t he Western Hemisphere  
G i b r a l t a r . ^
The speech,  i ndeed,  genera t ed a t remendous amount
 ^  ^He r be r t  Hoover ,  Addresses Upon the American Road, 
1950-195  5 ( S t a n f o r d :  S t a n f or d  U n i v e r s i t y  Pr ess ,  1 9 5 5 ) ,
pp. 3 - 9 .  H e r e a f t e r  c i t e d  as Hoover ,  Addresses Upon the  
American Road,  1 9 5 0 - 1 9 5 5 .
12U . S . ,  Truman Pub l i c  P a p e r s , 1950,  p.  761.
13 Te l egram,  H e r b e r t  Hoover to A l l a n  Gol d,
January 2,  1951,  Pu b l i c  St atements 3262,  P o s t - P r e s i d e n t i a l  
Papers ,  H e r b e r t  Hoover P r e s i d e n t i a l  L i b r a r y .  A l l a n  Gold 
was the e d i t o r  of  the Assoc i a t ed  Press.
14 H e r b e r t  Hoover to Anne O' Hara McCormick,
December 29 , 1 950,  Pu b l i c  Statements 3262,  P o s t - P r e s i d e n t i a l  
Papers ,  H e r b e r t  Hoover P r e s i d e n t i a l  L i b r a r y .
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o f  comment.  Th i s  was r e f l e c t e d  not  on l y  in  the press but
a l s o  in  Hoover ' s  m a i l .  In a d d i t i o n  to personal  f r i e n d s  and
a d m i r e r s ,  a number of  Congressmen sent  l e t t e r s  of  s up po r t .
I n  response to a l e t t e r  f rom Senat or  Ri chard M. Ni xon,
Re publ i can  from C a l i f o r n i a ,  Hoover w r o t e ,  " a t  l e a s t  we have
15t he animals  s t i r r e d  u p ! 1 L i e u t e n a n t  General  A l b e r t  C. 
Wedemeyer , then out  of  f a v o r  w i t h  the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,  
b e l i e v e d  t h a t  under  a p a r l i a m e n t a r y  system of  government  
t he  Truman government  would i mmedi a t e l y  f a l l  i n f a v o r  of  
someone espousing the Hoover p o l i c y . ^  Through f r i e n d s  
Hoover l e a r ne d  of  General  E i senhower ' s  a p p r a i s a l  o f  the  
b r o a d c a s t .  Eisenhower  had wished more emphasis had been 
pl aced on the Un i t ed  St a t e s  p r o v i d i n g  t he  necessary  l e a d e r ­
s h i p  f o r  European defense e f f o r t s . ^7
Both the Admi ni s t r a t i o n  and the Hoover f o r c e s
c l a i me d p u b l i c  se nt i me nt  was r unni ng in t h e i r  f a v o r ,  and
18each d i s p u t e d  t he  f i g u r e s  c i t e d  by the o t h e r .  Truman
1 5 He r b e r t  Hoover to Ri chard Ni xon,  December 29,  1950,  
P u b l i c  St at ement s  3262,  P o s t - P r e s i d e n t i a l  Papers ,  H e r b e r t  
Hoover  P r e s i d e n t i a l  L i b r a r y .
^ A .  C. Wedemeyer to H e r b e r t  Hoover ,
December 19,  1950,  P u b l i c  Statements  3262,  P o s t - P r e s i d e n t i a l  
Paper s ,  H e r b e r t  Hoover P r e s i d e n t i a l  L i b r a r y .
^ L .  Ward Ba n n i s t e r  to He r be r t  Hoover ,
December 26,  1950,  Pu b l i c  St atements 3262,  P o s t - P r e s i d e n t i a l  
Pa pe r s ,  H e r b e r t  Hoover P r e s i d e n t i a l  L i b r a r y .  B a n n i s t e r ,  a 
Denver  a t t o r n e y ,  had v i s i t e d  Eisenhower  a f t e r  the Hoover  
s pe e c h .
18 E d i t o r i a l  , Evening World Heral d  (Omaha) ,
January  5 ,  1951 ,  p. 22.
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never  d i s c l o s e d  the bas i s  of  h i s  c o n t e n t i o n ;  however ,  
Hoover ' s  s t a f f  ga t her ed  the e d i t o r i a l  op i n i ons  of  over  642 
newspapers.  T h e i r  f i g u r e s  i n d i c a t e  377 papers were 
" t o t a l l y  f a v o r a b l e "  to the speech.  Based upon r e g i o n a l  
c i r c u l a t i o n  they found 67 per  cent  " f a v o r a b l e "  in the New 
England and Mi dd l e  A t l a n t i c  s t a t e s ,  32 per  cent  in the  
South and South A t l a n t i c  s t a t e s ,  84 per  cent  in the  
Sout hwest ,  Mountain and P a c i f i c  s t a t e s  , and 67 per  cent  in 
the Mi ddl e  West .  The na t i on wi de  suppor t  appeared i mpress i ve  
but  the computat i ons were in  f a c t  somewhat m i s l e a d i n g .
F i r s t ,  the c i r c u l a t i o n  f i g u r e s  of  the l a r g e r ,  more i n f l u e n ­
t i a l  papers were o f f s e t  by i n c l u d i n g  numerous papers having  
much s m a l l e r  c i r c u l a t i o n s .  For exampl e,  the Des Moines 
T r i b u n e ' s  (-145', 00Q ■. ci  r cu l  a t i o n  ) ' r e j e c t i o n  o f  the Hoover  
plan was count e r ba l a nc e d  by i n c l u d i n g  e l even  Iowa papers ,  
each having l ess  than 3 0 , 00 0  c i r c u l a t i o n ,  which suppor ted  
the former  P r e s i d e n t .  Second,  o t h e r  d i s c r e p a n c i e s  
appeared in such s t a t e s  as Mi ssour i  where the Kansas C i t y
19and St .  Louis papers were never  t a b u l a t e d  in the f i g u r e s .
In the f i n a l  a n a l y s i s  the Hoover s t a f f  p r obabl y  spent  more 
t ime compi l i ng  t h e i r  data  than did the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ;  
however t h e i r  s t a t i s t i c a l  a n a l y s i s  l e f t  something to be
19 Memorandum and worksheets  o f  Helene Lockwood,  
January 14, 1951,  Pu b l i c  St at ement s  3262,  Pos L-Pres i den t i a ' l  
Papers ,  H e r b e r t  Hoover P r e s i d e n t i a l  L i b r a r y .  Helene  
Lockwood was a member o f  Hoov er 1s s t a f f  who worked on the  
press response to his  December 20 speech.
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d e s i r e d .  I t  cannot  be denied t h a t  the e d i t o r s  gave
s u b s t a n t i a l  backing to Hoover ' s  i d e a s ,  but  the e xa c t
s t r e n g t h  i s  in q u e s t i o n .
E d i t o r i a l  response o f  a c r o s s - s e c t i o n  o f  major
papers can be broken down i n t o  those undeci ded,  those h i g h l y
f a v o r a b l e ,  and those f i n d i n g  f a u l t  w i t h  the program.  The
f i r s t  group i nc l uded  such papers as the Omaha Evening World
Heral  d , Los Angeles' 'Times , San Fr anc i sco C h r o n i c l e , and
D a l l a s  Morning S t a r . T h e i r  e d i t o r s ,  w h i l e  not  i mmedi a t e l y
v o i c i n g  t h e i r  suppor t  or  o p p o s i t i o n ,  viewed the speech as
food f o r  t h o u g h t ,  and some, a f t e r  c a r e f u l l y  r ead i ng  the
t e x t ,  even admi t t ed  t h a t  Hoover was not  n e c e s s a r i l y  f o r  the
20t o t a l  abandonment o f  Western Europe.  As the r e - e x a m i n a t i o n  
of  t he  n a t i o n ' s  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  progressed these papers did  
a l i g n  themselves w i t h  one camp or  a n o t h e r .  The c o n s e r v a t i v e  
Wal1 S t r e e t  J o u r n a l , S e a t t l e  Post  I n t e l  1 i gencer  , and 
Chicago Dai 1 y Tr i 'bune pl aced themselves f i r m l y  in the
21second group which s t r o n g l y  f a vor e d  the Hoover program.
S e a t t l e  Post  e d i t o r s  acknowledged the Hoover t h e s i s  as the
22embodiment o f  the He a r s t  newspaper ph i l os o ph y .  The
20 E d i t o r i a l ,  Evening Wo r l d - He r a l d  (Omaha) ,
December 21 , 1950,  p.  30 ; Edi t o r i  a 1 , San Fr anc i sco  C h r o n i c l e , 
December 21 , 1 950,  p. 20;  E d i t o r i a l  Da 11 as Morning News, 
December 21 , 1 950 , sec.  I l l ,  p . 2; E d i t o r i a l ,  Los Angeles  
Times , December 21,  1 950 ,  sec . I I ,  p. 4.
^ E d i t o r i a l ,  Wa l l  S t r e e t  Journal  , December 21 , 1 950,
p. 4 ,
22 E d i t o r i a l  , S e a t t l e  Post  I n t e l  1 i g e n c e r ,
December 25,  1950,  p, 10.
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v o c i f e r o u s  Chicago D a i l y  T r i bune  a l most  proc l a i med Hoover as
t he n a t i o n a l  s a v i o r .  Hoover ,  accor di ng to the paper ,  had
done a g r e a t  s e r v i c e  f o r  the c o u n t r y ,  but  i t  had earned him
"the e p i t h e t  o f  ' i s o l a t i o n i s t '  f rom a n e c k t i e  sa l esman. "
The McCormick paper  f u r t h e r  asked the n a t i on  not  to be
t r i c k e d  i n t o  f o l l o w i n g  the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  or  "a wayward
l i t t l e  f oo l  l i k e  Dewey.
The t h i r d  group was a t  l e a s t  s t r o n g l y  r e s i s t a n t ,
i f  not  u n a l t e r a b l y  opposed,  to Hoover ' s  p l a n .  The New York
Times and Washington Post  m i l d l y  rebuked the f ormer
24
P r e s i d e n t ' s  approach,  but  o t h e r  moderate and l i b e r a l  
papers commenced a f u l l - b l o w n  a t t a c k  on the F o r t r e s s  
America t h e s i s .  Ralph McG i 11 ,  edi  f o r  o f  the A t l a n t a  
Cons t i  tu t i  o n , c a l l e d  the plan " f a n t a s t i c a l l y  f a t a l  and
25
immature" because i t  gave the S o v i e t  Union the i n i t i a t i v e .
The S t .  Louis Post  D i spat ch  accused Hoover o f  undoing the  
good accompl ished a t  the December Brussel s  conf er ence
o c
because he was c a l l i n g  f o r  a r e t u r n  to i s o l a t i o n i s m .
. E d i t o r i a l , ,  Chi c a g o " D a i l y  T r i  bune , December 22,  1950,  
sec.  I ,  p. 14;  January 4 ,  1951,  sec.  I ,  p. 18.
24 E d i t o r i a l ,  New York T i me s , December 21,  1950,  
p. 28;  E d i t o r i a l  Washington P o s t , December 22,  1950,  p.  24.
25 Edi t o r i  a l , A t ! a n t a  Const i  t u t i o n , December 26 , 1 950,
p. 1.
26 W i l l i a m  H. Stoneman,  "Hoover ' s  Speech Tends to 
Shade Europe ' s  F a i t h  i n the Uni ted S t a t e s , "  S t .  Louis P o s t - 
D i s p a t c h , December 21,  1950,  p.  I B;  E d i t o r i a l ,  S t .  Louis  
P o s t - D i s p a t c h ,  December 22,  1950,  p. 2B.
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Papers such as the Denver  Post  p l ayed up the f a c t  t h a t  Pravda
gave much a t t e n t i o n  to the Hoover speech by p r i n t i n g  the
t e x t  in f u l l ,  the i m p l i c a t i o n  being t h a t  Hoover was doing
27S t a l i n ' s  work f o r  him.  An e d i t o r i a l  comment in the
Nat i on descr i bed the speech as "a r a l l y i n g  cry f o r  a l l  the
d i s c r e d i t e d  f or ces  of  i s o l a t i o n i s m  . . ." who have "nursed
28t h e i r  i n f a n t i l e  i l l u s i o n s  o f  a hemi spher i c  1G i b r a l t a r . 1"
Er nest  K. L i n d l e y ,  an e d i t o r  f o r  Newsweek magaz ine ,  found
the Hoover-Kennedy s t r a t e g y  to command " the suppor t  o f  no
more than a c o r p o r a l ' s guard of  unreconst rue  ted
29i s o l a t i o n i s t s . "  The Times (London)  cor respondent  in
Washington d i s c r e d i t e d  the Hoover t h e s i s  as s i mpl y  a
r e s u r r e c t i o n  o f  his depression po1i c i e s - - h o a r d  the resources
and b u i l d  a wa l l  around the n a t i o n .  That  same cor respondent
thought  i t  a p p r o p r i a t e  the i s o l a t i o n i s t s '  case was pr esent ed
30"by a man w i t h  a r ecord f o r  being wrong."
Col umni st  Wa l t e r  Lippmann j o i n e d  the debate t a k i ng  
a p o s i t i o n  very c l ose to Hoover and Kennedy.  As he saw i t  
the n a t i o n a l  sent i ment  was to get  out  o f  Korean- t ype
27 Barnet  Nover ,  "Joe L i ked ' I s o l a t i o n '  Theme,"
Denver  P o s t , December 27 , 1 950,  p. ,  14.
p o
E d i t o r i a l ,  Nat i  o n , December 30,  1950,  p. 6 8 8 .
p Q
E d i t o r i a l ,  Newsweek, January 22,  1951,  p.  27.
30 The Times (London) ,  December 22,  1950,  p.  4;  
December 23,  1950,  p. 5.
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31e nt angl ement s  and r e p l a c e  these wi t h  an "armed i s o l a t i o n . "
He sa i d  he p r e f e r r e d  a p o l i c y  somewhere between what  he
r egarded as the unworkable ext remes o f  the Dewey proposa l s
32and the Hoover-Kennedy s t r a t e g y ,  but  u l t i m a t e l y ,  his
p o s i t i o n  came much c l o s e r  to t h a t  o f  the c o n s e r v a t i v e s
than t h a t  of  t he  T r uma n i t e s .
John Fos t e r  D u l l e s ,  in b e h a l f  o f  the S t a t e
Depar t ment ,  made a formal  p u b l i c  r e p l y  to t he  Hoover program
in the l a s t  days o f  December.  As mer e l y  a r e i t e r a t i o n  o f
the e s t a b l i s h e d  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  l i n e ,  i t  d i d  not  produce the
3 3
same commotion the Hoover speech d i d .  However the
Chicago D a i 1 y T r i bune  q u i c k l y  c h a r a c t e r i z e d  Du l l e s  as a
34"renegade Republ i can"  being used by Truman.
H e r b e r t  Hoover made a second speech in F e b r u a r y , 1951,  
as the debate mushroomed. He again c a l l e d . f o r  an American  
a i r  and naval  defense based in t h i s  hemisphere.  Hoover  
a s s e r t e d  t h a t  the i dea o f  a peacet i me NATO army s t r e t c h e d  
the pact  beyond i t s  t r u e  i n t e n t ,  and asked Congress to 
r e c o v e r  i t s  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  p r e r o g a t i v e s  in f o r e i g n  a f f a i r s .
31 Wa l t e r  Lippmann,  "Toward Armed I s o l a t i o n ? "  S t .
Louis P o s t - D i s p a t c h , December 19,  1950,  p. 3C.
32 Wa l t e r  Lippmann,  "The Dewey and Hoover T h e o r i e s , "  
Washi ngton P o s t , December 26 , 1 950,  p.  9.
^ New York T i m e s , December 3.0, ' 1950 ,  p. 4.
34 E d i t o r i a l ,  Chicago D a i l y  T r i b u n e , December 29,  1950,  
sec .  I , p . 8.
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The f or mer  P r e s i d e n t  expanded hi s  emphasis on a European 
army b u i l t  f rom European f o r c es  by suggest i ng non-NATO 
c o u n t r i e s  such as Spa i n ,  Greece ,  T u r k e y ,  and West Germany 
be i n v i t e d  i n t o  the pa c t .  As an. a i r  power adv oc a t e ,  he 
b e l i e v e d  t h a t  t he  purchase of  390 B - 3 6 ' s , the most  
advanced long range bomber in 1951,  was a b e t t e r  buy than
m a i n t a i n i n g  ten a d d i t i o n a l  ground d i v i s i o n s  f o r  the same
. 35 c o s t .
The n a t i o n a l  press response was s i m i l a r  to the  
r e a c t i o n  fol-1 owing his December address .  By February  the  
Omaha W o r l d - H e r a l d  had swung behind t he  Hoover program
36because i t  had " the  v i r t u e  o f  c l a r i t y  and s i m p ! i c i t y ."
The Washi  ngton Post  accused the f or mer  P r e s i d e n t  of
m i s i n t e r p r e t i n g  the T r e a t y ' s  o r i g i n a l  i n t e n t  o f  b u i l d i n g
a c o l l e c t i v e  c a p a c i t y  to r e s i s t  armed a gg r e s s i o n .  The
Post  s a i d  t h a t  the Hoover program would not  o n l y  a l l o w  Russia
to over run Europe but  would then s u b j e c t  the c o n t i n e n t  to
3 7
d e v a s t a t i o n  by A me r i c a n ' bombers. Wa l t e r  Wi nchel l  
r e p o r t e d  open h o s t i l i t y  e x i s t e d  between Truman and Hoover ,  
but  subsequent  l e t t e r s  r e v e a l e d  t h a t  no such f e e l i n g s  ever
35 Hoover ,  Addresses Upon the American Road,  1 9 5 0 - 1 9 5 5 ,
pp.  1 4 - 2 2 .
36 E d i t o r i a l ,  Evening World He r a l d  (Omaha) ,
February  12,  1951,  p. 18.
37 E d i t o r i a l , Washington P o s t , February  19,  1951,
p . 8 .
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d e v e l o p e d . ^
Hoover agai n  a i r e d  h i s  views a few weeks l a t e r  a t  
Congress i ona l  hear i ngs  on the t r o o p s - f o r - E u r o p e  i s s u e .  By 
then he had c l e a r l y  e s t a b l i s h e d  h i s  p o s i t i o n  and had given  
p r e s t i g i o u s  suppor t  to the Truman opponents.  His F o r t r e s s  
America speech,  indeed sounded l i k e  the i s o l a t i o n i s m  o f  an 
e a r l i e r  e r a . C1 a imi  ng he was no i s o l a t i o n i s t  i n  the  
pr e - Wor l d  War I I  sense o f  the word,  he accept ed Europe as 
the f i r s t  l i n e  defense i f  on l y  those na t i ons  would prove 
t hemse l v e s .  As w r i t t e n ,  the program c o n c e i v a b l y  gave 
something to a l l  p h i l o s o p h i e s  and a t  the same t ime was 
i n t ended to scare  the Europeans i n t o  a c t i o n .  Y e t ,  the  
overwhelming'  i mpress i on was one o f  s t r a t e g i c  r e t r e a t .  As 
an a l t e r n a t i  Ve to a sometime c o s t l y  and f r u s t r a t i  ng p o l i  c y , 
the Hoover  plan was s i mp l e ,  e f f e c t i v e ,  and r e l a t i v e l y  
i n e x p e n s i v e .  S h o r t l y ,  the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  quest i oned not  
on l y  the f e a s i b i l i t y  but  a l s o  t he  d e s i r a b i 1 i t y  o f  such 
p r o p o s a l s .
■On .January 5 ,  1951,  Sena t o r  Rober t  A.  T a f t  gave the 
n a t i o n  h i s  a p p r a i s a l  o f  t he  Truman f o r e i g n  p o l i c y ,  an 
a p p r a i s a l  not  i n  harmony w i t h  the P r e s i d e n t ' s  S t a t e  o f  the
38 H e r b e r t  Hoover to Har ry  S. Truman,  March 7,  1951,  
and Har ry  S. Truman to H e r b e r t  Hoover ,  March 13,  1951,
H. S. Truman F i l e  (1 949-1 9 5 3 ) ,  P o s t - P r e s i d e n t i a  1 Papers,  
H e r b e r t  Hoover P r e s i d e n t i a l  L i b r a r y .  In t h i s  exchange of  
l e t t e r s  both men d i scount ed  as nonsense a Wa l t e r  Wi nchel l  
a r t i c l e  in  the March 6 , 1951 i ssue  o f  the New York D a i l y  
Mi r r o r .
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Union message which was g i ven t h r e e  days l a t e r .  U n l i k e  
T a f t ,  P r e s i d e n t  Truman cont i nued  to press f o r  a d d i t i o n a l  
economic and m i l i t a r y  a s s i s t a n c e  to the r e s t  o f  the f r e e  
w o r l d . ^
U n t i l  i l l n e s s  removed Senat or  Vandenberg f rom
Washington Senat or  T a f t  had not  been i n f l u e n t i a l  in f o r e i g n
a f f a i r s .  He l e f t  t h a t  area to Vandenberg w h i l e  he made
his r e p u t a t i o n  i n  domest ic  p o l i c y .  P r i o r  to Pear l  Harbor
T a f t  had a l r e a d y  f o r m u l a t e d  a c o n s e r v a t i v e  view o f
P r e s i d e n t i a l  -power.  In the f a l l  o f  1941 he quest i oned
R o o s e v e l t ' s  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  a u t h o r i t y  and opposed his
a l l e g e d  a t t empt s  to i n v o l v e  the Uni t ed  S t a t es  i n  the Euro-  
40pean war .  To avoid being c a l l e d  an i s o l a t i o n i s t ,  T a f t  
c a l 1ed his  approach " the p o l i c y  o f  the f r e e  hand.
Whi le  he r e s i s t e d  the Truman f o r e i g n  p o l i c i e s ,  i t  was not  
u n t i l  a f t e r  the e l e c t i o n  of  1950,  accor d i ng to his b i o g r a ­
pher  Wi 1 1 i  am S . Whi t e ,  t h a t  T a f t  worked a t  becoming a 
f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  e x p e r t .  The Republ i can P a r t y  needed someone 
to r e p l a c e  Vandenberg' s  l e a d e r s h i p ,  and,  b e s i d e s ,  T a f t  had
U . S . ,  Truman P u b l i c  P a p e r s , 1951,  pp.  7 - 1 0 .
40 U . S . ,  Congress,  77th Cong. ,  1s t  sess.  , Congres-  
s i on a l  Recor d , LXXXVI I ,  A4 3 6 4 .
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Wa l t e r  Sloan Pool e ,  "The Quest  f o r  a Republ i can  
Fore i gn P o l i c y :  1941- 1951"  ( unpubl i shed  Ph.D.  d i s s e r t a t i o n ,  
U n i v e r s i t y  o f  Pennsy1vani a  , 1 968)  , p.  33.  H e r e a f t e r  c i t e d  
as Poole*  "Republ i can For e i gn  Pol i c y ."
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4?P r e s i d e n t i a l  a s p i r a t i o n s .  Since he was his  P a r t y ' s  
Congress i ona l  p o l i c y  l e a d e r  he saw no reason not  to assume 
l e a d e r s h i p  in f o r e i g n  as we l l  as domest ic  a f f a i r s ,  a l e a d e r ­
shi p the Pa r t y  1 i b e r a l s  never  w i l 1 i n g l y  f o l l o w e d .
He based hi s  ph i l osophy  on the abhor rence o f  war  
and : the p r o t e c t i o n  of  the l i b e r t y  of  the i n d i v i d u a l  
Amer i can.  Whi te p o r t r a y s  T a f t  as having "an immovably 
m e r c a n t i l e  v iew toward m i l i t a r y  e x p e n d i t u r e s  . . . , " and 
t h i s  r e s u l t e d  in his p l a c i n g  " p r i c e  tags"  on n a t i o n a l  
s e c u r i t y .  What knowledge o f  m i l i t a r y  o p e r a t i o n s  he 
possessed came f rom two s ou r c e s — his r ead i ng  the h i s t o r y  of  
the i Napol eonic  campaigns and B r i g a d i e r  General  Bonner  
F e l l e r s  ( r e t i r e d ) .  From the Napol eoni c  campaigns he l e a r n e d  
t h a t  Wei 1 i ng t on  ' s success a t  Wat er l oo was accompl i shed w i t h
t wenty  per cent  B r i t i s h  t roops and e i g h t y  per  cent  
4 3m e r c e n a r i e s .  General  F e l l e r s ,  an a dmi r e r  of  General
MacAr t hur ,  was on the Republ i can N a t i o n a l  Commit tee and had
44
occasi on to adv i s e  the Se n a t o r .
T a f t ' s  own book,  A For e i gn  P o l i c y  f o r  Amer i c ans , 
u n d e r l i n e d  h i s  d i s t r u s t  o f  the Truman f o r e i g n  p o l i c y .  For  
him the u l t i m a t e  purpose o f  f o r e i g n  pol icy-was*  to p r o t e c t
^ W i l l i a m  S. Wh i t e ,  The T a f t  S t or y  (New York:
Harper  & B r o t h e r s ,  P u b l i s h e r s ^  1 954 ) ,  p p . 1 4 5 - 4 8 .  H e r e a f t e r  
c i t e d  as Wh i t e ,  T a f t  S t o r y .
4 3 I b i d . , pp.  1 4 9 - 5 3 .
44 Marquis C h i l d s ,  " T a f t  Moves I n t o  the S p o t ! i g h t ,
St'. Louis P o s t - P i  s patch , February  5 , 1 951 , p. 3B.
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I n d i v i d u a l  l i b e r t y ,  which in turn could be secured by moral  
l e a d e r s h i p  and " n e u t r a l i t y  and n o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e  w i t h  o t h e r  
na t i ons  . . . " He d i s l i k e d  Truman's f o r e i g n  p o l i c y
because the s t r a t e g y  was too c o s t l y  and the p o l i c i e s  were 
not  being a p p l i e d  e q u a l l y  a l l  over  the w o r l d .  The Truman 
s t r a t e g y  was c o s t l y  i n t h a t  i t  r e q u i r e d  balanced f or ces  to 
meet any l a n d ,  sea ,  or  a i r  a t t a c k .  Maintenance o f  such huge 
f o r c e s ,  ac cor d i ng  to T a f t ,  r e q u i r e d  i n d i v i d u a l s  to f o r f e i t  
a c e r t a i n  amount o f  t h e i r  economic and personal  f reedom.
He opposed a - land war in Europe or  Asi a  because i t  f o r c e d  
the Un i t ed  S t a t es  to f i g h t  w i t h  ground f o r c e s ,  a s t r a t e g y  
i n  which t he  Communist  wor l d  had v a s t l y  more manpower than  
t he Un i t e d  S t a t e s .  However ,  he did not  c a l l  f o r  a r e t r e a t  
f rom the r e s t  o f  the wor l d  but  r a t h e r  proposed to help  
defend i t  w i t h  the f o r c e s  i n  which Americans held  
super ior ! *  t y - - a i  r  and naval  power.  He p o i n t e d  out  t h a t  
B r i t a i n ,  r e l y i n g  on her  navy,  had been e f f e c t i v e  in the  
n i n e t e e n t h  c e n t u r y  w i t h o u t  a l a r g e  l and f o r c e .  The Uni t ed  
St a t e s  could be j u s t  as e f f e c t i v e  in the t w e n t i e t h  c ent ur y  
wi t h  a i r  power.  On the m a t t e r  o f  a pp l y i ng  p o l i c i e s  equal  1y , 
he accused the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  o f  o v e r e x t e n d i  ng i t s e l  f  i n 
Europe but  on l y  g i v i n g  a h a l f - h e a r t e d  e f f o r t  i n  the Far  
E a s t . 45
The Ohio S e n a t o r ,  having been ' .overwhelmingly
45 T a f t ,  A Fore i gn P o l i c y  f o r  Amer i cans ,  pp.  1 1 - 1 2 ,  
6 7 - 6 8 ,  7 7 - 7 8 ,  1 1 2 - 1 3 .
r e - e l e c t e d  in the November,  1950,  e l e c t i o n ,  asked the new 
Congress to r e - exami ne  the Truman f o r e i g n  p o l i c y .  The 
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  had not  convi nced him t h a t  Europe should be 
the f i r s t  l i n e  o f  de f e nse .  When asked i f  he was a g a i n s t  
sending t roops to Europe T a f t  sa i d he was not  opposed to 
t h a t  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  but  wanted the e n t i r e  defense s t r a t e g y  
r e v i e we d .  T a f t  did not  c o n s i d e r  h i m s e l f  an i s o l a t i o n i s t  
because,  accor d i ng to him,  such persons no l on ge r  e x i s t e d .  
In r e b u t t a l  S e c r e t a r y  Acheson r e j e c t e d  the idea t h a t  i s o l a ­
t i o n i s m  was dead;  i n s t e a d ,  i t  was r ea p pe a r i ng  under  the  
gui se  of  " r e - e x a m i n i s t . " I n c a p a b l e  o f  a s u s t a i n e d  purpose,  
the r e - e x a m i n i s t , accor d i ng  to Acheson,  was l i k e  the f a r mer
"who would p u l l  up his crops in the morning to see how they
46had done dur i ng  the n i g h t . "
When Rober t  T a f t  s t a t e d  h i s  case a g a i n s t  the  
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  in Januar y ,  1951 he c e nt e r e d  on t h r e e  i ssues  
e x e c u t i v e  c o n s u l t a t i o n  w i t h  Congress,  P r e s i d e n t i a l  powers 
under  the C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  and the defense o f  Europe.  On the  
m a t t e r  of  c o n s u l t a t i o n ,  he accused the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  of  
c o n s u l t i n g  w i t h  Congress on l y  a f t e r  the P r e s i d e n t  had 
s e c r e t l y  f o r mu l a t e d  a program and then i n d o c t r i n a t e d  his  
f r i e n d s  in t he  n a t i o n a l  p r ess .  What T a f t  wanted was consul  
t a t i o n  p r i o r  to the p u b l i c  u n v e i l i n g  o f  a d e c i s i o n  or
New York T i m e s , November 11,  1950,  p. 8 ;
November 14,  1 950,  p.  1 ; November 18,  1950,  pp.  1,  7.
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program.  The problem was by no means new, but  w i t h  the
breakdown o f  the b i p a r t i s a n  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  i t  had become
more e v i d e n t .  Th i s  d i s p u t e  l ed  him to ques t i on  the
P r e s i d e n t ' s  r i g h t  to commit Amer ican f o r c e s  to Korea.
Under the U n i t e d  Nat i ons  C h a r t e r  the S e c u r i t y  Counci l  could
n e g o t i a t e  a s p e c i a l  agreement  to c r e a t e  an i n t e r n a t i o n a l
army.  In a c c e p t i n g  the C h a r t e r ,  Congress r equi  red t h a t  any
such agreement  be s u b j e c t  to i t s  a p p r o v a l . From t h i s  T a f t
contended t h a t  the P r e s i d e n t ,  by commi t t ing t roops to Korea
under  U n i t e d . Na t i ons  auspices , had i l l e g a l l y  bypassed 
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Congress.  The f a c t  was,  the S e c u r i t y  Counci l  had never  
negot i  a t ed t he  spe c i a l  mi 1 i t a r y  agreement  because of  
Russian i n t r a n s i g e n c e .
He then moved t o  the A t l a n t i c  Pact  and the defense  
o f  Europe.  Passage of  the pact  was a "t remendous m i s t a k e , "  
i n  h i s  o p i n i o n ,  because Russia could e a s i l y  i n t e r p r e t  i t  as 
an a g g r e s s i v e  move,  and American m i l i t a r y  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  
could induce the Sov i e t s  to i n i t i a t e  a no t h e r  war .  A l l  t h a t  
was r e a l l y  needed f o r  an e f f e c t i v e  d e t e r r e n t  was to make i t  
known t h a t  t he  Un i t ed  S t a t es  would go to war i f  Russia  
a t t a c k e d  Western Europe.  He a dmi t t e d  t h a t  sending American  
t r oops  might  be a c o n f i d e n c e - b u i 1der  f o r  Europeans but  was 
f e a r f u l  i t  mi ght  t ake  up to f o r t y  d i v i s i o n s  to "uphold t h e i r
^ U . S . ,  Congress,  82nd Cong. ,  1 s t  s e s s . ,  
Congr ess i ona l  Re c o r d , X C V I I ,  5 5 - 5 7 .  H e r e a f t e r  c i t e d  as 
Congr ess i ona l  Re c or d , XCV I I .
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m o r a l e . "  U l t i m a t e l y ,  he was a f r a i d  o f  where t h i s  might
l e ad:  "We cou 1 d go on i n d e f i n i t e l y . "  T a f t  was not  t o t a l l y
a g a i n s t  sending a l i m i t e d  number o f  t r oops  pr ov i ded the
o t h e r  na t i on s  c o n t r i b u t e d  t h e i r  shar e .  On the o t h e r  hand,
w h i l e  g i v i n g  h i s  suppor t  to i n c r e a sed  a i r  and naval  f o r c e s ,
he r e a l i z e d . t h a t - a i r  bombardment a lone could not  stop
48Communist a r mi es .
Senators  Co n n a l l y  and J . Wi11 iam F u l b r i g h t ,  the l a t ­
t e r  a Democrat  f rom Ar kansas ,  c a s t i g a t e d  the Ohio Senat or  
f o r  d e m o r a l i z i n g  the peopl e  of  Western Europe,  but  they
made no immediate a t t e m p t  to d i s p u t e  p o i n t - b y - p o i n t  what
49
T a f t  had s a i d .  As in the case o f  the Hoover addr e s s ,  the
n a t i o n a l  press responded d r a m a t i c a l l y .  The Los Angeles
T i m e s , undecided on the Hoover p r o p o s a l s , now suppor ted
50T a f t  on the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  and economic i s s u e s .  The
51Omaha Wo r l d - H e r a l d  gave i t s  f u 11 a p p r o v a l ; however ,  the  
C h i c a g o . D a i l y  T r i b u n e  found the speech went  "a l i t t l e  
f a r t h e r  in the d i r e c t i o n  of  i n t e r v e n t i o n i s m  than some of  us 
would go . . But i n  comparing Rober t  T a f t  and
Har r y  Truman the McCormick paper  r e a d i l y  accepted
4 8 I b i d . , pp.  6 2 - 6 7 .
4 8 1bi  d . ,  pp.  1 4 1 - 4 4 .
50 E d i t o r i a l ,  Los Angeles T i me s , January 11,  1951,  
s e c . 1 1 , p . 4.
^ E d i t o r i a l  , EvenIng Wor 1 d- Hera 1 d (Omaha) ,
January 8 , 1951 ,  p.  14.
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52M r . R e p u b l i c a n . In the o t h e r  camp, the St .  Louis Po s t -
Di spa t ch  accused T a f t  of  out do i ng Senat or  McCarthy in
5 3
i r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . Washington Post  e d i t o r s  c h a r a c t e r i z e d
Hoover as un wi I T i n g  to f i g h t  u n t i l  Europe b u i l t  a wa l l  o f
p r o t e c t i o n  and T a f t  as w i l l i n g  to f i g h t  but  not  u n t i l
54
Russia ov er r an  Europe.
One y e a r  e a r l i e r  T a f t  c l a i med the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  
had put  an end to any r ema i n i ng  b i p a r t i s a n  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y .  
However ,  on January 9j  1951,  he o f f e r e d  to s i t  down w i t h  the
Democrats in an e f f o r t  to work out  j u s t  such a p o l i c y .
Whi le Truman did not  rush to accept  T a f t ' s ■ s u g g e s t i o n , the  
announcement  d i d  mean T a f t  had taken over  Vandenberg' s
5 5
p o s i t i o n  as the Republ i can f o r e i g n  a f f a i r s  l e a d e r .
The same week a t  a press conf er ence  P r e s i d e n t  Truman 
a t t empt ed  to c l a r i f y  his  p o s i t i o n  and a t  t he  same t ime  
answer some o f  T a f t ' s  a l l e g a t i o n s .  He s t a r t e d  out  sayi ng  
t h a t  he had the power under the C o n s t i t u t i o n  to deploy  
t roops  anywhere in  the wor l d  and t h a t  Congress and the  
cou r t s  had r e p e a t e d l y  r ec ogn i ze d  this. .  R e f u t i n g  T a f t ,  he 
c l a i med hi s  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  had "always"  c on s u l t e d  w i t h  the
5 2E d i t o r i a l ,  Chi cago Dai  Ty T r i b u n e , January 7,  1951,  
s e c . I , p . 18.
53 E d i t o r i a l ,  S t .  Louis P o s t - D i s p a t c h , January 7,  1951,
p.  2C.
54
E d i t o r i a l  , Washington P o s t , January  10,  1951,  p. 10.
^ New York T i m e s , January  9,  1950,  p. 12;
January  10,  1951 ,  p.  1.
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a p p r o p r i a t e  Congress i ona l  commi t tees on f o r e i g n  a f f a i r s .
C o n s u l t a t i o n  di d  not  mean,  however ,  t h a t  he would be bound
by Congr ess i ona l  a dv i c e :  " I  d o n ' t  ask t h e i r  p e r mi s s i o n ,
I j u s t  c o n s u l t  t h e m . " He r e a f f i r m e d  t h a t  a d e c i s i o n  had
been made to g i v e  General  Eisenhower  s u f f i c i e n t  f o r c e s  to
b u i l d  a def ense  i n  Europe and f u r t h e r  a dmi t t e d  t h a t
General  Mar s ha l l  and S e c r e t a r y  Acheson had a l r e a d y  met w i t h
56the Congr ess i ona l  commi t t ees .  Judging from the debate  
t a k i n g  p l ace  on C a p i t o l  Hi 11 , the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s p r i v a t e  
c o n s u l t a t i o n - b y  no means produced Congress i ona l  agreement .
Soon T a f t ' s  c e n t r a l  o b j e c t i o n  to the P r e s i d e n t i a l  
c l a i m o f  power was t h a t  no American Exe c u t i v e  could commit  
American f o r c e s  to an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  army w i t h o u t  Congres­
s i o n a l  a p p r o v a l .  He did not  deny the o t h e r  powers as 
Co mma n d e r - i n - Ch i e f ,  but  observed t h a t  an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
f o r c e  could a l t e r - s u b s t a n t i a l l y  the P r e s i d e n t ' s  c o n t r o l  
over  h i s  own m i l i t a r y .  From T a f t ' s  v i e w p o i n t  the P r e s i ­
dent  had come c l os e  to a l l o w i n g  t h a t  in Korea,  and such a 
p o s s i b i l i t y  aga i n  arose w i t h  the c r e a t i o n  o f  a NATO army.
In such i n s t a n c e s  he b e ! i e v e d  t h a t  Congress had the duty of  
checking t h e  P r e s i d e n t ' s  a c t i o n s .  As the debate  progressed  
t h e . O h i o  Se na t or  r e f i n e d  t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  i s s u e ,  and in  
doing so he made some s u b t l e  p o s i t i o n  changes r e g a r d i n g  
Western Europe.  A month a f t e r  his  January 5 speech he 
r e j e c t e d  the i dea  o f  ever  w i t h dr a wi ng  from the Nor th A t l a n t i c
U . S . ,  Truman Pub! i c  "Papers', 1951,  pp.  1 8 - 2 2 .
64
Pact  or  e ver  abandoning Europe.  He was now convinced t h a t  
a f r e e  Europe was of  " v i t a l  i n t e r e s t "  to the Un i t ed  S t a t e s ,  
but  agai n he emphasized t h a t  a c t i o n  should be taken by the  
European c o u n t r i e s . ^
I nde e d ,  Rober t  T a f t  was not  e n t i r e l y  c o n s i s t e n t  in 
hi s  stand on t he  t r o o p s - f o r - E u r o p e  i s s ue .  In November he 
was unconvinced t h a t  Europe should be the f i r s t  Tine of  
def ense .  In January he c l e a r l y  had r e s e r v a t i o n s  about  
sending Amer ican ground f o r c e s  to Europe.  In February  he 
backed away f rom hi s  e a r l i e r  p o s i t i o n s ;  though not  d e s i r i n g  
to de p l oy  l a r g e  numbers o f  t roops he did concede the i mpor ­
tance o f  Europe f o r  the s e c u r i t y  o f  the Un i t e d  S t a t e s .
Only in demanding t h a t  Europe do i t s  share and in  g i v i n g  
suppor t  to the A i r  Force l obby was Sena t or  T a f t  r e a l l y  
c o n s i s t e n t .  The Washi ngton P o s t , r e f e r r i n g  to T a f t  as a
chameleon,  found t h a t  f o r  a l l  his r h e t o r i c  the p u b l i c  s t i l l
58was unsure where he s t ood.  W i l l i a m  S. Whi te  r ecogn i zed
T a f t  as "a man whose r eco r d  in wor l d  a f f a i r s  was i n c o n s i s t e n t
59a l most  to the p o i n t  of  i n c o n c e i v a b i 1 i t y ."
L i k e  Hoover ,  Senat or  T a f t  was a major  c o n t r i b u t o r  
to  the r e - e x a m i n a t i o n  o f . Truman., f o r e i g n  ■ poi  i c y . He did not  
a l i g n  him.self.  c l o s e l y  to the Hoover t h e s i s ,  but  he stood f a r
^ Congress i ona l  Re c or d , X C V I I ,  5 4 6 - 4 7 ,  1121.
58 E d i t o r i a l ,  Washi ngton Pos t , February  13,  1951
p. 10.
Wh i t e ,  T a f t  S t o r y , p . 142.
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away from t he  Truman D o c t r i n e .  As the l e a d i n g  Republ i can  
i n  Congress he became one of  the r a l l y i n g  po i n t s  f o r  the  
a n t i - T r u ma n  f o r c e s .  Anyone w i t h  P r e s i d e n t i a l  ambi t i ons  
could not  i gnor e  the potency of  t he  i ssue when the c ount r y  
e x h i b i t e d  a r e s t l e s s n e s s  over  the e x i s t i n g  p o l i c y .  Bes i des ,  
T a f t ' s  Senate F l o o r  L e a d e r ,  Kenneth Wherry,  who had 
ambi t i ons  o f  his  own, had e n t e r e d  the f o r a y .
Senat or  Wherry e n t e r e d  the Senate in 1943 and f rom 
then u n t i l  h i s  death i n  November 1951 he d i s p l a y e d  an 
u n r e l e n t i n g  o p p o s i t i o n  — many . t imes-b.ased on economic 
c o n s e r v a t i s m - - t o  the Ro os e v e l t  and Truman f o r e i g n  p o l i c i e s .
He was a g a i n s t  the Truman D o c t r i n e  because i t  went  a g a i n s t  
n a t i o n a l  t r a d i t i o n .  He opposed the Mar sha l l  plan as too 
c o s t l y  to the American t a x p a y e r  and l . a t e r  a t t empt ed  to have 
t he  app r o pr i  a t i o n  f o r  the Economi c Cooper a t i  on Admi ni  s t r a t i  on 
c u t .  A l t hough he vot ed f o r  the Vandenberg R e s o l u t i o n ,  he 
opposed the Nor th A t l a n t i c  T r e a t y  because o f  the i mp l i e d  
commitment  to implement  the p a c t . ^
In domest ic  p o l i t i c s  Wherry a c t i v e l y  sought  Federa l  
spendi  ng p r o j e c t s  f o r  t he  be n e f i  t  o f  hi  s home s t a t e  of  
Nebraska.  In 1948 the A i r  Force s e l e c t e d  a s i t e  south of  
Omaha as t he  new hea dqua r t e r s  f o r  the S t r a t e g i c  A i r  Command. 
General  C u r t i s  LeMay,  head o f  t h a t  Command, a t  f i r s t  d i d not
■ ^ H a r l  Adams Dal s t r om , "Kenneth S. Wher ry , "  Vo l .  I I  
( un pu b l i she d  Ph.D.  d i s s e r t a t i o n ,  U n i v e r s i t y  o f  Nebraska,  
1 9 6 5 ) ,  pp. 519 ,  542 ,  5 8 5 - 8 6 ,  5 8 8 - 8 9 ,  903,  913.
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f a v o r  the l o c a t i o n ,  in p a r t ,  due to a l o c a l  housing s h o r t a g e .  
Senat or  Wherry made i t  his  business to see t h a t  the A i r  
Force di d not  change i t s  mind.  To so l ve  the housing problem 
he e n l i s t e d  the a i d  o f  the Omaha Chamber of  Commerce and
6 i
i n t r o du c e d  in Congress a m i l i t a r y  housing b i l l .  The 
Wherry Housing Act  of  1949 convi nced General  LeMay,  who l a t e r  
looked upon Wherry as an " ab l e  and f a r s e e i n g  and courageous"
CO
man "who saved our  bacon. "  Out o f  t h i s  came a n a t u r a l
a l l i a n c e  as Wherry proved to be an a r d e n t  s up p o r t e r  of  the
a i r  power 1 ob-by .
The Nebraska p o l i t i c i a n  was a staunch c o n s e r v a t i v e
a t  t he  n a t i o n a l  l e v e l  and an i s o l  a t i o n i s t  i n  f o r e i g n  a f f a i r s  .
As one w r i t e r  s a i d .  Wher r y ' s  ph i l osophy  "was very  sound
p o l i t i c s  i n  Nebraska ,  y e t  i t  would be u n f a i r  and i n a c c u r a t e
to say t h a t  h i s  c onser va t i sm was based s o l e l y  upon p o l i t i c a l
expedi ency  '-Hi s i s o l a t i o n i s m  , w h i 1e bei  ng tempered by the
r e a l i t i e s  o f  the t w e n t i e t h  c e n t u r y ,  sought  a s i mpl e  s o l u t i o n
63to the n a t i o n ' s  Cold War probl ems.  Senat or  Vandenberg  
a l so  looked upon Wherry as an o l d  s t y l e  i s o l a t i o n i s t  when 
he s a i d ,  "He [ Whe r r y ]  i s  w i d e l y  r egarded as one o f  the l a s t  
r emai n i ng symbols o f  Republ i can  i s o l a t i o n i s m - - a n d  I f e l t
61 I b i d . , pp.  792 - 81  3.
6 2C u r t i s  E . LeMay,  Mi ss i on  w i t h  LeMay; My St or y  
(Garden C i t y ,  New York:  Doubleday & Company, I n c . ,  1 9 6 5 ) ,
p. 471 .
^ D a l s t r o m ,  "Kenneth S. Wher r y , "  pp.  9 7 5 - 8 4 .
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64t he  Pa r t y  could not  a f f o r d  to renew any p a r t  o f  t h i s  l a b e l . "
As a r i  g h t - w i  ng Republ i  can the Senator  was too much
o f  an u l t r a - c o n s e r v a t i v e  to become a l e a d i n g  p o l i c y - m a k e r ,
but  t h i s  in no way stopped him from a t t e m p t i n g  to i n f l u e n c e
p o l i c y .  Express i ng his  " d i s a p po i n t me n t "  w i t h  Truman's
65S t a t e  o f  the Union message,  he sponsored a r e s o l u t i o n
which " d e c l a r e d  i t  to be the sense o f  the Senate t h a t  no
ground f o r c e s  o f  the Un i t e d  St a t e s  should be ass i gned to
duty  in t he  European area  f o r  the -purposes of  the Nor th
A t l a n t i c  T r e a t y  pending the adopt i on  o f  a p o l i c y  w i t h  r e s p e c t
66t h e r e t o  by the Congress . "  Senate Concur r ent  R e s o l u t i o n  
No. 8 , or  the Wherry R e s o l u t i o n  as i t  was c a l 1e d , i n i t i a t e d
t he  bas i s  f o r  Congr ess i ona l  a c t i o n .
Wi th t h i s  r e s o l u t i o n  Wherry e n t e r ed  the grey  area  
o f  E x e c u t i v e - C o n g r e s s i o n a l  r e l a t i o n s  by a t t e m p t i n g  to under ­
cut  P r e s i d e n t i a l  i n i t i a t i v e  in conduct i ng f o r e i g n  . a f f a i r s .
"The r e s o l u t i o n  pr ov i des  f o r  on l y  one t h i  ng ,"  he poi  nted 
o u t ,  "namel y ,  t h a t  the q u e s t i o n  o f  commitments by the Pr e s ­
i d e n t  o f  the Un i t ed  St a t e s  s h a l l  be held in  abeyance u n t i l  
Congress i t s e l f  has made the d e t e r m i n a t i o n . "  I t  was aimed
64 Vandenberg , Pr i  va t e  P a p e r s , p . 466.
6 5Congress i onal  R e c o r d , X C V I I , 94.
6 6
U. S . , Congress , Sen a t e ,  Commit tee on Fore i gn  
R e l a t i o n s  and Commit tee on Armed S e r v i c e s ,  Assignment  of  
Ground Forces o f  the U n i t e d  S t a t e s  to Duty i n the European 
Ar e a ,  H e a r i n g s , on S. Con. Res.  8 , 82 nd . Con g . ,  1st  sess.  ,
1951 ,  p. 38.  H e r e a f t e r  c i t e d  as Se na t e ,  Hear ings,  S. Con.
Re s . 8 .
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s o l e l y  a t  A r t i c l e  3,  the mutual  a i d c l ause  o f  the Nor th  
A t l a n t i c  A l l i a n c e ;  in no way di d i t  a f f e c t  A r t i c l e  5,  the  
a ggr e s s i on  c l a u s e .  Reviewing the North A t l a n t i c  T r e a t y  
h e a r i n g s ,  he observed t h a t  both Senators  Conna l l y  and 
Vandenberg had d e c l a r e d  t h a t  Congress i ona l  approval  was 
necessary  to implement  the pa c t .  L i ke  T a f t ,  he demanded t h a t  
the P r e s i d e n t  c o n s u l t  w i t h  Congress be f or e  any d e c i s i o n  was 
r eached.  The two Senators  took s i m i l a r  stands on the send­
ing o f  Amer ican t roops to Korea,  both contendi ng t h a t  
Truman had usurped Congress i ona l  power in  doing so.  Ad mi n i s ­
t r a t i o n  s up po r t e r s  q u i c k l y  l a b e l l e d  the r e s o l u t i o n  as an 
a t t e m p t  to c o n t r o l  mi 1 i t a r y  t a c t i c s  in t h a t  i t  was . s p e c i f i -  
c a l l y  aimed a t  the use o f  ground f o r c e s .  They asked i f  the  
A i r  Force would not  be a f f e c t e d  s i nce t h a t  branch of  the  
m i l i t a r y  needed ground f o r c e s  to p r o t e c t  t h e i r  advanced 
bases i n  Europe.  Wherry answered t h a t  the r e s o l u t i o n  was 
meant to deal  w i t h  " p o l i c y "  and not  w i t h  what  c o n s t i t u t e d  
ground f o r c e s  or  mi 1 i t a r y  t a c t i c s . U l t i m a t e l y ,  he viewed  
commitment  of  American t roops to an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  army as 
a d e p a r t u r e  f rom e x i s t i n g  p o l i c y . ^
The Wherry R e s o l u t i o n  amounted to a v e i l e d  p a r t i s a n  
a t t a c k  on the Truman p o l i c y .  E x p l a i n i n g  his  r e s o l u t i o n ,  
t he  Sena t or  made i t  c l e a r  t h a t  h i s  proposal  sought  to 
pr e s er v e  the " n e v e r - d y i n g  p r i n c i p l e s  of  our  R e p u b l i c , "
^ Congress i ona l  Re c or d , X C V I I ,  3 2 0 - 2 6 .
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68p r i n c i p l e s  which had been under  a t t a c k  s i nce  the New Dea l .
The Chicago Dai 1y T r l bu ne  f a v o r e d  the Wherry R e s o l u t i o n  as
69t he on l y  p r a c t i c a l  means o f  r e s t r a i n i n g  Har ry  S. Truman.
Wherry sol  i ci  ted Hoove r 1 s' suppor t  to a g r e a t e r  
degree than T a f t ' s  s i nce  as r i v a l s  the p o l i c y  l e a d e r  
p u r p ose l y  s t ayed some d i s t a n c e  f rom his f l o o r  l e a d e r .  On 
the o t h e r  hand,  Wherry and Hoover cor responded r e g u l a r l y  
w i t h  the l a t t e r  s u b m i t t i n g  h i g h l y  usable  m a t e r i a l  to the  
N e b r a s k a n . ^  The simi  1 a r i  t y  o f  the two men's p o s i t i o n s  
undoubt ed l y  promoted such a r e l a t i o n s h i p ,  in a d d i t i o n  to 
the f a c t  Hoover  was not  seeking power through a p u b l i c  
o f f i  c e .
As more and more persons e n t e r e d  the debate Wherry  
moved to have p u b l i c  hear i ngs  on h i s  r e s o l u t i o n .  O r i g i n a l l y  
the Senate l e a d e r s h i p  s e t  a s i de  one day to debate and vote  
on the r e s o l u t i o n ,  but  a few days l a t e r  Wherry asked the  
Commit tee on Armed S e r v i c e s  and the Commit tee on Fore i gn  
R e l a t i o n s  to hold j o i n t  h e a r i n g s .  The Republ i can Senat or  
f rom M i s s o u r i ,  James P. Kern, i mme di a t e l y  warned Wherry t h a t
6 8 1 b i d . ,  pp.  327.
69 E d i t o r i a l ,  Chicago D a i 1y T r 1bune , January 11,  1951,  
s e c . I , p . 18.
^ H e r b e r t  Hoover to Kenneth S... Wher ry,  May 6,  1950 
and January  9,  1951 ,  Kenneth S. Wherry F i l e ,  Post  P r e s i ­
d e n t i a l  Paper s ,  H e r b e r t  Hoover P r e s i d e n t i a l  L i b r a r y .  Both 
o f  these l e t t e r s  deal  d i r e c t l y  w i t h  European defense and 
the Amer ican commitment to i t .
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the Senate Fore i gn R e l a t i o n s  Commi t tee,  under  the cha i r man­
shi p  o f  C o n n a l l y ,  would p i geonho l e  the r e s o l u t i o n . ^  He 
was not  the on l y  one w i t h  such f e e l i n g s ;  the Washington
Post  p r o c l a i m e d ,  "The r o u t i n g  of  Wherryism thus c l e a r s  the  
7 2
a i r . "  L i t t l e  did they know Wherry would not  be deni ed so 
e a s i l y .
I t  was n a t u r a l  f o r  the Senate to d i r e c t  i t s  a t t e n t i o n  
to the f o r m u l a t i o n  of  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y : s i nee  the C o n s t i t u t i o n  
gave i t  j o i n t  powers w i t h  the P r e s i d e n t .  I ndeed,  Senate  
debate  f a r  exceeded any House d i s c u s s i o n  o f  the i s s u e .
There were ,  however ,  l e s s e r  e f f o r t s  being made i n  the lower  
house.  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e  F r e d e r i c k  R. Couder t ,  J r . ,  R e p u b l i ­
can from New York ,  i n t r o d u c e d  House J o i n t  R e s o l u t i o n  No. 9
whi ch ,  though worded d i f f e r e n t l y ,  proposed the same t h i n g
73
as the Wherry R e s o l u t i o n .  Couder t  l ooked upon the
a p p r o p r i a t i o n s  power as the on l y  e f f e c t i v e  means o f  b r i n g i n g
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Truman to Congress.  He had,  in f a c t ,  been prepared to
o f f e r  his  r e s o l u t i o n  a y e a r  e a r l i e r  but  had been "warned by
75
the G. 0 . P . . 1e a d e r s h i p  t h a t  the t ime was ' n o t  y e t  r i p e . ' "
^ Congr ess i ona l  Record , XCVI I  , 318-1 9 , 477 , 487.
72 E d i t o r i a l ,  Washington P o s t , January 24,  1951,  p. 8 .
^ Congress i ona l  Re c o r d , X C V I I ,  34.
74 F r e d e r i c k  R. Co ud e r t ,  J r .  to H e r b e r t  Hoover ,
January  25 ,  1951,  F r e d e r i c k  Co u d e r t ,  J r .  F i l e ,  Post  P r e s i ­
d e n t i a l  Papers ,  H e r b e r t  Hoover P r e s i d e n t i a l  L i b r a r y .
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"The Hoover L i ne  Grows,"  New Republ i c  
January  15,  1951,  p. 7.
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Republ i can  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e  James I .  D o l l i v e r  f rom Iowa 
sponsored a s i m i l a r  r e s o l u t i o n ,  but  l i k e  C o u d e r t 1s i t  died  
i n  commi t t ee .  One hundred e i g h t e e n  members of  the House 
did s i gn a d e c l a r a t i o n  of  p o l i c y  demanding E x e c u t i v e -  
Congress i ona l  consul  .'tat i o n , an impregnabl  e defense i n  the  
Western Hemisphere,  and the stopage o f  a i d  to Western  
Europe u n t i l  those c o u n t r i e s  s t a r t e d  c a r r y i n g  t h e i r  share  
o f  t he  burden.  Democrats di d not  subs cr i be  to the d e c l a r ­
a t i o n  in a b i p a r t i s a n  s p i r i t  as i t  t ur ned out  to be a p a r t y
76l i n e  document .  For t he  most p a r t  t h e  House o f  R e p r e s e n t a ­
t i v e s  s a t  back and l e t  the Senate t a l k  i t s e l f  ou t .
H e r b e r t  Hoover ,  Rober t  T a f t ,  and Kenneth Wherry 
r e p e a t e d l y  spoke in b e h a l f  o f  those seek i ng a r ev i ew o f  the  
n a t i o n ' s  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y .  They were a r t i c u l a t e  and hel d  
p o s i t i o n s  f rom which they could d i s s e mi na t e  t h e i r  v i ews.
They were by no means the so l e  opponents ,  but  they  
e nn un c i a t e d  p o s i t i o n s  which r e c e i v e d  s i g n i f i c a n t  p u b l i c  
a t t e n t i o n  and drew heavy c r i t i c i s m .  T h e i r  f o l l o w e r s  had 
n e i t h e r  Hoover and T a f t ' s  p r e s t i g e  nor Wher r y ' s  vocal  
t e n a c i t y .  Democrat  Joseph Kennedy never  s u s t a i n e d  his  f o r a y  
on Truman p o l i c y ,  and t h e r e f o r e  r e l e g a t e d  h i m s e l f  once more 
to pr i va te  l.i f  e .
These men espoused courses which i n  many ways
^ Congress i ona l  Re c o r d , X C V I I ,  1246,  1 2 5 8 - 5 9 .
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sounded l i k e  an i s o l a t i o n i s m  o f  an e a r l i e r  age,  and the 
n a t i o n a l  press and many p u b l i c  o f f i c i a l s  openl y  disavowed  
them as " i s o l a t i o n i s t s ." Such a term by i t s  na t ur e  i s  
h i g h l y  c o n n o t a t i v e  and r e q u i r e s  a conci se  d e f i n i t i o n .  Yet  
"those who ba n d i e d " t h e  word in p u b l i c  made no e f f o r t  to  
d e f i n e  i t .  The word,  " n e o - i s o l a t i o n i s t , 1 l i k e w i s e  very  
c o n n o t a t i v e ,  does l i t t l e  more than i d e n t i f y  a new kind of  
i s o l a t i o n i s t  w i t h o u t  d e f i n i n g  the o r i g i n a l  term.  I f  these  
men were i s o l a t i o n i s t s ,  t h e i r  p o s i t i o n s  di d not  n e a t l y  f i t  
a phi  1osophy- o f  t o t a l  no n - i nv o l v e me n t  w i t h  the r e s t  of  the  
w o r l d .  Perhaps f o r  t h i s  reason the word " r e - e x a mi n i s t s "  b e t t e r  
c h a r a c t e r i z e s  these spokesmen,  f o r  i t  does not  i mme di a t e l y  
i mp l y  a p o l i c y  of  compl ete  r e t r e a t .
A number o f  a n a l y s t s  have a t t e mpt e d  to d e f i n e  the
re - e xa mi  ni sts* phi  1 osophy as i t  r e l a t e s  to an o l d e r
\
i s o l a t i o n i s m .  Samuel Lube l l  found the i s o l  a t i o n i s t  f e e l i n g s  
of  the World War I p e r i o d  c e n t e r e d  on a gg r i e v e d  e t h n i c  
groups ( ma i n l y  German- Amer i cans) and economic p r o t e s t s .
World War I I  a l t e r e d  the e a r l i e r  a l i g n m e n t ;  i n s t e a d  o f  being  
i n  the P r o g r e s s i v e  camp opposing Old Guard Republ i cans  the  
i s o l a t i o n i s t s  were now in the Old Guard Republ i can camp 
opposing t he  New D e a l e r s .  Thi s  amounted to a movement f rom 
t he  p o l i t i c a l  l e f t  to the p o l i t i c a l  r i g h t .  The Cold War 
changed the s o - c a l l e d  i s o l a t i o n i s t s *  ph i l osophy  even more 
because t hey  were no l on g e r  a n t i - w a r  but  perhaps more p r o ­
war .  Lu b e l l  suppor ted t h i s  c o n t e n t i o n  by p o i n t i n g  to t h e i r
73
a g g r e s s i v e  approach to Communism in the Far  E a s t .  He 
concluded t h a t  any Republ i can  appeal  to a t o t a l l y  non-  
i n v o l v e me n t  i s o l a t i o n  was r e f l e c t e d  on l y  in  t h e i r  d i s g u s t  
w i t h  the l a s t  war and the a l l e g e d  mi s t akes  o f  Tehran and 
Y a l t a ,  He suggested t h a t  T a f t  and Wherry o v e r e s t i m a t e d  
any s e r i o u s  r e v i v a l  o f  e a r l i e r  a t t i t u d e s  because in the  
1950 e l e c t i o n  the Democrat i c  vot e  held up b e t t e r  i n  the  
" ' o l d - t i m e .1 i s o l a t i o n i s t  areas than did the Republ i can  
v o t e . ^
A " r e a c t i o n a r y - n a t i o n a l i s t  e l i t e ," accor d i ng  to 
Norman Gr a e bne r ,  had espoused a p r e - Wor l d  War I I  
i s o l a t i o n i s m  which emphasized the domest ic  economy,  o v e r ­
e s t i m a t e d  the power o f  the Un i t e d  S t a t e s ,  and depended 
upon u n i l a t e r a l  d i p l omacy .  The new or  n e o - i s o l a t i o n i s m  
which f o l l o w e d  the war s t i l l  accepted u n i l a t e r a l i s m  and the  
b e l i e f  i n  n a t i o n a l  power.  T a f t  wanted the Un i t ed  St a t e s  
to ex t end u n i l a t e r a l l y  the Monroe D o c t r i n e  to Europe r a t h e r  
than e n t e r  i n t o  t he  Nor th A t l a n t i c  A l l i a n c e .  The a i r  
power advocates  pr ov i ded  an omni pot ent  mi 1 i t a r y  s o l u t i o n .
On the o t h e r  hand,  GraebnerVs n e o - i s o l a t i o n i s t s  r e j e c t e d  
bei ng c a l l e d  i s o l a t i o n i s t s  because they  had i n  f a c t  
suppor t ed many of  Truman' s commitments to the r e s t  o f  the  
w o r l d .  Whi l e  the n e o - i s o l a t i o n i s t s  did suppor t  some of  
t he  programs,  he found they  had done so "wi t h  the a ppar ent
7 7
Samuel Lubel  1 , "Who Votes Iso-1 a t i o n i  s t - a n d  Why,"
H a r p e r ' s  M a g a z i n e , A p r i l ,  1951,  pp. 2 9 - 3 6 .
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78i n t e n t  of  an e v e nt ua l  w i t h d r a w a l . "  Ot her  aut hors  c a l l e d
i t  " an a t t e m p t  to make the wo r i d  sa fe  f o r  American r e t r e a t  
79f r om i t . "  L a s t l y ,  Graebner  concluded t h a t  they d i s p l a y e d  
a c e r t a i n  i r r a t i o n a l i t y .  Whi l e  being f i e r c e l y  a n t i -  
Communi s t , t hey  a t t a c k e d  Dean Acheson who had checked the
on
Communists more than anyone e l s e .
A r t h u r  M. S c h i e s i n g e r ,  J r .  concur red wi th L u b e l 1 1 s 
a n a l y s i s  o f  t he  i s o l a t i o n i s t  movement f rom t he  p o l i t i c a l  
l e f t  to t he  r i g h t  and w i t h  Graebner  on the m a t t e r  of  
u n i l a t e r a l  d i p l omacy.  S c h l e s i n g e r  then t ur ned his a t t e n t i o n  
to t he  r o l e s  o f  General  Douglas MacAr thur  and Senat or  
Joseph McCarthy in  the new i s o l a t i o n i s t  movement.  Ma cAr t hu r ' s  
i n t e r v e n t i  oni  s t  t endenc i es  did not  f i t  i sol  a t i o n i  s t  
p h i l o s o p h y ,  but  he pr ov i ded  p o l i t i c a l  c a p i t a l  on which to
o p e r a t e .  Senat or  McCar t hy ' s  a nt i - Communi s t  zeal  helped to
cover  up t he  a t t e n t i o n  Pravda had g i ven to such people as 
Hoover .  Senat or  T a f t ,  ac c or d i ng  to S'chTesi n g e r , t y p i f i e d  
t he  new i s o l a t i o n i s t  when he s a i d ,  "The p o l i c y  on which a l l  
Republ i  cans can uni  t e  . . .  i s  one o f  a l l - o u t  o p p o s i t i o n  
to the spread o f  Communism, r e c o g n i z i n g  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a 
l i m i t  beyond which we cannot  go . "  A New York Post  e d i t o r
78 Gr aebner ,  New I s o l a t i o n i s m , p p . 2 3 - 2 6 .
79 Thomas I .  Cook and Malcolm Moos, Power Through
Purpose:  The Real ism of  I d e a l i s m  as a Basis f o r  Fore i gn
P o l i c y  ( B a l t i m o r e :  The Johns Hopkins Pr ess ,  1 9 5 4 ) ,  p . 5 4 .  
H e r e a f t e r  c i t e d  as Cook and Moos,  Power Through Pur pose .
80 Gr aebner ,  New I s o l a t i  oni  sm , p. 64.
81c a l l e d  t h i s  s t a t e me n t  T a f t ' s  " a l 1 - o u t , ha l f way  p o l i  c y ."
R e a l i s t  Hans J.  Morgenthau c h a r a c t e r i z e d  the neo­
i s o l a t i o n i s t s  as d i s a p p o i n t e d  Ut opians who had f ought  two 
wars to make t he  wor l d  sa f e  f o r  democracy on l y  to f i n d  they  
had f a i l e d .  Th i s  postwar  f a i l u r e  r e v i v e d  an i s o l a t i o n i s t  
a t t i t u d e  of  mind.  However ,  i n s t e a d  of  r e f u s i n g  to p a r t i c i ­
pate  i n wor l d  a f f a i r s ,  t h e ■n e o - i  s o l a t i  oni  s ts sought  to
82deal  w i t h  t he  wor l d  on l y  on t h e i r  t erms.
The views o f  t hese  f o u r  w r i t e r s  are i n d i c a t i v e  of  
the d i f f i c u l t y  encount er ed  when a t t e m p t i n g  to c h a r a c t e r i z e  
t he  r e - e x a m i n i s t s .  No one w r i t e r  a r r i v e d  a t  an u l t i m a t e  
d e f i n i t i o n  which would f i t  a l l  r e - e x a m i n i s t s  /
Ye t  some g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s  can be made. F i r s t ,  the  
r e - e x a m i n i s t s  ac t ed because o f  d i f f e r e n t  m o t i v a t i o n s .  In  
the case o f  R e p u b l i c a n s ,  p o l i t i c s  p l ayed a s i g n i f i c a n t  
r o l e .  On the o t h e r  hand,  t h e r e  were those i n  both p a r t i e s  
who expressed l e g i t i m a t e  concern and asked l e g i t i m a t e  
q u e s t i o n s  rega r d i  ng the Admini  s t ra . t . ion'  s ha n d l i n g  o f  
f o r e i g n  a f f a i r s .  T a f t ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  had much more to gain
81 A r t h u r  M. Schl  esinger. , -  J r . ,  "The New I s o l a t i o n i s m , "  
A t l a n t i c , May,  1952,  pp. 3 4 - 3 8 .  As quoted b y ■ S c h l e s i n g e r . 
H e r e a f t e r  c i t e d  as Sch1esi  n g e r , A t l a n t i  c .
82 Hans J.  Morgent hau,  In Defense o f  the Na t i o n a l  
I n t e r e s t :  A C r i t i c a l  ' Exami nat i on of  American Fore i gn P o l i c y
(New Y o r k : A l f r e d  A . Kn opf , 1 9 5 1 ) ,  p p . 1 28 - 29  , 1 34.  Her e ­
a f t e r  c i t e d  as Morgent hau,  Defense o f  N a t i o n a l  I n t e r e s t .
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p o l i t i c a l l y  than did Hoover  who appeared to a c t  p r i m a r i l y  
on hi s  p r i n c i p l e s .  Second,  as a group,  they were adamant l y  
a n t i - C o mmu n i s t ;  and,  i n  so e r e c t i n g  t h i s  f acade they  
a t t e mpt ed  to make the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  look s o f t  on the i ssue  
o f  Communism. Senator  McCarthy and the a t t a c k s  on S e c r e t a r y  
o f  S t a t e  Acheson e x e m p l i f y  t h i s .  T h i r d ,  w h i l e  they expressed  
v a r y i n g  degrees o f  r e s i s t a n c e  to sending American ground 
f o r c e s  to Europe,  they were i n c o n s i s t e n t  r e g a r d i n g  the Far  
E a s t .  On t he  one hand they could suppor t  Ma c Ar t hu r ' s  p r o ­
gram f o r  t o t a l  v i c t o r y  through t he  use of  a i r  power in  
Korea,  and on the o t h e r  hand,  c a p i t a l i z e  on the u n p o p u l a r i t y  
o f  the war and c a l l  f o r  an end to such e n t a ng l emen t s .
F o u r t h ,  t he  r e - e x a m i n i s t s  r e f l e c t e d  d i s c o n t e n t  w i t h  c o l l e c ­
t i v e  s e c u r i t y  and c o l l e c t i v e  defense and c o n t i n u a l l y  opted  
f o r  a g o - i t - a l o n e  p o l i c y .  T a f t  c a l l e d  f o r  mer e l y  the  
e x t e n s i o n  o f  t he  Monroe D o c t r i n e ,  w h i l e  he,  Wher ry ,  and 
Hoover  a l l  p l aced g r e a t  f a i t h  i n  American a i r  power.  F i f t h ,  
w h i 1e denouncing i s o l a t i o n i s m ,  t h e i  r proposal  s c a r r i e d  
d i s t i n c t  ov e r t one s  o f  r e t r e a t i s m .  Hoover would have Europe  
as t he  f i r s t  l i n e  o f  def ense  o n l y  i f  s t r i n g e n t  c o n d i t i o n s  
were met ;  and knowing the per formance o f  Europe,  people  
q u i c k l y  grasped the F o r t r e s s  America t h e s i s .  T a f t  would 
defend Europe but  on l y  ac c or d i ng  to his game p l a n .  The 
Wherry R e s o l u t i o n  not  on l y  i mp l i e d  a r e v e r s a l  of  the Truman 
f o r e i g n  p o l i c y ,  but  i t  a l s o  kept  the s p o t l i g h t  on a h i g h l y  
v o l a t i l e  p o l i t i c a 1 i s s u e . T e c h n i c a l l y ,  the r e - e x a m i n i s t s
77
were not  t o t a l l y  w i t h dr a wi ng  f rom the r e s t  o f  the wor l d  but
were w i l l i n g  to p a r t i c i p a t e  on l y  on t h e i r  own terms.  As a
r e s u l t ,  t h e i r  pr oposa l s  a t  t imes amounted to what  Senat or
Vandenberg c a l l e d  the f i f t e e n - f o o t  rope p o l i c y .  The r e -
e x a m i n i s t s  were t h r owi ng  a f i f t e e n - f o o t  rope to na t i ons
83drowning t h i r t y  f e e t  f rom shore .
Whatever  t h e i r  i n d i v i d u a l  p o s i t i o n s ,  the Hoover -  
T a f t - W h e r r y  f o r c es  had made a c o l l e c t i v e  a s s a u l t  upon t he  
e x i s t i n g  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y . Wi th t he  promise o f  open h e a r i n g s ,  
P r e s i d e n t  Truman,  in t u r n ,  was p r e p a r i n g  a power f u l  defense  
in h i s  own b e h a l f .
83 S c h l e s i n g e r ,  A t l a n t i c , p . 37.
CHAPTER I I I
The Senate Hea r i n gs :  The Pros and
Cons of  European Defense
Truman and his c r i t i c s  a l i k e  based t h e i r  i n d i v i d u a l  
p o s i t i o n s  upon the a l l e g e d  S o v i e t  s t r e n g t h  and West  
European e f f o r t s  a t  c r e a t i n g  a v i a b l e  de f e n s e .  Both s i des  
g e n e r a l l y  acknowledged t h a t  the m i l i t a r y  f o r c e s  of  Western  
Europe were no equal  to the Communist  b l o c ;  however t h e r e  
was no agreement  r e g a r d i n g  the ser i ousness  o f  West  
European i n t e n t i o n s  to do something about  i t .
W i t h i n  the S o v i e t  mi 1 i t a r y  the Red Army posed the  
g r e a t e s t  t h r e a t  w i t h  i t s  v a s t  numbers and emphasis on 
mobi l e  armoured u n i t s .  A l 1 i ed mi 1 i t a r y  a u t h o r i t i e s  
conceded t h a t  Russia had b u i l t  tanks equal  to those o f  any 
o t h e r  na t i on s  dur i ng  Wor ld War I I ,  and t h a t  her  postwar  
weapons p r od u c t i o n  c e n t e r e d  upon tanks and s e l f - p r o p e l l e d  
a r t i l l e r y . ^  Not everyone a r r i v e d  a t  the same e s t i m a t e  o f  
S o v i e t  ground s t r e n g t h ,  but  the more r e l i a b l e  sources  
agreed t h a t  Russia was f i e l d i n g  175 to 200 d i v i s i o n s  a t  
the end o f  1950.
General  J.  Lawton Col 1 ins , Uni ted S t a t e s  Army C h i e f
. D. Warne, N . A . T . O .  and i t s  P r o s p e c t s , The Army 
Q u a r t e r l y  Se r i e s  (New York:  F r e d e r i c k  A. P r a e g e r ,  P u b l i s h ­
ers  , 1954 ) ,  p p . 2 1 - 2 2 .
o f  S t a f f ,  t o l d  the Senate For e i gn  R e l a t i o n s - A r me d  S e r v i c e s
j o i n t  commi t tee in  February  1951 t h a t  he knew " q u i t e
c e r t a i n l y "  Russia had 175 to.  200 - d i v i s i o n s '  pi us the f o r c e s
o f  the s a t e l l i t e  c o u n t r i e s .  He hastened to e x p l a i n  t h a t
175 S o v i e t  d i v i s i o n s ; . e q u a l  l e d . - a b o u t ' 1.10 Amer ican d i v i s i o n s
because t he  average Russian d i v i s i o n  was composed o f  1 2 , 0 0 0
to 1 4 , 0 0 0  men w h i l e  an Amer ican d i v i s i o n  averaged a p p r o x i -
2ma t e l y  1 8 , 0 0 0  men. The A s s o c i a t i o n  o f  the U n i t e d  S t a t e s
Army concur red w i t h  t h a t  e s t i m a t e  and f u r t h e r  t a l l i e d  the
t o t a l  Communist  s t r e n g t h , i n c l u d i n g  Russia , Ch i na ,  and a l l
the  s a t e l l i t e  n a t i o n s ,  a t  467 d i v i s i o n s .  In compar i son,
3the f r e e  wor l d  coul d on l y  c a l l  upon 141 d i v i s i o n s .  I t  i s
e v i d e n t  the f i g u r e s  the Defense Depar tment  gave Senat ors  im-
4pressed the l e g i s l a t o r s ;  even Rober t  T a f t  accept ed the e x i s
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tence o f  175 S o v i e t  d i v i s i o n s  and 60 s a t e l l i t e  d i v i s i o n s .
Most  people  d i s p l a y e d  a n x i e t y  over  the S o v i e t  
ground f o r c e s  but  l ess so r e g a r d i n g  the Russian A i r  Force  
or  Navy.  Should war come, many b e l i e v e d  i t  would be a s t and  
o f f  between the Un i t e d  S t a t e s  Navy and the Russian Navy;  
t he  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  had a s u p e r i o r  c a r r i e r  f o r c e  w h i l e  the
2Se n a t e ,  H e a r i n g s ,  S. Con. Res.  8 , p.  168.
3Conrad H. Lanza ,  "World P e r i m e t e r s ," U n i t e d  S t a t e s  
Army Combat Forces J o u r n a l , I (June 1 9 5 1 ) ,  44.
4 L e t t e r s  to a u t ho r  f rom Paul  H. Dougl as ,
December 13,  1970*  and L e v e r e t t  S a l t o n s t a l l ,  November 25,  
1970.
5T a f t ,  A For e i gn  P o l i c y  f o r  Am e r i c a n s , p.  7.
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S o v i e t s  m a i n t a i n e d  a much l a r g e r  submar ine f o r c e . ^
Regarding the S o v i e t  A i r  For c e ,  t he  Amer ican Defense
E s t a b l i s h me n t  r e v e a l e d  l i t t l e  about  Russian a i r  power;
however ,  the French e s t i m a t e d  S o v i e t  a i r  s t r e n g t h  a t  6 0 0 , 0 0 0
men and 5 0 , 0 0 0  p l a n e s ,  o f  which 1 0 , 0 0 0  were j e t  f i g h t e r
a i r c r a f t  and 2 , 0 0 0  were medium-range bombers. ^ U n l i k e  the
Un i t e d  S t a t e s  A i r  For c e ,  the S o v i e t s  s t r e s s e d  t a c t i c a l  a i r
suppor t  o f  ground f o r c e s  w i t h  on l y  secondary  emphasis on
s t r a t e g i c  bombing o f  the enemy. Some a n a l y s t s  e s t i m a t e d
t h a t  a p p r o x i m a t e l y  t w o - t h i r d s  o f  the S o v i e t  a i r c r a f t
s t r e n g t h  was i n t e g r a t e d  w i t h  t h e i r  v a s t  ground f o r c e s .
Whi l e  the U n i t e d  S t a t e s  produced a new g e n e r a t i o n  o f  bombers,
the  S o v i e t  Union mer e l y  copi ed the Amer ican B - 2 9 - -  a medium
range bomber which would have r e q u i r e d  f o r w a r d  bases to
8s t r i k e  t he  Amer ican c o n t i n e n t .  Russi a had f o u g h t  Wor ld  
War I I  p r i m a r i l y  w i t h  ground f o r c e s , and in  1950 t h a t  
r e l i a n c e  on l and f o r c e s  had not  b a s i c a l l y  changed.
Besides the S o v i e t  army i t s e l f ,  t h e r e  were s igns  
t h a t  Russia was e n l a r g i n g  t he  s a t e l l i t e  f o r c e s .  Unconf i rmed
c
How We Stack Up A g a i n s t  Russi a  , " Newsweek,
March 13,  1950 ,  p. 17.
^ " A i r  S t r e n g t h ," Mi 1 i t a r y  Revi  ew, XXX ( Januar y  , 1 9 5 1 ) ,  
p.  72.  A r t i c l e  quoted f rom t he  French p u b l i c a t i o n  
I l l u s t r a t i o n .
8 Raymond L.  G a r t h o f f ,  " S o v i e t  A t t i t u d e s  Toward 
Modern A i r  Power , "  M i l i t a r y  A f f a i r s  XIX (Summer,  1955)  
pp.  77 ,  79.  G a r t h o f f  was a s p e c i a l i s t  on S o v i e t  m i l i t a r y  
and p o l i t i c a l  a f f a i r s  on the s t a f f  o f  the RAND C o r p o r a t i o n .
He po i n t e d  out  t h a t  the S o v i e t  TU-4 was a l most  an e x a c t  copy 
o f  an Amer ican B- 2 9 ,  one o f  which had cr ashed i n  S i b e r i a  i n  
1944 .
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r e p o r t s  showed a f i f t y  per  c e n t  i n c r e a s e  i n  the s a t e l l i t e  
ground f o r c e s  dur i ng  t he  l a s t  s i x  months o f  19 50.  In 
a d d i t i o n ,  t he  press r e p o r t e d  e x t e n s i v e  a c t i v i t y  i n  East  
Germany: the e s t a b ! i s h m e n t  o f  a German A i r  Force exceeded
i n  s t r e n g t h  on l y  by Ru ss i a ,  t he  U n i t e d  S t a t e s ,  and Engl and;  
t he  l a y i n g  o f  double and even qu a dr up l e  r a i l r o a d  t r a c k s  
f rom the S o v i e t  bor der  wes t war d;  and the s t o c k p i l i n g  o f
9l a r g e  g a s o l i n e  and ammuni t ion dumps i n  German t e r r i t o r y .
I t  i s  i mp o s s i b l e  to assess a c c u r a t e l y  t he  S o v i e t  
s t r e n g t h  and the b u i l d - u p  i n  the s a t e ! 1 i t e s . Defense  
Depar t ment  e s t i m a t e s  o f  Russi an s t r e n g t h  may have been 
r e a s o n a b l y  a c c u r a t e  even though S t a l i n  guarded h i s  s t a t e  
s e c r e t s  w e l l .  On the o t h e r  hand,  the r e p o r t s  o f  s a t e l l i t e  
b u i l d - u p s  came to t he  s u r f a c e  i n  press r e p o r t s  which were  
never  v e r i f i e d  by t he  Defense Depar t ment  or  anyone e l s e .
As a r e s u l t  o f  the e s t i m a t e s  p r o v i d e d ,  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  
s u p p o r t e r s  and c r i t i c s  a l i k e  g e n e r a l l y  b e l i e v e d  a m i l i t a r y  
t h r e a t  to Western Europe di d  e x i s t .
At  the same t i m e ,  however ,  Amer icans coul d not  agree  
whet her  or  not  Europeans had the w i l l  to meet  t he  S o v i e t  
c h a l l e n g e .  A Frenchman,  d i s c u s s i n g  European r ear mament ,  s a i d ,
9Joseph and S t e w a r t  A l s o p ,  "Russia  B u i l d s  S a t e l l i t e  
Armies i n Europe,  Takes Ot her  Steps t h a t  M i g h t  Mean War i n  
S p r i n g , "  S t .  Louis P o s t - D i s p a t c h , January  23,  1951 ,  p.  I B ;  
Chalmers H. G o o d ! i n ,  "Four t h  L a r g e s t  A i r  Force i n  t he  World  
B u i l t  up by Russia i n  Ea s t e r n  Germany,  Repor ts  I n d i c a t e , "
S t .  Louis P o s t - D i s p a t c h , March 11,  1951 ,  p . 3B.
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"Our apat hy  has sometimes seemed t h a t  o f  an o l d  goat  
hy p no t i z e d  by a p y t h o n . " ^  Truman and hi s  c r i t i c s  both  
demanded t h a t  the o t h e r  NATO members c a r r y  t h e i r  f a i r  share  
of  the bur den,  but  the c r i t i c s  were more i n c l i n e d  to b e l i e v e  
t h a t  Europeans no l o n g e r  had the w i l l  f o r  b a t t l e .  "What i s  
demanded o f  t hem, "  observed W a l t e r  Lippmann,  " i s  r ou g h l y  
the e q u i v a l e n t  to g e t t i n g  out  o f  a s i ckbed i n  o r d e r  to f i n d  
out  how f a s t  you can run up the Washington Monument.
Bef or e  the Senate For e i gn  R e l a t i o n s  and Armed
Se r v i c e s  Commit tees convened he a r i ng s  on Senate C o n c u r r e n t
R e s o l u t i o n  No. 8 , P r e s i d e n t  Truman sent  General  Eisenhower
on a w h i r l w i n d  f a c t - f i n d i n g  t o u r  o f  the NATO c o u n t r i e s  in
Europe.  Al t hough the Supreme A l l i e d  Commander may have had
hi s  mind made up,  he di d  i n v e s t i g a t e  the f e e l i n g s  o f  the
European member n a t i o n s .  Genera l  E i senhower ,  in r e p o r t i n g
to Truman,  concluded t h a t  Europeans had the w i l l  to b u i l d
an adequate  d e f e n s e ,  but  t h e i r  poor  economic c o n d i t i o n s
pr event ed  them from doing any more than they  were a l r e a d y
doi ng .  In h i s  o p i n i o n ,  sendi ng equipment  and men was the
12on l y  s o l u t i o n .
The General  made t hese same p o i n t s  on February  1,
^ M i c h a e l  S t r a i g h t ,  "Can the A t l a n t i c  C o u n t r i e s  
Un i t e ?"  New R e p u b l i c , August  21,  1950 ,  p.  11.
^ W a l t e r  Lippmann,  "The I sol  a t i  on i s t  T i de ,"
Washington P o s t , December 19,  1950,  p.  19.
12 Truman,  Memo i r s , 1 1 , 258.
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1951,  in a s t a t e me n t  be f o r e  a j o i n t  sessi on o f  Congress and
l a t e r  the same day when he t e s t i f i e d  b e f o r e  the j o i n t
Senate commi t t ees .  He - emphasized the i mpor t ance  o f  Europe ' s
i n d u s t r i a l  c a p a c i t y  and noted t h a t  should her  p o t e n t i a l  be
gi ven to t he  Communist bl oc the ba l ance  o f  power would
become "ver y  c r i t i c a l , "  even to the p o i n t  t h a t  the s a f e t y
o f  t he  Un i t e d  S t a t e s  would be " g r a v e l y  i m p e r i l e d . "  To
pr e v e n t  t h a t  f rom happening he s e t  a goal  o f  b u i l d i n g
European moral e and c o n f i d e n c e .  His f i r s t  p r i o r i t y  was
i ncreas i ng American a i d  i n  the form o f  mi 1 i t a r y  equi  pment ;
second,  American ground f o r c es  would a c t  to b o l s t e r
European def ense u n t i l  Europe could c a r r y  i t s  own l oad .
He found i t  unnecessary to match the S o v i e t  Union d i v i s i o n
f o r  d i v i s i o n  and suggested t h a t  an army a f r a c t i o n  o f  the
S o v i e t  s t r e n g t h  could defend s i g n i f i c a n t  p o r t i o n s  o f  Europe.
I mme d i a t e l y  s e v e r a l  Senat ors  wanted assurances t h a t  the
Un i t e d  St a t e s  would not  end up f u r n i s h i n g  n i n e t y  per  cent
o f  the t roops as had happened in Korea.  Under q u e s t i o n i n g
Ei senhower  r e f used to i n d i c a t e  what  the Amer ican c o n t r i b u t i o n
o f  men should or  would be,  b u t ,  a t  the same t i m e ,  he
13r i g i d l y  opposed s e t t i n g  a l i m i t  or  a . f i x e d  r a t i o .
Out s i de  o f  Congress the r e a c t i o n  to E i senhower ' s  
r e p o r t  and t e s t i mo n y  was g e n e r a l l y  f a v o r a b l e .  Al t hough the  
Chicago D a i l y  T r i bu ne  p r e d i c t e d  t h a t  Amer icans would not  be
13 Senat e ,  H e a r i n q s ,  S, Con. Res.  8 ,  pp.  3,  5,  14,
27 ,  31.
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14t aken in  by hi s  r emarks ,  moderate and l i b e r a l  papers found
t he  General  1s m a t t e r - o f - f a c t  approach to be q u i t e  
15c o n v i n c i n g .  In f a c t ,  such c o l umni s t s  as A r t h u r  Kr ock ,
Drew Pear son,  and James Reston c r e d i t e d  Ei senhower  w i t h ,  i f  
not  wi nn i ng  over  Co ng r e s s , a t  l e a s t  removing much o f  the
1 c
o p p o s i t i o n  to the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n 1s pi an . The i m p l i c a t i o n  
was t h a t  E i senhower ,  w h i l e  s e r v i n g  the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,  
accompl i shed what  Truman had no t .
The Senate he a r i ngs  c on t i n ue d  t h r o u g h o u t  the month 
o f  February  w i t h  Truman sending i n  hi s  f i r s t  1 i ne  1 i e u t e n a n t s . 
Among the more n o t a b l e  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  w i t n e s s e s  were  
S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e  Dean Acheson,  S e c r e t a r y  o f  Defense  
George M a r s h a l l ,  Chai  rman of  the Joi  nt  Ch i e f s  o f  S t a f f  Omar 
B r a d l e y ,  Army C h i e f  o f  S t a f f  J .  Lawton C o l l i n s ,  C h i e f  o f  
Naval  Op e r a t i o n s  F o r r e s t  P. Sherman,  A i r  Force C h i e f  o f  
S t a f f  Hoyt  S. Vandenberg,  A l t e r n a t e  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e  to the  
U n i t e d  Na t i ons  John Sherman Cooper ,  and f o r me r  M i l i t a r y  
Governor  in  Germany Lucius D. C l a y .  U n t i l  t he  h e ar i ng s  
Truman had,  in essence,  made on l y  a h a l f - h e a r t e d  de f ense  o f
14 E d i t o r i a l ,  Chicago D a l l y  T r i b u n e , Fe br ua r y  2 ,
1 9 5 1 ,  s e c . I , p . 1 2 .
15 E d i t o r i a l ,  A t l a n t a  C o n s t i t u t i o n , Febr ua r y  2,  1951 ,  
p.  22;  E d i t o r i a l ,  San Fr a nc i s c o  C h r o n i c l e , Febr uar y  2,  19 51 ,  
p.  18;  E d i t o r i a l , Washington P o s t , Febr uar y  2 ,  1951 ,  p.  22.
1 fiA r t h u r  Krock ,  "Congress E a s i l y  Won to E i s e n ho we r ' s  
Views ," New York T i m e s , February  4 ,  1951 ,  sec.  I V ,  p. 3;
Drew Pear son,  "Eisenhower  Wins the Congress to His C o r n e r , "  
Denver  P o s t , February  7,  1951 ,  p. 19;  James Rest on,  
" E i s e n h o w e r ’ s Magic Wins Over C a p i t a l  H i l l  S u s p i c i o n , "  New 
York T i m e s , February  2,  1951 ,  P- 5.
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h i s  d e c i s i o n  to depl oy  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  t r oops  to Europe;  
now he produced h i s  bi g guns.
S e c r e t a r y  Marshal  1,  f o l l o w i n g  E i senhower ,  made the  
next  maj or  dent  in the o p p o s i t i o n ' s  case .  The A d m i n i s t r a ­
t i o n ,  he p o i n t e d  o u t ,  was mer e l y  c a r r y i n g  out  the Congress'  
e a r l i e r  d i r e c t i v e - - t h a t  i ssued when the m i l i t a r y  a i d  
program was a p p r o v e d - - t o  i n t e g r a t e  the def ense  p l ans  o f  t he  
NATO members.  The i n t e n t  of  the T r e a t y  and the p l ans  
s u b s e qu e nt l y  devel oped were aimed a t  p r e v e n t i n g  war and 
t h i s ,  i n h i s  v i e w ,  meant  adequat e  p r e p a r a t i o n s  b e f o r e  a war  
broke o u t .  L i k e  E i senhower ,  he found the European w i l l  to  
defend t hemsel ves depended upon t h e i r  m o r a l e .  The mere 
r e l i a n c e  upon A r t i c l e  5 was not  enough because w a i t i n g  f o r
t h a t  c l ause  to t ake  e f f e c t  meant  Europe would once aga i n
17become a b a t t l e g r o u n d ,  i n v i t i n g  d e v a s t a t i o n .
F i n a l l y ,  Ma r s h a l l  s t r i p p e d  the H o o v e r - T a f t - W h e r r y  
f o r c e s  o f  one o f  t h e i r  main arguments.  U n t i l  t h i s  t ime the  
o p p o s i t i o n  had made much i ss ue  o f  the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s  
a l l e g e d  d e s i r e  to send " l a r g e "  numbers o f  Amer ican f o r c e s  
to Europe*  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  c r i t i c s  never  spoke i n  terms o f  
e x a c t  f i g u r e s  but  c o n s i s t e n t l y  p o i n t e d  out  t h a t  the U n i t e d  
St a t e s  was f u r n i s h i n g  n i n e t y  per  cent  o f  the f o r c e s  in  
Korea,  a s i t u a t i o n  l i k e l y  to happen in Europe.  M a r s h a l l  
r e v e a l e d  t h a t  the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  proposed to c o n t r i b u t e
^ S e n a t e ,  .Hearings'-,  S. Con.  Res.  8 ,  pp.  39 ,  51 , 61 ,
67.
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on l y  s i x  ground d i v i s i o n s  to a NATO army composed o f
a p p r o x i ma t e l y  s i x t y  d i v i s i o n s .  Since two Amer ican d i v i s i o n s
were a l r e a d y  in Germany s e r v i n g  oc c upa t i on  d u t y ,  on l y  f o u r
18more d i v i s i o n s  would be s e n t .  Truman d i d  not  make a l a s t -
minute concession to q u i e t  t he  o p p o s i t i o n  by pr opos i ng t h i s
r e l a t i v e l y  smal l  c o n t r i b u t i o n .  Before  the P r e s i d e n t  made
hi s  September  1950 announcement  on sendi ng t r oops  to Europe
he and the J o i n t  Ch i e f s  Of S t a f f  had dec i ded t h a t  an a d d i -
1 9t i o n a l  f o u r  to s i x  d i v i s i o n s  was a l l  t h a t  was needed.
S e c r e t a r y  Acheson c on t i n ue d  the l i n e  o f  r ea s on i ng
taken by Ei senhower  and M a r s h a l l .  His p r i ma r y  premise was
t h a t  the s e c u r i t y  o f  Western Europe was i n t e r t w i n e d  w i t h
the s e c u r i t y  o f  the Un i t e d  S t a t e s .  He suggest ed the
i n t a n g i b l e  bonds o f  s o c i a l ,  s p i r i t u a l ,  and p o l i t i c a l  va l ues
and acknowledged the i mpor t ance  o f  European i n d u s t r i a l
p r o d u c t i o n  to the f r e e  w o r l d .  Amer ican p o l i c y  in  Europe,
a c c or d i ng  to the S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e ,  c e n t e r e d  on p r e v e n t i n g
a n o t h e r  war w h i l e ,  a t  the same t i m e ,  p r e s e r v i n g  the f r e e
n a t i o n s  o f  Europe.  He,  1 i ke  his  a s s o c i a t e s  who t e s t i f i e d
e a r l i e r ,  found European morale  and c o n f i d e n c e  to be
20dependent  upon American a i d  and Amer ican t r o o p s .
18 I b i d . , p. 41.  None o f  the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s  
wi t n e s s e s  a d mi t t e d  t h a t  s i x t y  d i v i s i o n s  was the o r i g i n a l  
goal  o f  NATO; however ,  t h i s  was the gener a l  f i g u r e  i n f or med  
sources gave the press .
1 9Acheson,  P r e s e n t  a t  the C r e a t i o n , p.  439 .
Of)
Se n a t e ,  H e a r i n g s ,  S. Con. Res.  8 , pp.  7 8 - 7 9 ,  81 ,  
8 4 - 8 5 ,  9 5 - 9 6 ,  125.
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Sena t or  H i c k e n l o o p e r , a member o f  the Fore i gn  
R e l a t i o n s  Commi t tee,  r e s u r r e c t e d  Acheson' s t e s t i mo n y  gi ven  
a t  the Nor t h  A t l a n t i c  T r e a t y  h e a r i n g s .  Acheson was a b l e ,  
w i t h  on l y  moderate success,  to e x p l a i n  his  i n t e n t  a t  those  
e a r l i e r  h e a r i n g s .  When asked about  the December, 1950 
Br usse l s  c on f e r e nc e  Acheson deni ed t h a t  a commitment of  
t roops  had been made. T r u e ,  he s a i d ,  many o f  the d e t a i l s  
f o r  e s t a b l i s h i n g  a u n i f i e d  command and an army had been 
ha n d l e d ,  "but  no count r y  was asked t o ,  nor  did any count r y
commit  i t s e l f  in r egar d  to t u r n i n g  over  any a d d i t i o n a l
21t r o o p s . "  I ndeed,  the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  may not  have o b l i g a ­
ted i t s e l f  per  se,  but  mer e l y  a vague o f f e r  would have the  
i m p l i c a t i o n  of  some form o f  commitment .  Numerous Senators  
l ooked upon any such commitment  as an i mp l e me n t a t i on  of  
the T r e a t y ,  an i mp l e me n t a t i o n  which r e q u i r e d  Congress i ona l  
approva l  .
Truman assi gned the J o i n t  Ch i e f s  o f  S t a f f  the t ask  
o f  r e f u t i  ng the r e - e x a m i n i s t s '  m i l i t a r y  arguments.  General  
Br a d l e y  summed up the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s case f o r  de p l oy i ng  
t r oops  w i t h  f i v e  reasons:  ( 1 ) c o l l e c t i v e  s e c u r i t y  r e q u i r e d
l e a d e r s h i p ;  ( 2 ) p r o t e c t i n g  the Amer ican occupat i on  f o r c e s  
a l r e a d y  in Germany; ( 3 )  bo os t i ng  the morale  o f  Europeans;  
( 4 )  b r i n g i n g  about  a m i l i t a r y  r e c o v e r y  o f  Western Europe,  
and ( 5 )  i t  was b e t t e r  to f i g h t  a war on European s o i l  than
21 I b i d . , pp.  1 0 0 - 0 2 ,  1 1 1 - 1 4 .
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22American s o i l .  The J o i n t  Ch i e f s  o f  S t a f f  spent  c o n s i d e r ­
abl e  e f f o r t  e x p l a i n i n g  why Amer ican a i r  power was not  a
9 3
good s u b s t i t u t e  f o r  ground f o r c e s .  Mor eov er ,  the m i l i t a r y  
c h i e f s  r e s i s t e d , as di d  a l l  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  w i t n e s s e s ,  any 
at t empt s  by Congress to l i m i t ,  e i t h e r  by a f i x e d  number or  
by a r a t i o ,  the q u a n t i t y  o f  t r oops  to be depl oyed should  
more than s i x  d i v i s i o n s  e v e n t u a l l y  be needed.  In a d d i t i o n ,  
these s u b o r d i n a t e s  o f  t he  Co mma nder - i n - Ch i e f  m e t i c u l o u s l y  
avoi ded answer i ng q u e s t i o n s  r e g a r d i n g  the P r e s i d e n t ' s
24power to commit  and depl oy  Amer ican f o r c e s  to a NATO army.
The o t h e r  A d m i n i s t r a t i  on w i t n es s e s  d i d  not  d e v i a t e  
f rom the p o s i t i o n  a l r e a d y  e s t a b ! i s h e d . Not a l l  the  
wi t nes s e s  f a v o r i n g  the depl oyment  o f  t r oops  to Europe came 
f rom the E x e c u t i v e  br a nch ,  nor  were they  a l l  Democrats .
The p o s i t i o n s  o f  Thomas E . Dewey and Har o l d  E. St assen are  
exampl es,  f o r  t hey  came out  i n  d i r e c t  o p p o s i t i o n  to t he  
H o o v e r - T a f t - W h e r r y  stands t h e r e b y  exposi ng t he  r i f t  w i t h i n  
the Republ i can  P a r t y .
Dewey had c l e a r l y  e s t a b l i s h e d  h i m s e l f  as an i n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l i s t  much e a r l i e r ,  and he now r e j e c t e d  the  
r e - e x a m i n i s t ' s pr oposa l s  as bei ng the wrong approach.  He 
d i r e c t e d  much o f  h is  a t t e n t i o n  not  on l y  to the i mpor t ance
2 2 Ibj_d. , p.  126.
2 3 See pp.  9 5 - 1 0 7 .
2 4 I b i d . ,  pp.  9 - 1 0 ,  22 ,  46 ,  1 2 8 - 2 9 ,  1 5 6 - 5 7 ,  170,
219 ,  223 ,  232.
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o f  keeping Europe f r e e  but  a l s o  towards the s e c ur i ng  of
n a t u r a l  r esour ces  not  a v a i l a b l e  in the Uni t ed S t a t e s .  I f
Europe f e l l  to Russia then As i a  and A f r i c a  were sure to
f o l l o w ,  and in  such a case ,  he sur mi sed ,  t he  Un i t e d  S t a t e s
would be deni ed the i n d u s t r y  o f  Europe and a whole host  of
raw m a t e r i a l s  f rom o t h e r  p a r t s  o f  the wo r l d .  He s p e c i f i c a l l y
d i s l i k e d  Wher r y ' s  R e s o l u t i o n  because i t s  i n t e n t  was very
nar r ow,  t h a t  i s ,  "one l i t t l e  t oe ho l d  o f  i s o l a t i o n i s m
concer n i ng  t he  sending o f  ground t roops on l y  to one a r e a - -
2 5Western Eu r o pe . "
Har o l d  S t as s e n ,  then P r e s i d e n t  of  the U n i v e r s i t y  o f
P e n n s y l v a n i a ,  was by no means the l e a d i n g  spokesman f o r  any
f a c t i o n  o f  t he  Republ i can  P a r t y ,  but  l i k e  many o t h er s  he
voi ced hi s  o p i n i o n  whenever  t he  occas i on pr esent ed  i t s e l f .
He opposed the Wherry Reso1u t i o n , in p a r t ,  because i t
appeared to meddle in m i l i t a r y  t a c t i c s .  As a s u p p o r t e r  o f
c o l l e c t i v e  def ense  he wanted the Un i t e d  S t a t e s  to be f i r m
r a t h e r  than t i m i d ,  t h e r e b y  wi nn i ng "a v i c t o r y  f o r  c i v i l i z a -
2 fit i o n  and f reedom over  Communist  i m p e r i a l i s m . "
In the Senate P r e s i d e n t  Truman found backers among 
Republ i cans  such as Wayne Morse o f  Oregon and Henry Cabot  
Lodge o f  Massachuset ts  who were not  f ormal  w i t n e s s e s .
Se n a t o r  Morse asked t h a t  e v e r y t h i n g  necessary  be done to
2 5 I b i d . , pp.  527 ,  5 2 9 - 3 1 ,  539,
2 ^ I b i d  . , pp.  4 8 0 ,  487.
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27"assur e  the e f f e c t i v e  i mp l e me n t a t i o n  o f  the A t l a n t i c  P a c t . "  
The A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  m a r s h a l l e d  i t s  own Democra t i c  s u p p o r t e r s , 
Fo r e i g n  R e l a t i o n s  Commit tee Chairman Co n n a l l y  being t he  most  
v o c a l .  Also Sena t or  Paul  Douglas ,  Democrat  f rom I l l i n o i s ,  
v i g o r o u s l y  spoke up in the Senate on b e h a l f  o f  the Ad mi n i s ­
t r a t i o n .  As a s t u d e n t  o f  h i s t o r y  Douglas warned t h a t  
Western c i v i l i z a t i o n  and democr a t i c  i n s t i t u t i o n s  were a t  
s t a k e .  As an economi st  he r e j e c t e d  the argument  t h a t  the  
c ou nt r y  coul d not  a f f o r d  the Truman program and even went
to t he  e x t e n t  o f  showing how the e x t r a  economic burden coul d
28be s h o u l d e r e d .  Se n a t o r  J .  Wi11 iam F u l b r i g h t  c a u t i o n e d
hi s  a s s o c i a t e s  not  to seek o v e r s i m p l i f i e d  s o l u t i o n s  f o r  t he
c o m p l e x i t i e s  o f  f o r e i g n  a f f a i r s .  R i s i n g  above p a r t y  p o l i t i c s
he po i n t e d  out  the moral  o b l i g a t i o n  the n a t i o n  had to both
29NATO and to t he  past  h e r i t a g e  o f  h e l p i n g  defend Europe.
Not  everyone gave his un d i v i d e d  suppor t  to one
camp or  the o t h e r ;  some stood p a r t i a l l y  in both camps.
R e p r e s e n t a t i v e  John F. Kennedy,  Democrat  f rom Ma s s a c h u s e t t s ,
i s  one o f  the b e t t e r  examples because he f u l l y  s p e l l e d  out
h i s  p o s i t i o n  be f o r e  the j o i n t  Senate commi t t ee .  Upon
r e t u r n i n g  f rom a t r i p  to Europe he r e p o r t e d  to the House:
I f  Europe is  to be saved,  Europe must com­
mence to make s a c r i f i c e s  s u f f i c i e n t  f o r  t h a t
^ Congress iona 1 Record , XCVI I  , 258.
2 8 I b i d . , pp.  243 ,  249.
2 9 I b i d . , pp.  521 - 22  .
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purpose and commensurate w i t h  the danger  t h a t  
t h r e a t e n s  to e n g u l f  her  peop l e s .  The p l a i n  and 
b r u t a l  f a c t  today Is t h a t  Europe i s  not  making 
t hese  s a c r i f i c e s  . . . .  I t  i s  i mp o r t a n t  t h a t  
Western Europe be saved,  but  we cannot  do so o u r ­
s e l v e s  or  pay a p r i c e  t h a t  w i l l  endanger  our  own 
s u r v i v a l .  We cannot  l i n k  our whole f a t e  to what  
i s  p r e s e n t l y  a de s p e r a t e  g a m b l e . 30
A few days l a t e r ,  on February  2 2 ,  1951,  he t e s t i ­
f i e d  b e f o r e  the Senate commi t t ees .  In Kennedy's mind 
Western Europe was v i t a l  to Amer ican s e c u r i t y ,  and he was 
f e a r f u l  t h a t  i f  the number o f  Amer ican oc cu pa t i on  t roops  
were not  i n c r e a s e d  or  were t o t a l l y  wi thdrawn the e n t i r e  
European def ense e f f o r t  would c o l l a p s e .  Amer ican a i d  was 
t h e r e f o r e  n e c e s s a r y ,  b u t ,  more i m p o r t a n t l y ,  Europeans  
would have to s t a r t  doing more t he mse l v es .  He went  on to 
e x p l a i n  the d i f f e r e n c e  between his  p o s i t i o n  and his  
f a t h e r ' s  as one o f  t i m i n g .  Joseph Kennedy could not  
e n v i s i o n  Europeans c r e a t i n g  an army o f  s u f f i c i e n t  s t r e n g t h  
b e f o r e  the Red Army began moving across the c o n t i n e n t .
John Kennedy,  on the o t h e r  hand,  f e l t  the r i s k  should be 
t a k e n ,  f o r  i f  war could be pr event ed  f o r  e i g h t e e n  months 
then an adequate  f o r c e  coul d be assembled.  He t h e r e f o r e  
s i ded  w i t h  those wi sh i ng  to f u r n i s h  Amer ican ground f o r c e s  
to  Europe;  however ,  he r e f u s e d  to acknowledge the P r e s i d e n t ' s  
power i n  the absence o f  Congress i ona l  a p p r o v a l .  I n  e f f e c t ,  
he went  a l ong w i t h  the P r e s i d e n t  on t h e d e s i r a b i l i t y o f  
d e p l o y i n g  U n i t e d  St a t es  t r oops  and,  a t  the same t i m e ,  agreed
3 0 I b i d . , p.  1302.
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31wi t h  Wherry t h a t  the Congress should have the f i n a l  say.  
Kennedy's p o s i t i o n  is  t y p i c a l  o f  t h a t  t aken by many i n  the  
upper  house,  Democrat  and Republ i can a l i k e .  Whi le a 
m a j o r i t y  o f  Senators  suppor t ed the sending o f  t r o o p s ,  they  
l i k e w i s e  were a t t e m p t i n g  to r e a s s e r t  t h e i r  r o l e  i n  f o r e i g n  
a f f a i r s .  This  was a maj or  reason the debate  dragged on 
f o r  a f u l l  month a f t e r  the h e a r i n g s .
Sena t or  Wher ry ,  a l t hough he was not  a member o f  
e i t h e r  commi t t ee ,  s a t  i n  on the hear i ngs  as a guest  w i t h  the  
r i g h t  to c a l l  and q u e s t i o n  w i t n e s s e s .  Quest i on the wi t nesses  
he d i d ,  f o r  no one escaped hi s  pr obi ng i n t e r r o g a t i o n . He 
produced a f o l l o w i n g  composed o f  a v a r i e t y  of  i n d i v i d u a 1s 
and o r g a n i z a t i o n s .  His most i mp o r t a n t  wi t nesses  i n c l u d e d  
Senator  T a f t ,  f or mer  P r e s i d e n t  Hoover ,  and a host  of  a i r  
power a d v o c a t e s .
Wher ry ,  who t e s t i f i e d  h i m s e l f ,  r e i t e r a t e d  e a r l i e r  
r e - e x a m i n i s t  arguments and r e l i e d  h e a v i l y  upon the a i r  
power t h e s i s .  He c l e a r l y  r eve a l e d ,  his  " i s o l a t i o n i s t "  t e n ­
denci es when Senat or  Knowland suggested t h a t  i t  mi ght  be 
b e t t e r  to p r e v e n t  Russia f rom ov e r r u nn i ng  Europe in the  
f i r s t  p l a c e .  Wherry r e p l i e d ,  "What are you going to save?"  
Opposing the P r e s i d e n t  and his  p l a n ,  Wherry s a i d ,  " Ac t ,  I 
plead w i t h  you,  to p r e v e n t  the r i s k  o f  spr ead i ng  our  man­
power .around the g l o b e ,  t h i n  everywhere and st rong
31 Sena t e ,  H e a r i n q s ,  S. Con. Res.  8 ,  pp.  424 ,  427.
433,  443.
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nowhere . "  He went  on,  " I  b e l i e v e  you are  t a k i n g  a
m i s c a l c u l a t e d  r i s k  when you g i v e  the P r e s i d e n t  and hi s
l a n d - w a r  a d v i s e r s  a b l ank  check . "  In p l ace  o f  ground f o r c e s
he aga i n  c a l l e d  f o r  "mastery  o f  the a i r  to p u l v e r i z e  Russi a
32i n t o  submi ss i on . "  Whi l e  always cont endi ng hi s  r e s o l u t i o n  
was aimed a t  r e s t o r i n g  Co ng r e s s ' s r i g h t  to de t e r mi ne  ' ' p o l i c y "  
he r e p e a t e d l y  l apsed i n t o  a harangue on the omnipotence o f  
a i r  power .
Senat or  T a f t  i n  h i s  appearance b e f o r e  the commi t tees  
aga i n  s t r u c k a t  the economics o f  the t r oops  - f o r - E u r o p e  
i s s u e ,  the P r e s i d e n t ' s  a l l e g e d  power,  and the a d v i s a b i 1 i t y  
o f  h e l p i n g  Europe a t  a l l . Even though i t  had been p o i n t e d  
out  t h a t  t he  o v e r a l l  s i z e  o f  the Un i t e d  S t a t e s  Army would 
not  be i nc r e a s e d  by sending t roops  to Europe,  Se na t or  T a f t  
opposed the p r o j e c t e d  3 , 5 0 0 , 0 0 0  man army as be i ng beyond 
t he  economic c a p a c i t y  o f  the n a t i o n .  For a l l  h i s  t a l k  
about  money,  the Senat or  never  r e v e a l e d  what  i t  would cost  
to e s t a b l i s h  an adequat e  A i r  Force;  none o f  the r e - e x a m i n i s t s , 
f o r  t h a t  m a t t e r ,  made e f f o r t s  to produce a cos t  a n a l y s i s  
showing the savi ngs o f  having an a l l - p o w e r f u l  A i r  Force  
r a t h e r  than a bal anced m i l i t a r y .  F i n d i n g  an a p p a r e n t  s o l u ­
t i o n  in a i r  power,  T a f t  d id not  t h i n k  the l oss  o f  Western  
Europe would n e c e s s a r i l y  be " f a t a l . "  R e f l e c t i n g  h i s  c o n t i n ­
uing u n c e r t a i n t y  he a t  one p o i n t  s a i d  i t  would be s a f e r
^  I b i d . , pp. 676 ,  685 ,  708.
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" i f  we had no army in Eur ope , "  but  then r e v e r s e d  h i m s e l f
s ay i ng t h a t  Amer ican p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in the European army
p r o j e c t  was wa r r a n t e d  and j u s t i f i a b l e  because the U n i t e d
S t a t e s  had a " r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  as one o f  the occupyi ng
powers in Germany." U n l i k e  Hoover ,  the Ohio Se n a t o r  did
not  ask Europe to have an army i n  bei ng b e f o r e  Amer ican
t r oops  were sent  but  o n l y  r e q u i r e d  a promise or  commitment
o f  s p e c i f i e d  numbers o f  d i v i s i o n s  f rom t he  Europeans.  Wi th
more and more emphasis he c on t i n ue d  to demand t h a t  the
P r e s i d e n t  secure Congr e s s i ona l  a ppr ova l  b e f o r e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s
t r oops  could be ass i gned to an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  army.  T a f t
f a v o r e d  the Wherry R e s o l u t i o n  o n l y  because i t  c a l l e d  upon
t he P r e s i d e n t  to c o n s u l t  w i t h  Congress b e f o r e  any t r oops
coul d be s e n t ;  o t h e r w i s e  he found i t  to have a n e g a t i v e  
33c o n n o t a t i o n .
Former P r e s i d e n t  Hoover  a l s o  r e h a s h e d ' h i s  e a r l i e r
p r o p o s a l s .  A l t hough never  a m i l i t a r y  e x p e r t  he p r e s e n t e d
h i m s e l f  as such when he c l a i med t h a t  Western Europe coul d
not  be defended w i t h  l e s s  than 100 to 125 d i v i s i o n s  . He
r e j e c t e d  Dewey's concern over  the p o s s i b l e  l oss  of  v i t a l
r e sour ces  by say i ng t h a t  such s t r a t e g i c  raw m a t e r i a l s
coul d be o b t a i n e d  in t he  Amer icas f o r  o n l y  s l i g h t l y  more 
3 4
money.  However ,  he f a i l e d  to back t h i s  up w i t h  any cost
3 3 1b i d . , pp.  5 7 ,  138 ,  61 1 , 6 14 ,  61 7 - 2 0 ,  640-41 ,
635 ,  6 5 2 ,  656 ,  658.
3 4 1 b i d . , pp.  724 ,  735.
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e s t i m a t e s  or  o t h e r  p r o o f .  O v e r a l l ,  h i s  F o r t r e s s  Amer i ca  
t h e s i s  remained i n t a c t .
Se n a t o r  Wherry secured backers  such as R e p r e s e n t a t i v e  
W. J.  Bryan Dorn,  Democrat  f rom South C a r o l i n a ,  and 
R e p r e s e n t a t i v e  Lawrence H. Smi t h ,  Re p ub l i c a n  f rom Wi s c o n s i n ;  
however ,  h i s  p r i ma r y  wi t nesses were a s s o c i a t e d  i n  some way 
w i t h  t he  A i r  For ce .  These i n c l u d e d  such men as L i e u t e n a n t  
General  Har o l d  George ( r e t i r e d ) ,  L i e u t e n a n t  Genera l  C u r t i s  
E. LeMay,  A l e x a n d e r  de Se v e r s k y ,  Genera l  Car l  Spaat z  ( r e t i r e d ) ,  
and L i e u t e n a n t  General  Ennis C. Wh i t e he a d .  R e t i r e d  G e n e r a l s  
George and Spaatz  were c l e a r l y  l ob by i n g  f o r  the e s t a b l i s h m e n t  
o f  an a l l - p o w e r f u l  A i r  For ce .  Gener a l s  LeMay and Wh i t e h e a d ,  
w h i l e  having ve r y  nar row i n t e r e s t s  i n  t h e i r  branch o f  the  
m i l i t a r y ,  were f o r c e d  to g i ve  l i p  s e r v i c e  to the J o i n t  
C h i e f s '  o f  S t a f f  recommendat ion because t hey  were on a c t i v e  
dut y  and t h e r e f o r e  s u b o r d i n a t e  to t he  Pent agon.  U n l i k e  
General  LeMay,  de Sever sky  was not  in  a p o s i t i o n  r e q u i r i n g  
homage to the J o i n t  C h i e f s  o f  S t a f f ,  and t h e r e f o r e  coul d  
expound a t  l e n g t h  on the v i r t u e s  o f  a i r  power and the weak­
nesses o f  sea and l and f o r c e s .  De S e v e r s k y ,  hav i ng been a t  
one t ime or  a n o t h e r  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  both t he  A i r  Force and 
the a i r c r a f t  i n d u s t r y ,  proved to be one o f  Se n a t o r  Wh e r r y ' s  
main c o l l a b o r a t o r s .
The A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s  c r i t i c s ,  unsure o f  t he  European  
w i l l  to def end t hemse l ves  and u n w i l l i n g  to commit  Amer i can  
ground f o r c e s ,  responded w i t h  t h e i r  s o l u t i o n  to t he  di l emma:
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a i r  power.  They di d  not  deny t r oops  would be needed,  but  
t h a t  was a problem f o r  t he  Europeans.  The U n i t e d  S t a t e s ,  
t hey  cont ended,  coul d make the most us e f u l  c o n t r i b u t i o n  in  
t he area  o f  a i r  f o r c e s .
The b a s i c  a i r  power t h e o r y  was proposed by an 
I t a l i a n  G e n e r a l ,  G i u l i o  Douhet ,  between 1921 and 1 9 3 0 ,  and 
by 1950 the t h e o r y  had deve l oped to i n c l u d e  l o n g - r a n g e  
bombing r a i d s  w i t h  a t omi c  bombs. S t r a t e g i c  bombing was 
aimed a t  d e s t r o y i n g  an enemy's i n d u s t r i a l ,  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n ,  
and e n e r g y - p r o d u c i n g  c e n t e r s - - i n  o t h e r  words,  d i s r u p t i n g  
h i s  a b i l i t y  to make war .  Besides the m a t e r i a l  d e s t r u c t i o n ,  
"c i  v i V i  an c a s u a l t i e s  would so d e p l e t e  enemy .morale  t h a t  
p o pu l a r  demand would f o r c e  a s u i t  f o r  p e a c e . "  Once an 
enemy's means and hi s  w i l l  to make war were gone,  ground  
f o r c e s  would move in to occupy the t e r r i t o r y  a l r e a d y  won by 
t he  A i r  Force .  To p r e v e n t  the same d e s t r u c t i o n  upon one ' s
3 5
own c ou nt r y  n e c e s s i t a t e d  b u i l d i n g  an adequat e  a i r  d e f e n s e .
The a i r  power advocates  o f  the Gr ea t  Debate used t h i s  bas i c  
t he o r y  as t h e i r  a l t e r n a t i v e  to the depl oyment  o f  Amer ican  
ground f o r c e s .
World War I I  had added to the s t a t u r e  o f  a i r  power  
as a c o n v i n c i n g  weapon.  A i r  bombardment ,  a c c or d i n g  to 
General  LeMay,  who headed the S t r a t e g i c  A i r  Command, was 
d i r e c t l y  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  the c o l l a p s e  o f  Japan and would have
35 M a r s h a l l  .Andrews, D i s a s t e r  Through A i r  Power (New
York:  R i n e h a r t  & Company, I n c . ,  1 9 5 0 ) ,  ppT 2 3 - 2 4 .
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br ought  about  Germany's s u r r e n d e r  e a r l i e r  had adequat e  a i r
o c
f o r c e s  been a v a i l a b l e .  As i t  was the Army A i r  Force and
the  B r i t i s h  a i r  f o r c e s  di d  not  become r e a l l y  e f f e c t i v e  u n t i l
1944.  The U n i t e d  St a t es  S t r a t e g i c  Bombing Survey compi l ed
a t  the end o f  the war concluded t h a t  Axi s  arms p r o d u c t i o n
37did indeed d e c l i n e  s t e a d i l y  a f t e r  J u l y  1944.
Not  e v e r y o ne ,  however ,  agreed on the e f f e c t i v e n e s s
of  a i r  power as an o f f e n s i v e  weapon.  The f a i l u r e  o f  German
a i r  s t r i k e s  to break Gr ea t  B r i t a i n  was a good example o f  a
s t i f f e n i n g  r e s i s t a n c e  r a t h e r  than a d e g e n e r a t i o n  o f  mo r a l e .
Anot her  case was the B r i t i s h  r e f u s a l  to s u r r e n d e r  M a l t a
even though t he  Axi s dropped 1 5 , 7 0 0  tons of  bombs on the
38i s l a n d  between 1940 and 1943.  Even the most ext reme a i r
power advocate  r ec o gn i z e d  t h a t  World War I I  produced no
c o n c l u s i v e  r e s u l t s ;  de Seversky p o i n t e d  out  t h a t  because
s u f f i c i e n t  a i r  f o r c e s  were not  a v a i l a b l e  e a r l y ,  t he  war
3 9
s t r a t e g y  was not  planned around the a i r c r a f t .
The Un i t e d  S t a t e s  Army A i r  Fo r c e ,  however ,  made the  
be s t  use o f  i t s  war p r e s t i g e  by p u b l i s h i n g  in 1947 what  
appeared to be a r e p o r t  o f  the S t r a t e g i c  Bombing S u r v e y ,
oc
Se n a t e ,  H e a r i n g s ,  S. Con. Res.  8 , p.  327.
37 Andrews,  D i s a s t e r  Through A i r  Power , pp.  2 7 - 2 8 .
3 8 1 b i d . , pp.  8 , 27.
39 A l e x a n d e r  P. de Se v e r s k y ,  A i r  Power:  Key to
Surv i  val  (New York:  Simon and S c h u s t e r ,  1 9 5 0 ) ,  p . 200.
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though i t  was n o t .  E n t i t l e d  A i r  Campaigns o f  the P a c i f i c
War,  t he  book c r i t i c i z e d  the Navy and gave the A i r  Force
maj or  c r e d i t  f o r  t he  successes i n  the P a c i f i c .  An opponent
of  the A i r . F o r c e  l a b e l e d  i t  as a "wonder fu l  c o l l e c t i o n  o f
h a l f - t r u t h s ,  m i s c o n c e p t i o n s ,  d i s t o r t i o n s ,  u n s u p p o r t a b l e
c l a i m s ,  and s e l f - p r a i s e "  which c o n t r a d i c t e d  t he  p u b l i s h e d
40f i n d i n g s  o f  t he  S t r a t e g i c  Bombing S u r v e y . As a r e s u l t  o f  
such p u b l i c a t i o n s  a v i a t i o n  e n t h u s i a s t s  c l a i med t h a t  a i r  
power was the wave of  t he  f u t u r e  and i m p l i e d  t h a t  m i l i t a r y  
a i r  f o r c e s  atone could win wars .
To d e f e a t  an enemy the A i r  Force would r e l y  upon 
s t r a t e g i c  bombing and t he  n u c l e a r  bomb, but  under  q u e s t i o n i n g  
General  LeMay never  c l a i med t h a t  s t r a t e g i c  bombing was t he  
s ol e  s o l u t i o n .  However ,  he did emphasize t h a t  i t  was the  
major  d e t e r r e n t  to war and would c o n t i n u e  to be so f o r  
a no t h e r  two or  t h r e e  y e a r s ,  s i nce  the c on t e mpl a t e d  European  
army would not  p r e v e n t  Russia f rom o v e r r u n n i n g  Eur ope .
When asked i f  he was not  c o n t r a d i c t i n g  t he  J o i n t  Ch i e f s  o f  
' S t a f f ,  he po i n t e d  out  t h a t  the Defense E s t a b l i s h m e n t . w a s  
not  m a i n t a i n i n g  Russia could in  f a c t  be s t opped.  Under the  
e x i s t i n g  c o n d i t i o n s ,  he agreed w i t h  Wherry t h a t  i t  would be 
b e t t e r  to a l l o w  a t empor ar y  oc c u pa t i on  o f  Europe w h i l e  the  
A i r  Force d e s t r o y e d  Russia r a t h e r  than engage the Red Army
^ A n d r e w s , P i s a s t e r  Through A i r  Power , pp.  1 1 4 - 1 5 .
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41wi th i na d e qu a t e  ground f o r c e s .  Though he never  r e v e a l e d
i t  a t  the h e a r i n g s ,  General  LeMay f i r m l y  b e l i e v e d  t h a t  the
A i r  Force a t  one t ime could have d e f e a t e d  Russia w i t h o u t
ever  engaging the S o v i e t  Army.  That  p e r i o d  he s a i d ,
"extended from be f or e  the t ime when the Russians a c h i e v e d
The Bomb, u n t i l  a f t e r  t hey  had The Bomb but  d i d n ' t  y e t  own
4 9a s t o c k p i l e  o f  weapons."
U l t i m a t e l y ,  LeMay di d no t  f a v o r  the Wherry R e s o l u t i o n ,
and h i s  a s s o c i a t e s  did not  a c ce p t  h i s  p o s i t i o n  on s t r a t e g i c
bombing.  Whi l e  being a f r i e n d  of  Wher r y ,  he coul d not
disavow h i s  C o mma n d e r - i n - Ch i e f ;  he t h e r e f o r e  opposed the
Wherry R e s o l u t i o n  because i t  gave Congress too much say
4 3
over  m i l i t a r y  t a c t i c s .  On the o t h e r  hand,  t he  A d m i n i s ­
t r a t i o n ,  i n  e f f e c t ,  disavowed LeMay's s t and on s t r a t e g i c  
bombing.  A i r  Force C h i e f  o f  S t a f f  Hoyt  Vandenberg agreed  
w i t h  LeMay t h a t  an adequate  a i r  f o r c e  coul d d e s t r o y  the  
war i n d u s t r i a l  p o t e n t i a l  o f  Russia  but  f u r t h e r  p o i n t e d  out  
t h e r e  was more to i t  than t h a t .  The U n i t e d  S t a t e s  mi ght  
d e s t r o y  R u s s i a ' s  i n d u s t r i a l  p o t e n t i a l  but  the e f f e c t s  would  
not  be f e l t i m m e d i a t e l y ; w i t h  e x i s t i n g  f r o n t - l i n e  s t o c k ­
p i l e s  the Red Army coul d s t i l l  p o s s i b l y  ov er r un  a l l  o f  
Europe t h e r e b y  a c q u i r i n g  a n o t h e r  i n d u s t r i a l  base p r e t t y
^ S e n a t e ,  H e a r i n g s ,  S. Con. Res.  8 , pp.  326 , 341 ,
343,  345.
42 LeMay,  Mi s s i o n  w i t h  LeMay, p.  481 .
4 3
Se n a t e ,  Hear i ngs  S. Con. Res.  8 , p.  328.
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44much i n t a c t .  To deny the Russians t he  use o f  t he
European i n d u s t r i e s  the U n i t e d  S t a t e s  would have to bomb
i t s  own a l l i e s .  Army C h i e f  o f  S t a f f  Col 1i ns  f u r t h e r
p o i n t e d  out  t h a t  d u r i n g  World - Wa r ' l l  t he  Germans were a b l e
to r e b u i l d  i n d u s t r i e s  r e l a t i v e l y  q u i c k l y ,  and t he  Russians
45coul d p r o b a b l y  do t he  same. The J o i n t  C h i e f s  concluded
t h a t  some k i nd o f  European army was ne c e ss a r y  to f o r c e  the
Red Army to use up i t s  s t o c k p i l e s  b e f o r e  Europe was t o t a l l y  
46o v e r r u n .
Whi l e  t he  A i r  Force emphasized i t s  need f o r  a
s u p e r i o r  d e l i v e r y  system,  most peopl e  assumed the weapon
dropped would be the n u c l e a r  bomb. "The b a s i c  mi 1 i t a r y  f a c t
i n  t o d a y ' s  w o r l d , "  wrote  Joseph C. Harsh o f  t he  C h r i s t i a n
Sci ence  M o n i t o r , " i s  t h a t  the a tomic weapon i n  t he  Amer ican
ar s e n a l  i s the c o u n t e r p o i n t  to t he  mass o f  t he  S o v i e t  
4 7Army."  David E . Li  1 i e n t h a l , f o r me r  head o f  t he  Atomic  
Energy Commission,  warned t h a t  f i x a t i o n  on n u c l e a r  w a r f a r e  
was p r e v e n t i n g  t he  n a t i o n  f rom coming to g r i p s  w i t h  l i m i t e d  
wa r ,  such as the Korean c o n f l i c t ,  and was d r i v i n g  the
4 4 I b i d . , pp.  2 22 ,  232.
4 5 1 b i d . , p. 192.
46 Andrews i n  h i s  D i s a s t e r  Through A i r  Power p o i n t e d  
out  t h a t  d u r i n g  World War I I  i n a c t i v e  t r oops  consumed s i x  
pounds o f  s u p p l i e s  per  man per  day w h i l e  t roops a c t u a l l y  
f i g h t i n g  consumed on the average  of  sever i t y - one  pounds per  
man per  day.  (p.  4 6 ) .
^ J o s e p h  C. Har sch ,  "The Atom Bomb Means T o t a l  War , "
S t .  Louis  P o s t - D i s p a t c h , December TO, 1950 ,  p. 2B.
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c o u n t r y  to the a n n i h i l a t e - o r - b e - a n n i h i l a t e d  f or mul a  o f
48p r e v e n t a t i v e  war .  O t h e r s ,  i n c l u d i n g  c e r t a i n  m i l i t a r y  men,
opposed s t r a t e g i c  bombing w i t h  n u c l e a r  weapons because i t
commi t ted t he  Un i t e d  S t a t e s  to a war a g a i n s t  a n a t i o n ' s
49p o p u l a t i o n  r a t h e r  than a g a i n s t  the l e a d e r s .
The a i r  power t h e s i s  ran i n t o  o t h e r  c o m p l i c a t i o n s
i n v o l v i n g  the range o f  the bombers and the need f o r  f i g h t e r
s u p p o r t .  The H o o v e r - T a f t - W h e r r y  f o l l o w e r s  c a l l e d  f o r  an
Amer i can- based bomber f o r c e  capabl e  o f  f l y i n g  to any t a r g e t
in the w o r l d . a n d  r e t u r n i n g  to the Un i t e d  S t a t e s ,  thus
a l 1e v i a t i n g  any need to s t a t i o n  Amer ican f o r c e s  in f o r e i g n
t e r r i t o r y .  Such a bomber did not  e x i s t  i n  World War I I ;
mor eover ,  the number o f  bomber l osses depended upon whet her
f i g h t e r  e s c o r t s  were a v a i l a b l e .  By 1951 the Un i t e d  S t a t e s
di d have a l on g - r a n g e  bomber,  t he  B - 3 6 ,  capabl e  o f  f l y i n g
504 , 0 0 0  mi l e s  to a t a r g e t  and r e t u r n i n g ,  but  i t s  v u l n e r a ­
b i l i t y  to f i g h t e r  a t t a c k s  was not  f u l l y  known. The B-36  
was desi gned to f l y  above 4 0 , 0 0 0  f e e t  t h e r e b y  a v o i d i n g  an
enemy's a t t a c k i n g  f i g h t e r s  and making ones own f i g h t e r
51e s c o r t s  unnecessar y .  On the o t h e r  hand,  the B-36 was a
^ D a v i d  E . L i l  i e n t h a l  , "Can the Atom Bomb Beat  
Communism?" C o l l i e r ' s , Febr uar y  3,  1951 ,  p.  6 6 .
D. V. G a l l e r y ,  "An Admi ra l  T a l k s  Back to the  
Ai r me n, "  Sa t ur day  Evening P o s t , June 25 ,  1959 ,  p. 136.
^ M o l l ,  " Nu c l e a r  S t r a t e g y , "  p. 198.
51 Andr ews,. D i s a s t e r ' T h r o u g h  A i r  Power , pp.  3 1 - 3 2 .
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p r o p e l l e r - d r i v e n  a i r c r a f t  which f l e w  c o n s i d e r a b l y  s l owe r
than j e t  a i r c r a f t .  Al t hough such peopl e  as de Sever sky
f e l t  i t  u n l i k e l y ,  t h e r e  was the p o s s i b i l i t y  the Russian
52MI G- 1 5 ,  a j e t  f i g h t e r ,  could c h a l l e n g e  t he  bomber.
General  LeMay a d m i t t e d  t h a t  f i g h t e r  e s c o r t s  would
m i n i mi z e  bomber 1 o s s e s , but  t h i s  i m m e d i a t e l y  b r ought  up t he
q u e s t i o n  o f  f o r war d  bases s i nce  f i g h t e r s  did not  have t he
range o f  bombers.  The Un i t e d  S t a t e s  a l r e a d y  had e s t a b l i s h e d
some f or war d  bases in Europe,  and the A i r  Force acknowledged
t h a t  Russian ground t roops  coul d wipe out  t hose bases.
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  sup po r t e r s  b e l i e v e d  t h i s  was a l l  t he  more
53reason f o r  sending t roops to Europe.  In a d d i t i o n ,  the
A i r  Force i t s e l f  was h i n d e r i n g  t he  l o n g - r a n g e  bomber
a d v o c a t e s .  The S t r a t e g i c  A i r  Command had 14 groups o f
which 10 were medium range groups o f  B - 2 9 ,  B - 5 0 ,  and B - 4 7 ' s .
Thus,  the m a j o r i t y  o f  the bomber f o r c e  s t i l l  needed
f or war d  bases s i nce  a e r i  a l - r e f u e l  i ng ; - t echni ques . ' ;and e q u i p -
5 4
ment were not  f u l l y  de v e l oped .  In f a c t ,  t he  A i r  Force
5 5
con t i n ue d  to buy more propel  1e r - d r i v e n  B-50 bombers,  and 
52 De Sever sky ,  A i r  Power , p. 265;  Joseph and S t e w a r t  
A l s o p ,  "The S h i e l d , "  Washington Po s t ,  Febr uar y  21 ,  1951 ,  
p. 1 7.
^ S e n a t e ,  H e a r i n g s ,  S. Con. Res.  8 , pp.  2 2 3 - 2 4 ,  333 ,
3 3 7 - 3 9 .
^ J o s e p h  and S t e w a r t  A l s o p ,  "A-Bombs Lack Val ue  
Wi t hout  A l l i e s ’ Bases, "  S t .  Louis  P o s t - D i s p a t c h ,
December 19,  1950 ,  p. 1C.
55 Andrews,  D i s a s t e r  Through A i r  Power , p.  36 .
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A i r  Force S e c r e t a r y  F i n l e t t e r  in March 1951 r e v e a l e d  t h a t
h i s  s e r v i c e  was c o n c e n t r a t i n g  on the medium-range B-47
because i t  was a j e t  and t h e r e f o r e  f a s t e r  than any o t h e r  
56bomber.  In a l l ; ,  i t  added up to the c ont i nue d  r e l i a n c e  on 
f o r war d  bases in Europe and the M e d i t e r r a n e a n  which in t ur n  
r e q u i r e d  ground f o r c e s  to p r o t e c t  them.
Most  a i r  power l o b b y i s t s  wished to b u i l d  t h e i r  A i r  
Force around s t r a t e g i c  bombers w h i 1e i g n o r i n g  the r o l e  o f  
t a c t i c a l  s u p p o r t .  The r o l e  o f  t a c t i c a l  a i r  miss i ons  
i nc luded i sol  a t i  ng the b a t t l e f i  e l d  by d i s r u p t i n g  an enemy' s 
suppl y  l i n e s ,  c l os e  suppor t  o f  one ' s  own ground f o r c e s ,  and 
g a i n i n g  complete  c o n t r o l  o f  the s k i e s .  Yet  an undi sput ed  
c o n t r o l  o f  Korean sk i es  had not  d e f e a t e d  Communist  f o r ces  
because the A i r  Force coul d not  e x p l o i t  i t s  s t r a t e g i c  
bombing c a p a b i l i t i e s  by f l y i n g  beyond the Yalu R i v e r  and 
because i t  had f a i l e d  to r e l y  i mme d i a t e l y  upon t a c t i c a l  a i r  
. support  o f  ground f o r c e s .  Nor was t a c t i c a l  a i r  power the  
sol e  s o l u t i o n ,  f o r  even General  LeMay acknowledged t h a t  
u n l i m i t e d  t a c t i c a l  a i r  f o r c e s  could not  stop the advance 
o f  enemy t r o o p s - - a i r  s uppor t  plus ones own t roops were
5 7
necessar y  t o  accompl i sh t h a t .  In f a c t ,  the A i r  Force was 
i l l - p r e p a r e d  to f u r n i s h  adequate t a c t i c a l  suppor t  to ground
5 6 “The Growing U. S.  A i r  F o r c e , "  U. S . News & Wor 1d 
R e p o r t , March 2 , 1951,  pp.  3 0 - 3 1 .
57
S e n a t e ,  H e a r i n g s ,  S. Con Res.  8 ,  pp.  155,  1 6 5 - 6 6 ,
329.
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f o r c e s .  When Truman c u t  t he  s i z e  o f  t he  A i r  Force f rom 
f i f t y - e i g h t  to f o r t y - e i g h t  groups p r i o r  to Korea the A i r  
Force r e o r g a n i z e d  i t s e l f  i n  f a v o r  o f  s t r a t e g i c  a i r  power ,  
even though t h i s  meant  r e l y i n g  upon medium range bombers.  
F i g h t e r  groups o f  a l l  t ypes were r e d u c e d - - t h e  number of  
l i g h t  bombardment groups f o r  t a c t i c a l  ground s uppor t  was cut  
to o n e - - w h i l e  t he  bombing groups were i nc r e a s e d  i n  number
C O
and s i z e .  Mor eover ,  t he  A i r  Force and Army c l ashed over
who should have o v e r a l l  command of  j o i n t  g r o u n d - a i r  t a c t i c a l
o p e r a t i o n s ;  the A i r  Force was f e a r f u l  t h a t  Army o f f i c e r s
5 9
might  t ake  over  c o n t r o l  o f  a l l  such a i r  m i s s i o n s .
The ne t  e f f e c t  o f  the a i r  power t h e s i s  was a 
f i x a t i o n  on t o t a l  war .  I t s  a dvo ca t e s '  key phrase was the  
" e x p l o i t a t i o n  o f  the c o u n t r y ' s  a i r  c a p a b i 1 i t y , "  and e x p l o i ­
t a t i o n  meant  us ing long range a i r c r a f t  and n u c l e a r  weapons 
to bomb an enemy i n t o  o b l i v i o n .  The success o f  such a 
s t r a t e g y  supposedl y  would save the l i v e s  of  Amer ican ground  
f o r c e s .  Yet  a t  t he  same t i me such a s t r a t e g y  de- emphas i zed  
t a c t i c a l  a i r  mi ss i ons  and t h e r e f o r e  c o m p l e t e l y  d i s r e g a r d e d  
l i m i t e d  w a r f a r e  or  the n e c e s s i t y  of  ground f o r c e s  i n  any 
kind o f  c o n f l i c t .  The H o o v e r - T a f t - W h e r r y  gr oup,  by s u p p o r t i n g  
bomber e n t h u s i a s t s ,  wer e ,  i n  e f f e c t ,  a d v o c a t i n g  an a l l - o r -
5 Q
Andrews,  D i s a s t e r  Through A i r  Power , p.  84.
^ 1 b i d . , p. 70;  W i l l i a m  R. K i n t e r ,  "Who Should  
Command T a c t i c a l  A i r  Forces?"  Un i t ed  S t a t e s  Army Combat  
Forces J o u r n a l , I ,  (November ,  1 9 5 0 ) ,  p. 37.
not h i ng  p o l i c y .
The A d m i n i s t r a t i  on n a t u r a l l y  wanted to impress  
Americans and Europeans'  w i t h  i t s  h u m a n i t a r i a n  concern f o r  
peopl es w i t h  s i m i l a r  c u l t u r e , i deas , and i n s t i t u t i o n s  and 
t h e r e f o r e  pl ayed upon the n e c e s s i t y  o f  a f r e e  Europe and 
the moral e  o f  i t s  peop l e .  At  the same t ime Truman and h i s  
a d v i s e r s  p e r c e i v e d  v i a b l e  m i l i t a r y  reasons f o r  de p l o y i n g  
Amer ican t roops to Europe a long w i t h  a i r  f o r c e s .  U l t i m a t e l y ,  
the s e c u r i t y  of  Nor t h  Amer ica was a t  s t a k e ,  and,  i n  the  
words o f  Admi ral  Sherman,  the wor s t  p l a c e  to p r o t e c t  the  
Un i t ed  S t a t e s  was on i t s  home s o i l .  I n s t e a d ,  the bes t  
pl ace  was a t  l o c a t i o n s  n e a r e s t  the l i k e l y  a g g r e s s o r . ^
Many people  b e l i e v e d  s u p e r i o r  a i r  power and the  
n u c l e a r  bomb to be the maj or  d e t e r r e n t  s t opp i ng  Russia  a t  
the t i m e .  A g r e e i n g ,  S e c r e t a r y  Acheson f e l t  t h i s  gave t he  
Uni t ed  S t a t e s  a s u b s t a n t i a l  l e a d ,  but  w i t h  the passage of  
t ime Russi a  could e v e n t u a l l y  n e u t r a l i z e  Amer ican a i r  power  
w h i l e  r e t a i n i n g  a d e c i s i v e  ground f o r c e .  T h e r e f o r e  to 
remain on p a r i t y  w i t h  the S o v i e t  Union i t  was necessar y  to  
b u i l d  the nucl eus o f  a European army w h i l e  Russia'  c l osed  
t he a i r  power gap.  He f u r t h e r  p o i n t e d  out  t h a t  i n  the  
absence o f  a v i a b l e  European def ense S t a l i n  mi ght  use 
s a t e l l i t e  f o r c e s ,  hoping to avoi d  a d i r e c t  c o n f r o n t a t i o n  
between the Un i t e d  S t a t es  and the S o v i e t  Uni on.  The Un i t e d
^ S e n a t e ,  H e a r i n g s ,  S. Con. Res.  8 , p.  204.
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S t a t e s  would then have to dec i de  whet her  to use s t r a t e g i c  
bombing,  which i n  e f f e c t  would mean a n o t h e r  a l l - o u t  wa r ,  
or  to d e s e r t  the European a l l i e s . ^
Western Europe needed an army i mm e d i a t e l y  sa i d  the  
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,  and a few Amer ican d i v i s i o n s  would a c t  as a 
s t i m u l u s  f o r  t h e  o t h e r  NATO members.  Even an army r e l a t i v e l y  
s m a l l e r  than the Red Army could be an e f f e c t i v e  h o l d i n g  
f o r c e .  The U n i t e d  S t a t e s  a l r e a d y  had two o c c u p a t i o n  
d i v i s i o n s  i n  Germany,  and a c c or d i ng  to B r a d l e y ,  s i x  d i v i s i o n s  
"would be much b e t t e r  a b l e  to t a k e  care  o f  t hemse l ves  than
C O
two" should Russia a t t a c k .
Ei senhower  and the J o i n t  C h i e f s  o f  S t a f f ,  w h i l e  
acknowl edgi ng the growing i mpor t ance  o f  the A i r  F o r c e ,  
c o n t i n u a l l y  r e j e c t e d  the n o t i o n  t h a t  one branch o f  t he  
m i l i t a r y  coul d win a war  by i t s e l f .  Even i f  the A i r  Force  
cou l d  f l a t t e n  an enemy's i n d u s t r y ,  ground t r oops  were s t i l l  
necessar y  to f o r c e  the opponent  t o  d e p l e t e  h i s  s t o c k p i l e s
CO
and e v e n t u a l l y  to occupy t e r r i t o r y .  S o v i e t  m i l i t a r y  
l e a d e r s  concur red in t h i s  a n a l y s i s ,  as r e f l e c t e d  by t h e i r
64s t a t e me n t s  and t h e i r  i n t e g r a t i o n  o f  a i r  and ground f o r c e s .
61 I b i d . , p. 79.
6 2 I b i d . , p. 128.
6 3 1b i d . ,  pp.  149 ,  1 9 8 - 9 9 ,  2 2 1 - 2 2 ;  Drew Pear son,  
"Ei senhower  Wins the Congress to His C o r n e r , "  Denver  P o s t , 
Fe br ua r y  7,  1951 ,  p. 19.
64 Raymond L. G a r t h o f f ,  S o v i e t  S t r a t e g y  i n  the N u c l e a r  
Age (New York:  F r e d e r i c k  A.  P r a e g e r ,  Publ i  s h e r s , 19 5 8 ) ,
pp.  149 ,  170.
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Even the most a v i d  A i r  Force a u t h o r i t i e s ,  e x c ep t  f o r
de Se v e r s k y ,  e v e n t u a l l y  a d m i t t e d  t h a t  a i r  power coul d  not
by i t s e l f  win a war ,  though t hey  c on t i n ue d  to b e l i e v e  i t
6 5would be t he  d e c i s i v e  f a c t o r .  Thr oughout  the debate  the
J o i n t  C h i e f s  emphasized the n e c e s s i t y  f o r  team work among
a l l  t h r e e  branches o f  s e r v i c e .
In a d d i t i o n ,  the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s  w i t n e s s e s  h i t
hard a t  t he  q u e s t i o n  o f  European mor a l e .  General  E i senhower ,
a f t e r  t a l k i n g  w i t h  European l e a d e r s  d u r i n g  h i s  t o u r  o f  NATO
c o u n t r i e s ,  f e l t  r e a s o n a b l y  sure t h a t  the member n a t i o n s  not
on l y  had the w i l l  but  were in  f a c t  a c t i n g  to b r i n g  about
66changes in t h e i r  def ense e s t a b l i s h m e n t s .  General  C l ay  
and John Sherman Cooper both emphasized the change which  
had t aken p l ace  in European a t t i t u d e s .  C l ay  had seen the  
European morale  s i t u a t i o n  as hopel ess  i n  1947 and recom­
mended t h a t  no more Amer ican f o r c e s  be sent  to Europe ,  but
f o u r  y ear s  l a t e r  he d i s c o v e r e d  a r esur gence  o f  European  
67w i l l .  European o p i n i o n  changed d r a s t i c a l l y ,  a c c or d i n g  to  
Un i t e d  Na t i ons  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e  Cooper ,  between June 1950
68and December 1950 due to t he  see-saw pr ogress  i n  Korea.
Se n a t e ,  H e a r i n g s ,  S. Con. Res.  8 , pp.  3 2 5 - 2 6 ,  
3 8 1 - 8 2 ,  4 0 5 - 0 6 ,  446.
6 6 I b i d . , pp.  3 - 5 ,  29.
6 7 I b i d . , pp.  7 6 0 ,  769.
6 8 I b i d . , pp.  5 8 0 ,  586.
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Europeans r e f l e c t e d  t h i s  new w i l l ,  a t  l e a s t
p a r t i a l l y ,  in t h e i r  economic e x p e n d i t u r e s  f o r  d e f e n s e .
Sever a l  Congressmen pr e se nt e d  f i g u r e s  a l l  o f  which showed
i n c r e a s e d  European def ense  spendi ng ,  but  q u e s t i o n s  arose
whet her  the i n c r e a s e s  were enough.  John F. Kennedy f e l t
Europe was not  doing i t s  share s i nce  h i s  c a l c u l a t i o n s
r e v e a l e d  t he  U n i t e d  Kingdom, which was spending more than
any o f  t he  o t h e r  European members, was d e v o t i n g  on l y  one-
e i g h t h  o f  i t s  n a t i o n a l  income to def ense  w h i l e  the Un i t ed
St a t e s  planned to spend about  o n e - f i f t h  o f  i t s  n a t i o n a l
69income f o r  the same purpose.  Sena t or  C o n n a l l y ,  using  
anot her  b a s i s ,  p r es e nt e d  f i g u r e s  showing the U n i t e d  Kingdom,  
F r a n c e ,  and the Ne t h e r l a n d s  each spending a h i g h e r  
per cent age  o f  t h e i r  net  n a t i o n a l  incomes than the Un i t e d  
S t a t e s . ^  Others  o f f e r e d  t h e i r  own s t a t i s t i c s  and 
proceeded to i n t e r p r e t  them to s u i t  t h e i r  cause.
The Senate r e p o r t ,  i ssued by t he  For e i gn  R e l a t i o n s  
and Armed S e r v i c e s  Commi t t ees ,  gave the advantage  to 
n e i t h e r  the s up po r t e r s  nor t he  opponents o f  t r o o p s - f o r -  
Eu r o p e :
6 I b i d . , p.  4 2 8 .
Congr ess i ona l  R e c o r d , XCVI ,  9121 .
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Per cent age  o f  Gross N a t i o n a l  Product  Spent
on D e f e n s e / I










The 1 9 4 9 - 1 9 5 0  f i g u r e s ,  i n t e r p r e t e d  f rom the v i e w p o i n t  o f
Truman s u p p o r t e r s ,  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  t he  European members were
spending a l most  the same per c e nt a ge  o f  t h e i r  gross n a t i o n a l
p r oduc t  as the Un i t e d  S t a t e s - - r e l a t i v e l y  speak i ng t hey  were
c a r r y i n g  t h e i r  s har e .  The 1951 f i g u r e s ,  however ,  would
tend to uphold the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s  c r i t i c s  s i nce  the
U n i t e d  S t a t e s  pe r cent age  was n e a r l y  t w i c e  t h a t  o f  Europe.
The v a l u e  o f  such compar isons i s  q u e s t i o n a b l e  i n  t h a t  the
Commit tees used " u n o f f i c i a l  e s t i m a t e s "  when comput ing a l l
72the Amer ican e x p e n d i t u r e s .  In 1967 the Nor t h  A t l a n t i c  
T r e a t y  O r g a n i z a t i o n  r e l e a s e d  i t s  own s t a t i s t i c s  which are  
perhaps more a c c u r a t e :
Per cent age  o f  Gross N a t i o n a l  Product  Spent
'. ~ on De f e ns e / d  “
R e l a t i o n s  and Commit tee on Armed S e r  v i c e s , A s s i g n m e n t  o f  
Ground Forces o f  t he  Un i t e d  S t a t e s  to Duty in the Eu r o ­
pean A r e a , S. Rept .  175 to Accompany S. Res.  99 and S.
Con.  Res.  18,  82nd Cong . ,  1 s t  s e s s . , 1951,  Senate  R e p o r t s : 
M i s c e l l a n e o u s ,  I ,  13.










71 U . S . ,  Congress ,  S e n a t e ,  Commit tee on Fo r e i g n
^ N A T O , ' Facts  and F i g u r e s , p. 226.
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These f i g u r e s , a l t hough a f t e r  the f a c t ,  t end to sup po r t  
those a r g u i n g  t h a t  Europe was c a r r y i n g  i t s  share o f  the  
burden.  The d i f f e r e n c e  in  the 1951 p e r c e n t a ge  i s  not  even 
r e mo t e l y  near  t h a t  g i ven  i n  t h e  Senate r e p o r t  o f  1951.
Defense e x p e n d i t u r e s  and mora l e  were not  t he  on l y
measures f o r  d e t e r m i n i n g  the European w i l l .  Genera l
Eisenhower  and Senat or  Douglas e x t o l l e d  t he  European e f f o r t s
a t  i n c r e a s i n g  t h e i r  t o t a l  number o f  f o r c es  and e x t e n d i n g  the
l e n g t h  o f  m i l i t a r y  s e r v i c e .  The Un i t e d  S t a t e s  had 14 men
in the a r m e d . s e r v i c e s  f o r  e v er y  1 , 000  o f  p o p u l a t i o n  and was
i n c r e a s i n g  t h i s  to 18 per  1 , 0 0 0 .  The Un i t e d  Kingdom and
France were l i k e w i s e  proposi ng to i n c r e a s e  t h e i r  16 per
1 , 0 0 0  r a t i o s  t o  18 per  1 , 0 0 0 .  Whi l e  r a t i o s  o f  t he s e  t h r e e
members were r ough l y  t he  same, t he  r ema i n i ng  Pact  members
onl y  had m i l i t a r y / p o p u l a t i o n  r a t i o s  o f  f rom 6 . 5  per  1 , 0 0 0
to 10 per  1 , 0 0 0 .  On the m a t t e r  o f  m i l i t a r y  s e r v i c e  France
i nc r e a s e d  the l e n g t h  f rom 12 to 18 months and the U n i t e d
Kingdom i n c r e a s e d  i t  f rom 18 to 24 months.  The r ema i n i n g
European members were a l l  " c o n s i d e r i n g "  i n c r e a s e s  i n  t h e i r
l e n g t h  o f  m i l i t a r y  s e r v i c e  but  had not  done so by mid-  
74January  1 951..
Ei senhower  and Douglas made t he  most o f  t he  f a v o r ­
ab l e  f i g u r e s  w i t h  hopes t h a t  the o t h e r  n a t i o n s  coul d be 
persuaded to make s i m i l a r  e f f o r t s .  Based on the a l l e g e d
^ Congr ess i ona l  R e c o r d , X C V I I ,  235 ,  237;  S e n a t e ,
H e a r i n g s ,  S. C o n . R e s .  8 , pp.  3 - 4 .
mEuropean change o f  a t t i t u d e ,  the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s  backers
j u s t i f i e d  the presence of  Amer ican t roops on the c o n t i n e n t .
In t h e i r  v i e w .  Un i t e d  S t a t e s  ground f o r c e s  would not
defend Western Europe a l o n e ,  nor  would t hey  c o n s t i t u t e  the
maj or  p o r t i o n  o f  any European army.
The r e - e x a m i n i s t s  q u i c k l y  found a s i m p l e r  way o f
i n c r e a s i n g  NATO s t r e n g t h  w i t h o u t  Amer ican t roops  and
w i t h o u t  making un r easonab l e  demands f rom t he  o t h e r  e x i s t i n g
members.  The s o l u t i o n  was to b r i ng  new members i n t o  the
a l l i a n c e .  None o f  those f a v o r i n g  t r o o p s - f o r - E u r o p e  ment ioned
new members in  t h e i r  pr epar ed s t a t e ment s  a t  the h e a r i n g s ;
however ,  under  q u e s t i o n i n g  they  a l l  conceded t h a t  European
def ense  coul d be enhanced subs t a n t i a l l y  w i t h  such 
7 5
a d d i t i o n s .  Most  t a l k  c e n t e r e d  around i n v i t i n g  Gr eece ,  
T u r k e y ,  and Spain i n t o  the Pact  as t hese  t h r e e  coul d have 
added 1 . 2  mi l  l i o n  armed f o r c e s .  Yu go s l a v i a  , then i n  a 
somewhat p r e c a r i o u s  p o s i t i o n ,  could have p o s s i b l y  c o n t r i ­
buted a no t h e r  5 0 0 , 0 0 0  men. Ma r s h a l l  T i t o  w h i l e  be ing a 
Communist ,  was a t  odds w i t h  the K r e m l i n , and General  Cl ay
saw no p o s s i b i 1 i t y  t h a t  t he  Yugoslavs would aga i n  submi t  to
7 fiRussian d o mi n a t i o n .  John F. Kennedy even quoted T i t o  as 
saying he would f i g h t  w i t h  ;t he  West i n  a war  i n v o l v i n g
^ S e n a t e j  H e a r i n g s ,  S. Con. Res.  8 , pp.  4 7 - 4 8 ,
144 ,  206 ,  535 ,  600.
7 6 I b i d . , p p .  2 0 8 ,  7 4 9 .
77Rus s i a .
Al t hough i t  was seemi ngl y  easy to d i scuss  Yugo­
s l a v i a n  membership i n  NATO, West Germany posed a f a r  
d i f f e r e n t  s i t u a t i o n ,  o r  so i t  seemed a t  t he  t i m e .  The 
Pe nt a gon ' s  one-package proposal  o f f e r e d  i n  the f a l l  o f  
1950 i n c l u d e d  German m i l i t a r y  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  European  
d e f e n s e ,  and the P r e s i d e n t  suppor t ed t he  p l a n .  Truman 
noted t h a t ,  even though B r i t a i n  and France had voi ced  
o p p o s i t i o n ,  l e a d e r s  of  both c o u n t r i e s  r e a l i z e d  t h a t  some
k i nd o f  German p a r t i c i p a t i o n  was necessary  f o r  an e f f e c t i v e
78def ense  o f  the c o n t i n e n t .  A Ga l l up ,  p o l l  t aken in
December 1950 showed ov e r  s i x t y  per  c e n t  o f  Amer icans were
i n  f a v o r  o f  a l l o w i n g  West Germany to b u i l d  m i l i t a r y  f o r c e s
as p a r t  o f  an i n t e g r a t e d  European army,  w h i l e  o n l y  one-
t h i r d  o f  the French and t w o - f i f t h s  o f  the B r i t i s h  were i n  
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f a v o r .  Coupled w i t h  t he  B r i t i s h  and French r e s i s t a n c e ,
Germans t hemse l ves  were u n w i l l i n g  to do a n y t h i n g  u n t i l  some
ki nd o f  p o l i t i c a l  s e t t l e m e n t  was r eached.  The Germans were
demanding p o l i t i c a l  e q u a l i t y  plus some assur ance  t h a t  the
80U n i t e d  S t a t e s  would keep t roops s t a t i o n e d  i n  Europe.  As 
one f o r me r  C h i e f  of  S t a f f  o f  t he  German Army put  i t ,  "No
^ Congr ess i ona l  Re c o r d , X C V I I ,  1302.
78 Truman,  Memo i rs , I I ,  2 5 4 - 5 6 .
79 Washington P o s t , January  27,  1951 ,  p. 9.
^ S e n a t e ,  H e a r i n g s ,  S. Con. Res.  8 , pp.  4 26 ,  432 ,  
5 7 3 ,  591.
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81German i s  w i l l i n g  to serve  as a m e r c e n a r y . " E i senhower ,
M a r s h a l l  and B r a d l e y  a l l  f a v o r e d  r ear mi ng West Germany but
none found such a course i mme d i a t e l y  a t t a i n a b l e  s i nc e  the
8 2p o l i t i c a l  q u e s t i o n s  remained u n s e t t l e d .  The Russians
f u r t h e r  c o mp l i c a t e d  the p o l i t i c a l  u n c e r t a i n t y  by proposi ng
i n  the f a l l  o f  1950 a f o u r - p o w e r  c on f e r e nc e  on the German
q u e s t i o n .  The S o v i e t s ,  Acheson l e a r n e d ,  were f a r  more
i n t e r e s t e d  in s t opp i ng  German p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  West European
def ense than in s e r i o u s  n e g o t i a t i o n s  r e g a r d i n g  a German
s e t t l e m e n t . ^
On the who l e ,  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  f o r c e s  had d i f f i c u l t y
r e a s s u r i n g  the c r i t i c s  t h a t  the European members o f  the
T r e a t y  would i n  f a c t  do t h e i r  s h a r e .  T a f t  was u p - i n - a r m s
because the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  would not  d i s c l o s e  t he  e x ac t
84number o f  t r oops  expect ed of  the Europeans.  Wherry
i n c e s s a n t l y  asked the same q u e s t i o n ,  y e t  no one gave him 
85an answer .  R e f e r r i n g  to the Europeans,  Hoover  t o l d  the
commi t t ees ,  "What I am ask i ng now i s  t h a t  you gent l emen not
8 fit ake  a c t i o n  u n t i l  you can see the w h i t e s  o f  t h e i r  e y e s . "
O 1
"Can R u s s i a ' s  Army Be Beaten?" U. S .  News & World 
R e p o r t , September  8 , 1950 ,  p. 24.
op
S e n a t e ,  H e a r i n g s ,  S.  Con. Res.  8 , pp.  21 ,  50 ,  141.
83 Acheson, P r e s e n t  a t  the C r e a t i o n , p . 551.
84 Se n a t e ,  H e a r i n g s ,  S. Con. Res.  8 , p.  609.
8 5 I b i d . , pp.  1 8 3 - 8 5 .
8 6 I bi  d . , p. 733.
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John F. Kennedy , 1 i k e w i s e  s e c u r i n g  no i n f o r m a t i o n  on the
European t r oop commi tments,  opposed the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  by
c a l l i n g  f o r  a l i m i t  on- the number o f  Amer ican t r oops  se nt
to Europe v i s - a - v i s  the European c o n t r i b u t i o n .  He f e l t  the
American i n v o l v e me n t  i n  Europe would c o n t i n u e  to grow and
t h a t  Congress should u l t i m a t e l y  be a b l e  to c o n t r o l  t h a t
t r e n d .  To accompl i sh t h i s  he . proposed a r a t i o  system to be
de t e r mi ned  by Congress.  He h i m s e l f  f a v o r e d  a s i x  to one
r a t i o  whereby the Europeans would f i e l d  s i x  d i v i s i o n s  f o r
each Arneri can ground di  vi  s i on ass i gned to NATO. The e f f e c t
87would be to f o r c e  the Europeans t o  do t h e i r  s har e .  The
A d m i n i s t r a t i  oh d i d  not  look f a v o r a b l y  upon such a
p r o p o s a l ,  nor  di d i t  go f a r  i n  the Senat e .
Throughout  the he a r i ng s  t he  n a t i o n a l  press e d i t o r s
c on t i n ue d  to e x t o l  the p o s i t i o n  o f  t h e i r  f a v o r i t e s  w h i l e
l a mb a s t i n g  the o t h e r  s i d e .  The Chicago D a i l y  T r i b u n e
l ooked upon Truman' s s i x  d i v i s i o n  recommendat ion as "mer e l y
a s a c r i f i c e  f o r c e , "  and f u r t h e r  found the "Truman-Acheson-
Ei senhower"  s t r a t e g y  i l l o g i c a l  i n  t h a t  i t  asked Russi a  to
make no move f o r  two or  t h r e e  y e a r s  w h i l e  t he  a l l i e s
88pr epar ed  t hemse l v e s .  On the o t h e r  s i d e ,  the Was hi  ngton  
P o s t , r e j e c t i n g  s o l e  r e l i a n c e  upon a i r  power ,  asked Se n a t o r  
Wherry i f  he had e v e r  heard o f  a c ount r y  b r e a k i n g  the
8 7 1 b i d . , pp.  4 2 7 - 2 9 ,  440 .
88 E d i t o r i a l ,  Chicago D a i l y  T r i b u n e , Januar y  5 ,  1951 ,  
s e c . I , p . 14.
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89shack l es  o f  a " t empor ar y"  Russian o c c u p a t i o n .  In a l l ,  t he  
e d i t o r i a l  a l i g n m e n t  had been p r e t t y  we l l  e s t a b l i s h e d  by t he  
t i me  the h ea r i ng s  began and t h e r e f o r e  d i d  not  change.
The Truman A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,  i n e f f e c t ,  was o f f e r i n g  
an e n l a r ge me nt  of  p o l i c i e s  deve l oped a f t e r  Wor ld War I I ;  
Western Europe was f r e e  and she opposed Communist  a g g r e s s i o n ,  
t h e r e f o r e  t he  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  would come to her  a i d  w i t h  men 
and m a t e r i a l - .  The r e - exami  ni  s ts r a i s e d  a g r e a t  f a n f a r e  
r e g a r d i n g  t he  Far  E a s t ,  but  Truman r e a i i z e d  t h a t  t he  U n i t e d  
S t a t e s  had more to l ose  i n  Europe than she did i n  the Far  
Ea s t .  A r e l a t i v e l y  smal l  commitment  o f  Amer ican ground  
f o r c e s  could we l l  be a s a c r i f i c e  f o r c e ,  but  how many l i v e s  
would be l o s t  should a n o t h e r  D-Day i n v a s i o n  be r e q u i r e d ?
The r e - e x a m i n i s t s  p r ov i de d  a s i m p l e ,  glamorous  
s o l u t i o n  w i t h  a i r  power;  y e t  s t r a t e g i c  bombing had not  been 
proved f o o l p r o o f ,  and in  the ext reme s i t u a t i o n  i t  would  
e n t a i l  bombing ones own a l l i e s  in o r d e r  to deny the enemy 
a new i n d u s t r i a l  base.  Mor e ov er ,  r e l i a n c e  upon s t r a t e g i c  
a i r  f o r c e s  took away t he  n a t i o n 1s a b i 1 i t y  to respond i n  a 
f l e x i b l e  manner .  The l a c k  o f  even a smal l  European  
d e f e n s i v e  ground f o r c e  meant  t h a t  t he  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  would  
be f o r c e d  to respond w i t h  a l l  or  n o t h i n g .  I t  was a p o l i c y
89 E d i t o r i a l ,  Washington P o s t , Febr uar y  4 ,  1951 ,
p. 8.
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a i mi ng  f o r  t o t a l  v i c t o r y ,  and i t  l e f t  no room f o r  l i m i t e d
c o n f l i c t  and p o s s i b l e  s t a l e m a t e .
The H o o v e r - T a f t - W h e r r y  f o l l o w e r s ,  however ,  d i d  not
r e j e c t  the i dea o f  a European army.  Whi l e  Hoover  and Wherry
may not  have wanted any Amer ican ground f o r c e s  i n  Europe,
T a f t ,  though s t i l l  somewhat unsure o f  hi s  s t a n d ,  was w i l l i n g
t o  send a few t r oops  i f  i t  would serve to s t i m u l a t e  adequate
European e f f o r t s .  As f i s c a l  c o n s e r v a t i v e s  t hey  saw the
n a t i o n  spr ead i ng  i t s e l f  too t h i n  and spending i t s e l f  i n t o
b a n k r u p t c y .  .They f e l t  t h a t  the NATO army was becoming
too much of  an Amer ican p r o j e c t  w i t h  s i x  ground d i v i s i o n s
90as the f i r s t  of  s e v e r a l  i n s t a l l m e n t s .  De Seversky c a l l e d  
the P r e s i d e n t ' s  p l an "an e f f o r t  to p e r p e t u a t e  the methods 
and t he  weapons of  the l a s t  w a r " - - M a g i n o t  L i ne  t h i n k i n g .
As a r e s u l t ,  t he  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  would have to f i g h t  on 
R u s s i a ' s  t e r ms ,  t h a t  i s ,  l and war r a t h e r  than an a i r  war  
i n  which Amer ica would be s u p e r i o r .  F i n a l l y ,  once S t a l i n  
r e a l  i z e d  what  was happening he would move the Red Army 
b e f o r e  the NATO members coul d  b u i l d  a competent  f o r c e .
De Sever sky  and his  f o l l o w e r s  r e p e a t e d l y  r e t u r n e d  to the  
theme t h a t  the m a n i f e s t  d e s t i n y  o f  the Un i t e d  S t a t e s  was in  
t he  s k i e s . ^
As the hear i ngs  and debate  progressed those t a k i n g  
o n
Se n a t e ,  H e a r i n g s ,  S. Con. Res.  8 , pp.  348 ,  624 ,
722.
^ D e  Se v e r s ky ,  A i r  Power , pp.  1 6,  49 , 226 , 290,  349.
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the mi dd l e  s t a n d - - f a v o r i n g  t he  sending o f  t r oops  but  o n l y  
w i t h  Congr ess i ona l  a p p r o v a l - - b e g a n  to have a g r e a t e r  
i n f l u e n c e ,  I t  became l ess  o f  a q u e s t i o n  o f  whe t he r  Europe  
should be defended w i t h  t r oops  than i t  d i d  o f  the  
P r e s i d e n t ' s  a u t h o r i t y  to commit  those t r o o p s .  The C o n n a l l y -  
Russel l  R e s o l u t i o n s ,  r e p l a c i n g  the Wherry R e s o l u t i o n ,  were  
more p o s i t i v e  r e g a r d i n g  a t oken t r oop  commitment  bu t  d i d  
l i t t l e  to so l v e  the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  impasse.
CHAPTER IV
A Change o f  Emphasis:  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  Problems
and the Conc l us i on  of  the Debate
As the debate  pr ogressed Truman and h i s  a d v i s e r s  
g a t h e r e d  s u b s t a n t i a l  sup po r t  f o r  his  European pr ogr am; :  
however ,  his  opponents were u n w i l l i n g  to concede and 
g r a d u a l l y  s h i f t e d  t h e i r  focus towards t he  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  
q u e s t i o n s .  E a r l i e r , Senat ors  T a f t  and Wherry had both  
c h a l 1enged Truman 1s a u t h o r i t y  to i mplement  the Nor t h  A t l a n t i c  
Pact  w i t h o u t  Congr e s s i ona l  a p p r o v a l .  E d i t o r s  o f  the  
Sa t ur day  Evening P o s t , t y p i c a l  o f  the o p p o s i t i o n  p r e s s ,  were  
a s t o n i s h e d  t h a t  the P r e s i d e n t  was so i n s i s t e n t  "on b e a r i n g  
such a t e r r i f y i n g  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  a l l  by h i m s e l f .  . . .  Our  
r e c e n t  d i p l o m a t i c  r ecor d  is marred by s e c r e t  a gr e eme nt s ,  
excesses o f  e x e c u t i v e  power and cute  schemes to by- pass  
Co n g r e s s . " ^
The f o r e i g n  a f f a i r s  p r o v i s i o n s  o f  the C o n s t i t u t i o n  
have always pr ov i d ed  an open i n v i t a t i o n  f o r  P r e s i d e n t i a l -  
Congr ess i ona l  c o n f l i c t .  The P r e s i d e n t  d e r i v e s  hi s  power  
over  f o r e i g n  a f f a i r s  f rom hi s  r o l e  as c o m m a n d e r - i n - c h i e f , 
h i s  powers to a p p o i n t  and r e c e i v e  ambassadors,  the
^ E d i t o r i a l ,  Sa t ur day  Evening P o s t , March 24 ,  1951 ,
p. 10.
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c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  i n j u n c t i o n  t h a t  "he s h a l l  t ake  care  t h a t  
t he laws be f a i t h f u l l y  e x e c u t e d , "  and,  in p a r t ,  f rom his  
a u t h o r i t y  to make t r e a t i e s  "by and w i t h  the a d v i c e  and 
consent  of  the S e n a t e . "  Congress ,  on the o t h e r  hand,  has 
t he power to d e c l a r e  wa r ,  to r a i s e  and suppor t  a r m i e s ,  to  
make r u l e s  " f o r  t he  government  and r e g u l a t i o n  o f  l and  and
2naval  f o r c e s , "  and to g i v e  a d v i c e  and consent  on t r e a t i e s .  
The e n t i r e  problem of  P r e s i d e n t i a l - C o n g r e s s i o n a l  c o n f l i c t  
c e n t e r s  on where the P r e s i d e n t ' s  power ends and t h a t  o f  
the Congress_begi ns  , or  v i c e  v e r s a .
P r e s i d e n t  Truman,  in p r e p a r i n g  h i s  case f o r  d e p l o y ­
ing t r o o p s ,  a l s o  had h i s  s t a f f  deve l op h i s  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  
p o s i t i o n .  An a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  a s s i s t a n t ,  David D. L l o y d ,  
pr epar ed  a s t udy  which covered a l l  aspect s  o f  P r e s i d e n t i a l  
power to dep l oy  Amer ican f o r c e s  o u t s i d e  the Un i t e d  S t a t e s .  
Al t hough he made i t  c l e a r  the P r e s i d e n t  did not  have the  
a u t h o r i t y  t o  by-pass the C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  L l oyd c i t e d  a 
v a r i e t y  of  grounds f o r  P r e s i d e n t i a l  a c t i o n  and i n c l u d e d
numerous exampl es.  The E x e c u t i v e  supposedl y  coul d use
*
Amer ican t r oops  o u t s i d e  the U n i t e d  S t a t e s ,  and i n  f a c t  had 
done so,  f o r  s i x  ba s i c  purposes:  p r o t e c t i o n  o f  Amer ican
c i t i z e n s '  or  t h e i r  p r o p e r t y  a br oa d ,  p r o t e c t i o n  o f  the honor  
o f  the U n i t e d  S t a t e s ,  expansi on o f  f o r e i g n  commerce,  
def ense  o f  the c o u n t r y ,  o c c u pa t i on  o f  a vanqui shed enemy,
2
U . S . ,  C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  A r t . ,  I . ,  sec.  8 ; A r t .  I I ,  
sec.  2,  3.
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3
and e x e c u t i o n  of  a t r e a t y .  On the m a t t e r  o f  e x e c u t i n g  
t r e a t i e s ,  Lloyd po i n t e d  out  t h a t  c o u r t  d e c i s i o n s  and usage
c
had c l e a r l y  gi ven the P r e s i d e n t  the power to implement  such 
c o n v e n t i o n s . ^  In a d d i t i o n ,  the C u r t i  ss-Wri gh t  d e c i s i o n  
(299 U. S.  304)  l a i d  down a broad i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of  P r e s i d e n ­
t i a l  a u t h o r i t y  making i t  unnecessary f o r  s t a t u t e s ,  and
5t h e r e f o r e  t r e a t i e s ,  to be e x p l i c i t  i n  t h e i r  t e rms.
S e c r e t a r y  Acheson,  when asked about  Truman's  
a u t h o r i t y  to i mpl ement  the Pact  w i t h o u t  Congress i ona l  
a p p r o v a l ,  produced his own v e r s i o n  o f  Ex e c u t i v e  power.  In  
many r espec t s  very  s i m i l a r  to L l o y d ' s  p o s i t i o n ,  Acheson 
emphasized t h a t  the P r e s i d e n t  had the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  of  
seei ng t h a t  the 1aws, i n c l u d i n g  t r e a t i e s ,  were f a i t h f u l l y
3
Memorandum by David D. L l o y d ,  “Powers of  the P r e s i ­
dent  w i t h  r e s p e c t  to the d i s p o s i t i o n  of  the Armed Forces  
o u t s i d e  the Un i t e d  S t a t e s , "  February  2,  1951,  David D. Ll oyd  
F i l e ,  Truman Paper s ,  Truman L i b r a r y ,  pp.  1 3 - 3 2 .  H e r e a f t e r  
c i t e d  as L l oyd memorandum.
4 I b i d . , pp.  2 5 - 2 8 .
^ Ib i d . , pp.  2 8 - 2 9 .  The C u r t i  ss-Wr i  ght  case (299
U. S.  304)  arose out  o f  a v i o l a t i o n  of  a j o i  n t  r eso l  u t i  on o f
Congress empowering the P r e s i d e n t  to f o r b i d  the s a l e  o f  any
a r t i c l e s  of  war to c o u n t r i e s  engaged in  armed c o n f l i c t .  
Speaking f o r  the m a j o r i t y  J u s t i c e  George S u t h e r l a n d  s a i d ,
" I n  t h i s  v a s t  e x t e r n a l  real m [ f o r e i g n  a f f a i r s ] ,  w i t h  i t s  
i m p o r t a n t ,  c o m p l i c a t e d ,  d e l i c a t e  and ma n i f o l d  pr obl ems,  the  
P r e s i d e n t  a l one has the power to speak or  l i s t e n  as a 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  of  the n a t i o n . "
" I t  i s q u i t e  a p p a r e n t  t h a t  i f ,  i n  the maintenance  
of  our i n t e r n a t i o n a l  r e l a t i o n s ,  embar r assment - - perhaps  
s e r i o u s  embarrassment - - ! *s  to be avoi ded and success f o r  our  
aims a c h i e v e d ,  c ongr e s s i ona l  l e g i s l a t i o n  which i s  to be made 
e f f e c t i v e  through n e g o t i a t i o n  and i n q u i r y  w i t h i n  the i n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l  f i e l d  must o f t e n  accord to the P r e s i d e n t  a degree o f  
d i s c r e t i o n  and f reedom from s t a t u t o r y  r e s t r i c t i o n  which would 
not  be a d mi s s i b l e  were domest i c  a f f a i r s  a l one i n v o l v e d . "
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e x e c u t e d .  He a l s o  noted t h a t  numerous p u b l i c i s t s  and 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  a u t h o r i t i e s  had r e p e a t e d l y  conceded the  
r i g h t  o f  the P r e s i d e n t  to dep l oy  f o r c e s  o u t s i d e  the c o u n t r y  
w i t h o u t  Congr ess i ona l  endorsement .  "Not  on l y  has the  
P r e s i d e n t  the a u t h o r i t y  to use the Armed Forces i n  c a r r y i n g  
out  t he  broad f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  o f  the Un i t ed  S t a t e s  and 
i mp l ement i ng  t r e a t i e s , "  he s a i d ,  "but  i t  i s  e q u a l l y  c l e a r  
t h a t  t h i s  a u t h o r i t y  may not  be i n t e r f e r e d  w i t h  by the  
Congress in the e x e r c i s e  of  powers which i t  has under  the  
C o n s t i t u t i o n . " ^  Whi l e  r e l y i n g  upon the commander- i  n - c h i  e f  
c l a u s e ,  t he  s t a t e me n t  s u r e l y  produced r e s e nt me nt  among hi s  
Congr es s i ona l  enemies.
Many o t h e r  persons backed Truman' s proposed t r oop  
commitment  and sought  to e x p l a i n  hi s  a u t h o r i t y  to a c t .
Se n a t o r  Wi1 1 iam Ben t o n , Democrat  o f  C o n n e c t i c u t ,  b e l i e v e d  
t h a t  most c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  l awyers  would s i de  w i t h  Truman 
because he was a c t i n g  i n  the common def ense  o f  t he  peopl e  
o f  t he  U n i t e d  S t a t e s .  That  i s ,  t he  i mmedi at e  e f f e c t  o f  
Amer i can t roops  i n  Europe would be to p r o t e c t  Western Europe,  
but  u l t i m a t e l y  those f o r c e s  would a l so  be p r o t e c t i n g  the  
U n i t e d  S t a t e s . ^  Democrat i c  Se na t or  Huber t  H. Humphrey of  
M i n n e s o t a ,  w h i l e  hoping the P r e s i d e n t  would always c o n s u l t  
w i t h  Congress ,  sub s c r i b ed  to Truman' s p o s i t i o n  because the
^S e n a t e ,  H e a r i n g s ,  S. Con. Res.  8 , pp.  8 8 - 9 3 .
^Congr ess i ona l  Re c o r d , XCV11 , 2 8 5 3 - 5 4 .
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e x e c u t i v e  power was " n e i t h e r  i n c r e a s e d ,  l i m i t e d ,  nor  
extended i n peacet i me  or  in e m e r g e n c y . " The P r e s i d e n t  
e i t h e r  had t he  a u t h o r i t y  to dep l oy  t r oops  or  he did n o t ,  and 
the  Congress coul d not  add or  t ake  away f rom t h a t  b a s i c
o
power.  H i s t o r i a n  Henry S t e e l e  Commager agreed w i t h  t h i s
l i n e  o f  r e as on i ng  , p o i n t i n g  out  t h a t  Truman' s  c r i t i c s  had
a l r e a d y  r e c o g n i z e d  the P r e s i d e n t ' s  a u t h o r i t y  to send t he
Navy and A i r  Force to the European a r e a .  " I f  he does not
have a u t h o r i t y  to send l and f o r c e s  to p o i n t s  o f  da n g e r ,
n e i t h e r  does . he  have a u t h o r i t y  to send t he  Navy or  t he  A i r
Force to p o i n t s  o f  danger  o u t s i d e  the boundar i es  o f  t he
n a t i o n ,  f o r  h i s  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  a u t h o r i t y  in  one arena  i s
9p r e c i s e l y  the same as i n  t he  o t h e r s . "
Those on C a p i t o l  Hi 11 ,  on the o t h e r  hand,  d i d  have 
c e r t a i n  powers through which 1 i m i t a t i o n s  coul d  be e s t a b l i s h e d  
on the P r e s i d e n t ' s  sending o f  f o r c e s  a br oad .  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  
c r i t i c s  f o r t i  f i  ed thems e l v e s  t hrough t he  Congress i onal  
powers over  t he  armed f o r c e s ,  the Co ng r e s s i on a l  r i g h t  to  
e na c t  l e g i s l a t i o n  to i mpl ement  t r e a t i e s ,  and the Congr es ­
s i o n a l  a u t h o r i t y  to d e c l a r e  war .
Such A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  s u p p o r t e r s  as E i s e nhower ,  Dewey,  
and St assen a l l  acknowledged t he  a b s o l u t e  power o f  t he
8 1bi d  . , pp.  ' 2 8 5 4 ,  2 8 5 9 - 6 0 .
9Henry S t e e l e  Commager,  "Does the P r e s i d e n t  have too  
Much Power?" New York T i m e s , A p r i l  1 ,  1951 ,  sec .  V I ,  p.  31.
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a p p r o p r i a t i o n s  c l ause  in the C o n s t i t u t i o n . ^  As Dewey
expressed i t ,  "The power to r a i s e  t r oops  and t o  w i t h h o l d  or
g r a n t  funds f o r  t h e i r  suppor t  c a r r i e s  w i t h i n  i t  . . . t he
power to w i t h h o l d  appr ova l  o f  t h e i r  u s e . " ^  However ,  Se n a t o r
Wher r y ,  a member o f  the A p p r o p r i a t i o n s  Commi t t ee ,  d i s a g r e e d ,
say i ng t h a t  a l l  too o f t e n  the Congress was p r e s e n t e d  w i t h
commitments a l r e a d y  made.  " A l l  you do i s  he l p  j u s t i f y  i t ,
maybe c u t  i t  down in an i t em here or  an i t em t h e r e . "  The
t o t a l  e f f e c t  o f  the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s  a c t i o n ,  in Wher r y ' s
v i e w ,  was to usurp" . the .powers, o f  Congress and " e s t a b l  i sh
12a mi 1 i t a r y  di  e t a  t o r s  hi  p . "
Regarding Congr e s s i ona l  a u t h o r i t y  to e n a c t  l e g i s l a ­
t i o n  to i mplement  t r e a t i e s ,  a number o f  h o s t i l e  Senat ors  
viewed the sending o f  t r oops  i n  the same manner as 
f u r n i s h i n g  mi 1 i t a r y  m a t e r i a  1 ,  f o r  both r e q u i r e d  Co ng r e s s i on a l  
a p p r o v a l .  Those Senators  r e l i e d  h e a v i l y  upon C o n n a l l y  and 
Vandenber g ' s  1949 s t a t e me n t s  on A r t i c l e  11 o f  t he  Nor t h
A t l a n t i c  T r e a t y  in which t h e y  f i r m l y  a s s e r t e d  t he  r i g h t  of
1 3
Congress to implement  the P a c t .  Sen a t o r  Wherry ,j w h i 1e 
a c c e p t i n g  t h a t  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ,  went  beyond i t  by c a l l i n g  f o r  
Congress to de t e r mi ne  " p o l i c y "  be f o r e  the P r e s i d e n t  coul d
^ S e n a t e ,  H e a r i n g s ,  S. Con. Res.  8 , pp.  11 ,  516 ,  526.
11 I b i d . , p. 526.
^ 1b i d . ,  p.  516;  Congr e ss i ona l  R e c o r d , X C V I I ,  3010.  
^ S e e  Chapt er  1,  p.  13.
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c a r r y  out  any i mp l e me n t a t i o n  o f  t r e a t i e s .
On the m a t t e r  o f  the power o f  Congress to d e c l a r e
w a r ,  Se n a t o r  T a f t  was p a r t i c u l a r l y  unhappy w i t h  a document
c i r c u l a t i n g  t he  Senate which was e n t i t l e d  "Power o f  the
P r e s i d e n t  to Send the Armed Forces Out s i de  the Un i t e d
S t a t e s . "  One o f  the c on c l us i o ns  of  t h a t  document was t h a t
due to t e c h n o l o g i c a l  devel opments wars were no l o n g e r
d e c l a r e d  i n  advance,  and t h e r e f o r e  the Congr ess i ona l  power
to d e c l a r e  war had f a l l e n  i n t o  abeyance.  "This  document , "
s a i d  T a f t ,  " c o n t a i n s  t he  most u n b r i d l e d  c l a i ms  f o r  the
a u t h o r i t y  o f  the P r e s i d e n t  t h a t  I have ever  seen w r i t t e n  in  
14c o l d  p r i n t . "  Al t hough he d i d  admi t  t h e r e  were cases i n  
which i t  was unnecessary f o r  Congress to d e c l a r e  war ,  h is  
main o b j e c t i o n  was t h a t  m i l i t a r y  a s s i s t a n c e  in i t s e l f  
mi ght  b r i n g  about  armed c o n f l i c t .  A P r e s i d e n t  in the  
process o f  d e p l oy i n g  f o r c e s  to a count r y  or  area  which was 
t h r e a t e n e d  w i t h  war coul d e a s i l y  a l l o w  the Un i t e d  S t a t e s  to  
become i n v o l v e d  in  a c o n f l i c t  a g a i n s t  the wishes o f  Congress.  
On the o t h e r  hand,  T a f t  was w i l l i n g  to a l l o w  the P r e s i d e n t  
to send t r oops  to areas not  be i ng t h r e a t e n e d ,  p r ov i d ed  such 
a depl oyment  would not  cause an u n f r i e n d l y  n a t i o n  to r e a c t
1 4
T a f t ,  A For e i gn  P o l i c y  f o r  Am e r i c a n s , pp.  2 4 - 2 5 .
The House Commit tee on For e i gn  A f f a i r s  produced a s i m i l a r  
s t u d y ;  however ,  i t  did not  a r r i v e  a t  t he  same conc l us i on  but  
r a t h e r  was a c o l l e c t i o n  o f  arguments f o r  and a g a i n s t  the  
Execut i ve ' s  power.  (U . S . ,  Co ng r e s s , House,  Commit tee on 
Fo r e i g n  A f f a i r s ,  Background I n f o r m a t i o n  on the Use o f  Un i t e d  
S t a t e s  Forces in For e i gn  C o u n t r i e s , H. R e p t . ,  127,  82nd 
Conq . ,  1s t  sess.  , 1951 ,  House Repor t s :  M i s c e l l a n e o u s ,  I ,
1 - 7 7 .
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15h o s t i l e l y .  "There i s  one ver y  d e f i n i t e  l i m i t  . . . on
the P r e s i d e n t ' s  power to send t r oops  a b r o a d , "  t he  Ohio
Senat or  ob s e r v e d ,  "he cannot  send t r oops  abroad i f  t he
16sending o f  such t roops amounts to t he  making o f  w a r . "
Those f a v o r i n g  a NATO army w i t h  Amer ican t r oops  
came back w i t h  c o u n t e r c l a i m s  to d e f e a t  Co ng r e s s i on a l  i n f r i n g e ­
ment upon P r e s i d e n t i a l  power.  One p o i n t e d  out  t h a t  a 
d i f f e r e n c e  e x i s t e d  between c r e a t i n g  an army and commanding 
t h a t  a r m y - - t h e y  were d i f f e r e n t  f u n c t i o n s  e x e r c i s e d  by 
d i f f e r e n t  branches o f  g o v e r n m e n t . ^  Anot he r  p o i n t e d  to a 
s t a t e m e n t  by Se n a t o r  T a f t ' s  own f a t h e r ,  i n  which t he  f o r me r  
P r e s i d e n t  acknowledged t h a t  t he  mere a p p r o p r i a t i o n  o f
money f o r  an army gave the E x e c u t i v e  t he  means o f  o r d e r i n g
18f o r c e s  anywhere he want ed.  Even Se n a t o r  Vandenberg,  who
was unabl e  to t a k e  p a r t  in the De bat e ,  warned Wherry t h a t
a Congr e s s i ona l  c h a l l e n g e  to t he  P r e s i d e n t ' s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l
19powers coul d not  s u c c e s s f u l l y  be s u s t a i n e d .
David L l o y d ,  f o r  the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,  r e c o g n i z e d
^ S e n a t e ,  H e a r i n g s ,  S. Con. Res.  8 , pp.  626 ,  628.
1 fi T a f t ,  A For e i gn  P o l i c y  f o r  A m e r i c a n s , p. 27.
^ S e n a t e ,  H e a r i n g s ,  S. Con. Res.  8 , p.  59 9.
^ Congr e ss i ona l  R e c o r d , X C V I I ,  228.
19 Vandenberg,  P r i v a t e  P a p e r s , p.  567.
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20the Congr ess i ona l  power o f  t he  pu r s e ;  however  he went  on 
to show, t hrough the d e c i s i o n  o f  Swaim v.  U . S . (28 Cour t  o f  
Claims 1 7 3 - 2 2 1 ) ,  t h a t  Congress had no o t h e r  a u t h o r i t y  to
pi
l i m i t  the powers o f  the c o m m a n d e r - i n - c h i e f .  On t he  
m a t t e r  o f  Congr ess i ona l  i mp l e me n t a t i o n  o f  t r e a t i e s  he used 
P r o f e s s o r  E. S. C o r w i n ' s t h e s i s  t h a t  t r e a t y  p r o v i s i o n s  are  
addressed to c e r t a i n  branches o f  government  f o r  i mpl emen­
t a t i o n .  In the absence o f - . e x p l i c i t . . d i r e c t i o n s  i n  the
t r e a t y ,  t he  P r e s i d e n t  should then make t he  d e c i s i o n  s i nc e
2 ?he i s  charged w i t h  e x e c u t i n g  the laws o f  the l a n d .  
S i m i l a r l y ,  he r e j e c t e d  Se n a t o r  T a f t ' s  p o s i t i o n  on d e c l a r i n g  
o f  w a r :
Senat or  T a f t ,  i n  s h o r t  i s  a r g u i n g  t h a t  the  
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  power o f  t he  P r e s i d e n t  i s  l i m i t e d
20
Ll oyd memorandum, p. 33.  L l oyd wr o t e  ".  . . the
power o f  Congress over  a p p r o p r i a t i o n s '  i s  a b s o l u t e  . . . , "
but  someone in the Whi te  House a p p a r e n t l y  d i s a g r e e d  w i t h  t he  
use o f  the word " a b s o l u t e , "  as t h e r e  were q u e s t i o n  marks 
p e n c i l e d  i n  a long the s i de  o f  t he  sent enc e .
21 I b i d . , pp.  3 3 - 3 4 .  In Swaim v . U . S . (28 Co u'r.t o f  
Claims 1 7 3 - 2 2 1 )  the c o u r t  r u l e d ,  "Congress may i n c r e a s e  the  
Army,  or  reduce the Army,  or  a b o l i s h  i t  a l t o g e t h e r ;  but  so 
long as we have a m i l i t a r y  f o r c e  Congress cannot  t a ke  away 
f rom the P r e s i d e n t  the supreme command. I t  i s  t r u e  t h a t  the  
c o n s t i t u t i o n  has c o n f e r r e d  upon Congress the e x c l u s i v e  power  
t o make r u l e s  f o r  the government  and r e g u l a t i o n  o f  t he  l and  
and naval  f o r c e s ;  b u t  the two powers are  d i s t i n c t ;  n e i t h e r  
can t r e n c h  upon the o t h e r ;  t he  P r e s i d e n t  c a n n o t ,  under  the  
d i s g u i s e  o f  m i l i t a r y  o r d e r s ,  evade the l e g i s l a t i v e  r e g u l a ­
t i o n s  by which he in common w i t h  t he  Army must be governed;  
and Congress cannot  in  the d i s g u i s e  o f  ' r u l e s  f o r  t he  
go v e r n me n t 1 o f  the Army i m p a i r  the a u t h o r i t y  o f  t he  P r e s i ­
dent  a s C o m m a n d e r - i n - C h i e f ."
2 2 Ll oyd memorandum, pp.  4 8 - 5 0 .
127
by the p o s s i b i 1 i t y  t h a t  our  a d v e r s a r i e s  may t ake  
h o s t i 1e a c t i o n , even though the conduct  of  the  
P r e s i d e n t  i s  e n t i r e l y  d e f e n s i v e .  There i s  no 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  d o c t r i n e  to t h i s  e f f e c t ,  and t h e r e  
o b v i o u s l y  can be none i f  the n a t i o n  is to
s u r v i v e . 23
A s . a l r e a d y  ment i oned ,  T a f t ' s- c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  arguments  
wer e ,  i n  p a r t  r oo t e d  in Truman' s response to t he  opening o f  
h o s t i l i t i e s  i n  Korea.  A r t i c l e  43 o f  t he  U n i t e d  Na t i ons  
C h a r t e r  p r ov i d e d  f o r  t he  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
army by means o f  S e c u r i t y  Counci l  n e g o t i a t i o n s .  At  the  
same t ime t he  Senate was c o n s i d e r i n g  t he  U n i t e d  Nat i ons  
C h a r t e r ,  P r e s i d e n t  Truman s e nt  word t h a t  when such a g r e e ­
ments were a r r i v e d  a t  he would ask Congress f o r  the
a p p r o p r i a t e  l e g i s l a t i o n  to approve Amer ican p a r t i c i p a t i o n  
9 4
m  t h a t  army.  The Senate  For e i gn  R e l a t i o n s  Commi t t ee ,
i n  r e p o r t i n g  out  the U n i t e d  Na t i o n s  C h a r t e r ,  added a
pr ov i s o  a l l o w i n g  the P r e s i d e n t  to n e g o t i a t e  the agreements
w i t h  subsequent  Congr es s i ona l  approval  necessary  to make
9 5
such agreements e f f e c t i  v e . The Secur i  t y  Counci l  never
made use o f  A r t i c l e  43 because the S o v i e t  Union b l ocked  
a l l  a c t i o n  upon i t .
2 3 I b i d . , p.  41.
9 A
Congr ess i ona l  R e c o r d , X C V I I ,  3012.
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U . S . ,  Congress,  S e n a t e ,  Commit tee on For e i gn  
R e l a t i o n s *  P r o v i d i n g  f o r  the Appoint ment  o f - R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  
of  the Un i t e d  S t a t e s  in  the Organs and Agenci es  o f  the  
U n i t e d  N a t i o n s ,  and to Make Ot her  P r o v i s i o n  w i t h  Respect  to 
the P a r t i c i p a t i o n - o f  the Un i t e d  S t a t es  in Such O r g a n i z a t i o n ,
S. Rept .  717 ,  79th Cong. , 1st  sess.  , 1945,  Senate R e p o r t s : 
Mi seel  1aneous , I I I ,  2.
With the i n v a s i o n  o f  South Korea ,  the S e c u r i t y  
Counci l  on June 27,  1950 ,  adopted a r e s o l u t i o n  c a l l i n g  f o r  
Un i t e d  Na t i ons  members to a i d  the Repub l i c  o f  Korea in  
r e p e l l i n g  the armed a g g r e s s i o n  f rom the N o r t h .  P r e s i d e n t  
Truman responded i m m e d i a t e l y  by sending Amer ican f o r c e s .  
Truman gave some t hought  to ask i ng Congress f o r  a d e c l a r a ­
t i o n  o f  wa r ,  but  Se n a t o r  C o n n a l l y ,  a f r a i d  o f  a long  
Congr e s s i ona l  debate  which mi ght  t i e  the P r e s i d e n t ' s  hands 
c o m p l e t e l y ,  convi nced him t h a t  he had the power as
O f
c o m m a n d e r - i n r c h i e f  and under  t he  U n i t e d  Na t i ons  C h a r t e r .
Se n a t o r  T a f t  a l r e a d y  had r e s e r v a t i o n s  r e g a r d i n g  
P r e s i d e n t i a l  power,  and now he found Truman c ommi t t i ng  
Amer i can ground f o r c e s  t o  a U n i t e d  Na t i ons  army w i t h o u t  
e v e r  havi ng compl i ed w i t h  A r t i c l e  43 or  the Senate  p r o v i s o
27
r e g a r d i n g  t h a t  a r t i c l e .  The A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s  answer  was
t h a t  i t  had ac t ed  under  A r t i c l e  48 which p r o v i d e d :  "The
a c t i o n  r e q u i r e d  to c a r r y  out  the d e c i s i o n s  o f  t he  S e c u r i t y  
Counci l  . . - . ' s h a l l  be t aken by a l l  the Members o f  t he
Un i t e d  Na t i ons  or  by some o f  them,  as the S e c u r i t y
28Counci l  may d e t e r m i n e . " David L l oyd f u r t h e r  noted t h a t
A r t i c l e  4 3 ,  which had not  been i mp l e me n t e d , c o u l d  " h a r d l y  
be c ons t r ued  to i m p a i r  or  modi f y  t he  o b i i g a t i o n  o f  the  
member s t a t e s '  to c a r r y  ou t  the d e c i s i o n s  o f  the S e c u r i t y
^ C o n n a l l y ,  My Name i s  Tom C o n n a l l y , p.  346.
27 Se n a t e ,  H e a r i n g s ,  S. Con. Res.  8 , p.  608.
28 Ll oyd memorandum, pp.  5 2 - 5 3 .
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29Counci l  by d i r e c t  a c t i o n  on t h e i r  own p a r t . "  He f u r t h e r
d e c l a r e d  t h a t  the Congr e s s i ona l  p r o v i s o  i n  the a cc e p t a nc e
o f  the Un i t e d  Nat i ons  -Char ter  shoul d not  be c o n s i d e r e d  a
r e s t r i c t i o n  upon t he  P r e s i d e n t ' s  power i n  view of  t he  f a t e
o f  s i m i 1ar  p r o v i s i o n s  a t t a c h e d  to t he  S e l e c t i v e  S e r v i c e
30Act  o f  1940 and the Lend Lease A c t .
Truman' s  sending o f  f o r c e s  to Korea,  a l ong w i t h  
T a f t ' s  p o s i t i o n  on a P r e s i d e n t  making wa r ,  conv i nced the  
Ohio Re pub l i c an  t h a t  Co ng r e ss i on a l  approva l  was ne cessar y  
b e f o r e  an E x e c u t i v e  could commit  Amer ican ground f o r c e s  to  
any i n t e r n a t i o n a l  army.
Se na t or  T a f t  a r r i v e d  a t  t h a t  p o s i t i o n  i n  a r ound­
about  f a s h i o n ,  aga i n  r e f l e c t i n g  h i s  i n c o n s i s t e n c y .  In the  
case o f  NATO, the P r e s i d e n t ,  a c c or d i n g  to t he  S e n a t o r ,  
could not  ass i gn to i t  ground f o r c e s  w i t h o u t  Co n g r e s s i o n a l  
approva l  f o r  two r easons .  F i r s t ,  P r e s i d e n t i a l  dep l oyment  
o f  t roops to a t h r e a t e n e d  area  was,  i n  e f f e c t ,  a l l o w i n g  the
31
Co mma n d e r - i n - Ch i e f  to make war .  Second,  no P r e s i d e n t  
could commit  Amer ican f o r c e s  to an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  army
2 9 1 b i d . , p.  54.
30 I b i d . ,  p . 61.  The S e l e c t i v e  S e r v i c e  Act  o f  1940  
and the Lend Lease Act  both had p r o v i s i o n s  i n t e n d e d  to 
curb the use o f  the armed f o r c e s ,  y e t  P r e s i d e n t  R o o s e v e l t  
used the Navy in the Nor t h A t l a n t i c a n d  sent  t r oops  to  
I c e l a n d  and Gr een l and .  W i t h i n  the Senate  t h e r e  was 
s u b s t a n t i a l  b e l i e f  t h a t  the p r o v i s i o n s  coul d not  c o n s t i t u ­
t i o n a l l y  curb the P r e s i d e n t .
31 T a f t ,  A For e i gn  Pol i c y  f o r  A m e r i c a n s , p.  34.
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wher e i n  he d e l e g a t e d  or  f o r f e i t e d  some o f  h i s  powers as
32Co mma n d e r - i n - Ch i e f .  "My p o s i t i o n  has been t h a t  no
Commander i n  C h i e f  can d e l e g a t e  to a c o u n c i l  o f  t en n a t i o n s
the power to d i r e c t  Amer ican A r m i e s , "  d e c l a r e d  T a f t ,  " on l y
3 3
the  Congress can a u t h o r i z e  t h a t  p a r t i c u l a r '  a c t i o n . " -  He 
c on t i n ue d  to b e l i e v e  t h a t  the P r e s i d e n t  d i d  not  have the  
a u t h o r i t y  to make such a commitment ,  and r e p e a t e d l y  a s s e r t e d  
t h a t  such a c t i o n  coul d on l y  be c a r r i e d  ou t  by Congress in  
accordance w i t h  A r t i c l e  11 - o f : the- T r e a t y - - t h e  c l a us e  
p r o v i d i n g  t h a t  r a t i f i c a t i o n  and i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  be disposed
of  by t he  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  processes o f  t he  i n d i v i d u a l
34members .
The Ohio Senat or  may have br ought  up a v a l i d '
t e c h n i c a l  p o i n t  on the m a t t e r  o f  d e l e g a t i n g  e x e c u t i v e  power
t o  an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o r g a n i z a t i o n ,  but  a t  t he  same t ime he
acknowledged P r e s i d e n t i a l  powers which coul d e f f e c t i v e l y
' be  used to by-pass his  own argument .  He accept ed  the f a c t
t h a t  t he  P r e s i d e n t  coul d  s t a t i o n  naval  o r  a i r  f o r c e s
anywhere even i f  the p a r t i c u l a r  c o u n t r y  was be ing t h r e a t e n e d .
Should an agg r e s s o r  a t t a c k  t h a t  n a t i o n ,  i t  would be ve r y
3 5
easy f o r  t hose Amer ican f o r c e s  to e v a c u a t e .  As f a r  as 
3 ?S e n a t e ,  H e a r i n g s ,  S. Con. Res.  8 , pp.  6 0 3 - 0 4 .  
^ Congress ion a T Record , X C V I I ,  2852.
^ S e n a t e ,  H e a r i n g s ,  S; Con.  Res.  8 , p.  607.
35 T a f t ,  A ' Fo r e i gn - Po l  i c.y f o r  A m e r i c a n s , p.  34.
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sending ground f o r c e s ,  he even conceded a t  one p o i n t :
I have sa i d  t h a t  i f  he [Truman]  had a u t h o r i t y  
to do i t  w i t h o u t  the A t l a n t i c  T r e a t y ,  he had 
a u t h o r i t y  to do i t  i f  t h e r e  was an A t l a n t i c  T r e a t y .
And I t h i n k  he has the power ,  so f a r  as t h a t  i s  
concerned,  to send s i x  d i v i s i o n s  to Germany and t e l l  
the gener a l  t h a t  he s h a l l  cooper a t e  w i t h  the  
B r i t i s h  and o t h e r  p e o p l e . 36
In e f f e c t ,  h i s  l e g a l  p o i n t  r e g a r d i n g  a commitment  to an
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  army coul d be c i r c umv e nt e d  by u n i l a t e r a l
a c t i o n .
37Se n a t o r  Wherry agr eed in substance w i t h  T a f t ;
however ,  t h e i r  c r i t i c s  b e l i e v e d  the Nor th A t l a n t i c  Pact  had,
i n  f a c t ,  p r ov i ded  t he  P r e s i d e n t  adequate  a u t h o r i t y  to de p l oy
ground f o r c e s .  S e c r e t a r y  M a r s h a l l  a d m i t t e d  t h a t  even i f
Congress d i d  no t h i ng  i n  the way o f  appr ov i ng  Truman' s  p l a n ,
the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  would proceed to send t r oops  because i t
f e l t  i t  had s u f f i c i e n t  a u t h o r i t y  to do so under  A r t i c l e  3
o f  the T r e a t y  which c a l l e d  f o r  i n d i v i d u a l  or  c o l l e c t i v e
38s e l f - h e l p  and mutual  a i d .  Se n a t o r  Homer Ferguson,  
Republ i can  f rom M i c h i g a n ,  w h i l e  c l a i m i n g  t h a t  t he  T r e a t y  was 
n e i t h e r  s e l f - e x e c u t i n g ,  nor d i d  i t  g i ve  the P r e s i d e n t  the  
a u t h o r i t y  to commit  t r o o p s , g r a n t e d  c e r t a i n  p r e r o g a t i v e s  
to t he  E x e c u t i v e .  Tha t  i s ,  by appr ov i ng  t he  T r e a t y  the  
Senate agreed to i t s  i n t e n t ,  and i f  the Congress now f a i l e d
^ S e n a t e ,  H e a r i n g s ,  S. Con. Res.  8 , p.  6 32,
3 7 1 b i d . , pp.  6 89 ,  700-01 , 705.
3 3 1 b i d . ,  pp.  7 3 - 7 4 .
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to i mplement  t he  P a c t ,  then the P r e s i d e n t  could t ake  t he  
39i n i t i a t i v e .  "The absence o f  a l e g a l  o b l i g a t i o n  to send 
t r o o p s , "  observed David L l o y d ,  " i s  not  a p r o h i b i t i o n  on 
sending them i f  the C h i e f  E x e c u t i v e  de t e r mi ne s  t h a t  t hey  are  
necessary  to c a r r y  out  the purpose o f  t he  t r e a t y . "  He went  
on to p o i n t  out  t h a t  even i n  t he  absence o f  the T r e a t y  t he  
P r e s i d e n t  could a c t  mer e l y  upon the "broad c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  
o f  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  and n a t i o n a l  d e f e n s e . " ^ 0
The f a c t  t h a t  c o n s i d e r a b l e  t ime was spent  d e b a t i n g  
a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  i s s u e ,  which had l i t t l e  to do w i t h  the  
a c t u a l  de f ense  o f  Europe,  aga i n  exposed the n e c e s s i t y  o f  
P r e s i d e n t i a l  c o n s u l t a t i o n  w i t h  Congress.  W a l t e r  Lippmann 
blamed Truman f o r  t he  "bot ched- up bus i ness  o f  t he  t roops  
f o r  Europe" i s s u e , p o i n t i n g  out  t h a t  by announcing t he  d e c i ­
s ion b e f o r e  t a l k i n g  w i t h  Congress the P r e s i d e n t  had
41a l i e n a t e d  s uppor t  f o r  h i s  p l a n .  Even some o f  Truman' s
f i r m  backers  c r i t i c i z e d  the P r e s i d e n t  f o r  f a i l i n g  to come
42to an accommodat ion w i t h  h i s  o p p o s i t i o n .  Throughout  the  
debate  R e p u b l i c a n s ,  i n c l u d i n g  t hose i n  f a v o r  o f  sendi ng  
t r o o p s ,  were e s p e c i a l l y  c r i t i c a l  o f  Truman' s  f a i l u r e  to
^ Congr ess i ona l  R e c o r d , X C V I I ,  2940 ,  2949.
^ L l o y d  memorandum, pp.  6 5 - 6 6 .
41 W a l t e r  L ippmann, "Mr.  Truman' s  Co ng r e s s i on a l  
D i f f i c u l t i e s , "  S t .  Louis P o s t - P i  s p a t e h , A p r i l  6 , 1951 ,  
p. 3D.
4? E d i t o r i a l ,  Washington P o s t , Januar y  13 ,  1951 ,  p. 8 ; 
James Rest on,  "Our Basic C r i s i s  i s  the C r i s i s  o f  C o n f i d e n c e ,"  
New York T i m e s , January  14,  1951 ,  sec.  I V ,  p.  3.
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c o n s u l t  w i t h  Congress p r i o r  to the announcement  o f  t he  
d e c i s i o n . —  Truman a d mi t t e d  he could not  o p e r a t e  w i t h o u t  
the Congress but  a l so  acknowledged t h a t  Congressmen some­
t imes demanded i n f o r m a t i o n  " f o r  the s o l e  purpose o f
embar r ass i ng  and h a ms t r i n g i n g  t he  P r e s i d e n t - - i n  o t h e r  words,
44f o r  p a r t i s a n  p o l i t i c a l  r e a s o n s . "
P l a y i n g  upon the i mpor t ance  o f  t i m e ,  Governor  Dewey
de p l o r e d  the S e n a t e ' s  slowness to a c t  once i t  had been:
c o n s u l t e d .  Congr ess i ona l  debate  began in January  1951 and
no vot e  was t aken u n t i l  A p r i l - - s u c h  a d e l a y  posed problems
should the same pr ocedur e  be necessary  e v e r y  t ime the
45P r e s i d e n t  wished to send more t roops to Europe.
U l t i m a t e l y ,  n e i t h e r  s i de  won the day w i t h  t h e i r  
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  a rgument s .  A c e n t u r y  and a h a l f  o f  t r a d i t i o n ,  
p r a c t i c e ,  and c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  appeared to 
g i v e  the P r e s i d e n t  the edge,  y e t  Congress had made some 
v a l i d  l e g a l  p o i n t s  r e g a r d i n g  e x e c u t i v e - l e g i s l a t i v e  c o n s u l t a ­
t i o n ,  and the d e l e g a t i o n  of  e x e c u t i v e  power to an i n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l  body.  The f a c t  t h a t  the Repub l i ca ns  i n  Congress  
con t i n ue d  a t  l e n g t h  to hammer a t  t he  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  
ar gument s ,  arguments which t h e y  were u n l i k e l y  to win  
d e c i s i v e l y ,  exposed an a p p a r e n t l y  p a r t i s a n  a t t e m p t  to keep
43 Se n a t e ,  H e a r i n g s ,  S. Con. Res.  8 , p. 594;  Congres­
s i o n a l  R e c o r d , XCVI , 16956;  X C V I I ,  256.  /
^ T r u m a n ,  Memoi r s , I I ,  454 .
4 5Se n a t e ,  H e a r i n g s ,  S. Con.  Res.  8 , p . 539.
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the n a t i o n a l  s p o t l i g h t  on an i ss ue  a l r e a d y  dec i ded  i n  the  
minds o f  mos t  men.
Me a n whi l e ,  Democrats were wor k i ng to s i d e - t r a c k  the  
Wherry R e s o l u t i o n .  Accor d i ng  to t h a t  measure Congress  
would de t e r mi n e  " p o l i c y "  b e f o r e  the P r e s i d e n t  coul d a c t ,  and 
f o r  some t h i s  meant  Senate  m i l i t a n t s  coul d f i l i b u s t e r  to
46death any f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  pr oposa l  r e g a r d i n g  Western Europe.
Senate Co n c u r r e n t  R e s o l u t i o n  No. 8 was e s s e n t i a l l y  n e g a t i v e
i n  pur pose ,  and i t  i n v i t e d  f u r t h e r  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  pr ob l ems .
P r e s i d e n t  Truman wanted a more p o s i t i v e  a f f i r m a t i o n  o f
Congr e s s i ona l  f e e l  i ngs and t h e r e f o r e  asked Se n a t o r  C o n n a l l y ,
i n  hi s  c a p a c i t y  as Chai rman o f  the Fo r e i g n  R e l a t i o n s
Commi t t ee ,  to sponsor  a r e s o l u t i o n  r e p l a c i n g  t he  Wherry  
4 7
p r o p o s a l .  The Democrats were not  t he  on l y  ones d e s i r i n g  
a more f r i e n d l y  response .  Re p ub l i c a n  Senat or s  Lodge and 
Knowland both i n t r o d u c e d  r e s o l u t i o n s  which approved t h e  
sending o f  a l i m i t e d  number o f  t r oops  and,  a t  the same t i m e ,  
r e q u i r e d  Congr e s s i ona l  appr ova l  o f  any a d d i t i o n a l  t r o o p  
commi tments . ^
The Lodge and Knowland r e s o l u t i o n s  were never  
debated because f o l l o w i  ng t he  he a r i ng s  on Senate  Co n c u r r e n t
C o n g r e s s i o n a l  R e c o r d , X C V I I ,  230.
^ B l a i r  B o l l e s ,  "Curb on P r e s i d e n t ' s  Troop Powers 
Gains in Congr ess , "  F o r e i g n  P o l i c y  B u l l e t i n , XXX 
( F e b r u a r y  16,  1 9 5 1 ) ,  2.
^ Co ng r e ss i on a l  R e c o r d , X C V I I ,  1 3 1 7 - 1 8 ,  1 6 4 8 - 4 9 ,  1752.
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R e s o l u t i o n  No. 8 the  For e i gn  R e l a t i o n s  and Armed S e r v i c e s
Commit tees b u r i e d  the Wherry R e s o l u t i o n  and r e p o r t e d  out
two new r e s o l u t i o n s  on. March 14.  The Connal  l y  R e s o l u t i o n  ,
Senate  R e s o l u t i o n  99 ,  was a s i mpl e  measure mer e l y
e x p r e s s i n g  the s e n t i me n t  o f  the Sena t e .  The Russe l l
R e s o l u t i o n ,  Senate Co nc ur r en t  R e s o l u t i o n  18,  was i d e n t i c a l
except  t h a t  the word "Congress" r e p l a c e d  "Senat e"  t h e r e b y
r e q u i r i n g  both houses to vote  on i t .  The j o i n t  Commit tee
made up o f  t h i r t e e n  Democrats and e l e v e n  Republ i cans  vot ed
unani mousl y  to r e p o r t  out  Senate R e s o l u t i o n  99 and s i x t e e n
49to e i g h t  to r e p o r t  out  Senate Co n c u r r e n t  R e s o l u t i o n  18.
N e i t h e r  t he  s i mpl e  r e s o l u t i o n  nor the c o n c u r r e n t  one
r e q u i r e d  f ormal  P r e s i d e n t i a l  accept ance  or r e j e c t i o n ;  
on l y  a j o i n t  r e s o l u t i o n  or  a b i l l  coul d f o r c e  t h a t  a c t i o n .
T h e C on n a11y - R u s s e 11 R e s o l u t i o n s ,  w h i l e  demanding
the European members o f  NATO c a r r y  t h e i r  f a i r  share o f  the
bur den,  accept ed the n e c e s s i t y  o f  s t a t i o n i n g  Amer ican
f o r c e s  abroad to impl ement  the T r e a t y .  The core  o f  the
r e s o l u t i o n s  was in  S e c t i o n  6 which r e s o l v e d  t h a t
i t  i s  the sense of  the Senate t h a t ,  i n  the  
i n t e r e s t s  of  sound c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  p r o c e s s e s ,  and 
o f  n a t i o n a l  u n i t y  and u n d e r s t a n d i n g ,  c o n g r e s s i o n a l  
appr ova l  should be o b t a i n e d  of  any p o l i c y  r e q u i r ­
ing t he  assi gnment  of  Amer ican t r oops  abroad when 
such ass i gnment  i s  i n  i mp l e me n t a t i o n  o f  A r t i c l e  3 
o f  the Nor th A t l a n t i c  T r e a t y ;  and the Senate  
hereby approves the p r e s e n t  plans o f  the P r e s i ­
dent  and the J o i n t  Ch i e f s  o f  S t a f f  to send f o u r
4QSe n a t e ,  S . R e p t .  1 7 5 , p.  5.
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a d d i t i o n a l  d i v i s i o n s  o f  ground f o r c e s  to Western  
Eu r o p e . 5.0.
Upon r ea d i ng  t h i s  p r o v i s i o n  s u p p o r t e r s  and c r i t i c s  a l i k e
51a i r e d  a bar r age  o f  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s .  The A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s
opponent s ,  a l t hough never  a d m i t t i n g  the Wherry R e s o l u t i o n
was ambiguous,  suddenl y  d i s c o v e r e d  numerous l o o p h o l e s  i n
Truman!'s f a v o r  and began s ug ge s t i ng  v a r i o u s  changes to  
52S e c t i o n  6 , T h e i r  pr ime goal  was to make sure the P r e s i ­
dent  sought  Congr e ss i ona l  appr ova l  o f  t h i s  and subsequent  
t r o o p  dep l oyment s .  Some Democrats i n  t he  e x e c u t i v e  
commi t t ee  sess i ons  had a l r e a d y  a t t empt e d  to remove the  
Congr ess i ona l  approva l  c l a u s e ,  but  had been d e f e a t e d  by two
5 3
members o f  t h e i r  own p a r t y .  As a r e s u l t  the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l
c o n t e s t  c o n t i n u e d .
Republ i can  Sena t or  John W. B r i c k e r  f rom Ohio was
d i s s a t i s f i e d  w i t h  a l l  t he  r e s o l u t i o n s  because none o f  them,
even i f  passed,  would be b i n d i n g  upon the P r e s i d e n t .  The
p u b l i c ,  i n  his  v i e w ,  had been mi s l e d  i n t o  b e l i e v i n g  t h a t  the
54Senate  vot e  would have some l e g a l  s i g n i f i c a n c e .  R e p u b l i ­
can members of  the two commi t t ees  d i d  make an e f f o r t  to
^ Congr e s s i ona l  R e c o r d , X C V I I ,  2 3 6 3 - 6 4 .
51 I b i d . , pp.  2556 ,  2577 ,  25 8 2 ,  2 6 5 8 - 5 9 ,  2661 , 2863.
I b i d . ,  p p . 2 5 7 6 - 7 7 ,  2772;  S e n a t e ,  H e a r i n g s ,
S. Con. Res,  ft , p.  618.
^ New York T i m e s , March 14,  1951 ,  p.  7.
^^Congr e s s i ona l  R e c o r d , X C V I I ,  2863.
r e p o r t  out  a j o i n t  r e s o l u t i o n ,  which would have f o r c e d  the
P r e s i d e n t ' s  hand,  but  f a i l e d  by a vot e  o f  t w e l v e  to  
5 5e l e v e n .  There  wer e ,  i n  f a c t ,  dur i ng  t he  f i n a l  hours o f  
debate  i n  A p r i l ,  s e v e r a l  a t t e mpt s  to have t he  r e s o l u t i o n s  
r e i n t r o d u c e d  i n  the form of  a b i l l  or  j o i n t  r e s o l u t i o n .  
Se n a t o r  Wherry moved t h a t  a j o i n t  r e s o l u t i o n  w i t h  the same 
l anguage as Senate  R e s o l u t i o n  99 be c on s i de r e d  i n  l i e u  o f  
t h a t  s i mpl e  r e s o l u t i o n .  The V i c e - P r e s i d e n t  and Se n a t o r  
Co n n a l l y  q u i c k l y  found the Nebraska S e n a t o r  to be i n  v i o l a ­
t i o n  o f  a Senate  r u l e ,  t h e r e b y  s t r i k i n g  down Wh e r r y ' s  
56mot i o n .  Ot her  a t t e mpt s  were made by such Senat or s  as
South Dakota Re publ i can  Kar l  Mundt who t r i e d  to amend t he
r e s o l u t i o n s  i n t o  a b i l l ,  and Se n a t o r  B r i c k e r  who moved to
5 7recommi t  the r e s o l u t i o n s  to t he  commi t t ees .  None o f
the a t t e mp t s  succeeded because the m a j o r i t y  o f  Sena t or s  f e l t
t h a t  the commi t tees would deadl ock  and would not  r e p o r t  out  
any k i nd o f  r e s o l u t i o n  or  b i l l  , or  i f  a j o i n t  r e s o l u t i o n  
was passed,  t he y  b e l i e v e d  i t  would meet  w i t h  a P r e s i d e n t i a l  
ve t o  which would l eave  them w i t h  a b s o l u t e l y  n o t h i n g .  An 
o v e r r i d i n g  e l e ment  was the f a c t  t h a t  the Senate  had a l r e a d y  
ea t e n  up t h r e e  months d e b a t i n g  the i s s u e ,  and most members
^  I b i d . ,  pp.  2870 ,  31 73.  Se n a t o r  Knowland r e p o r t e d  
the 12 to 11 v o t e ,  w h i l e  Se n a t o r  H i c k e n l o o p e r  i n d i c a t e d  i t
was 13 to 1 1 .
5 6 1 b i d . , pp.  30 6 3 ,  3065.
5 7 I b i d . , pp.  31 07 ,  3173.
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f e l t  t h a t  no t h i ng  coul d be ga i ned by spending more t i me
_• + 58 on i t .
Unable to secure a b i l l  or  j o i n t  r e s o l u t i o n ,  s e v e r a l
Senators  s e t  about  to amend the e x i s t i n g  r e s o l u t i o n s  as to
when and how P r e s i d e n t i a l - C o n g r e s s i o n a l  c o n s u l t a t i o n  shoul d
t ake  p l a c e .  S e c t i o n  5 o f  the Conna1 l y - R u s s e l l  measures
a l l owed  the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  to r e q u e s t  a d d i t i o n a l  t r oops  by
mer e l y  c o n s u l t i n g  w i t h  the Senate For e i gn  R e l a t i o n s  and
Armed S e r v i c e s  Commit tees and the House For e i gn  A f f a i r s  and
Armed S e r v i c e s  Commi t t ees.  Republ i can  Senat ors  James Kern
o f  M i s s o u r i  and A r t h u r  Watkins o f  Utah i m m e d i a t e l y  r e s i s t e d
the idea of  l e t t i n g  f o u r  commi t tees speak f o r  the r e s t  o f  
5 9
the Congress.  Se n a t o r  Wherry s a i d  he did not  t h i n k  t h a t  
the accept ance  o f  the Nor th A t l a n t i c  T r e a t y  meant  t h e r e  
would be " s t a r  chamber pr oceedi ngs  in  which a few S e n a t o r s ,  
a c t i n g  i n  s e c r e t ,  would c o l l a b o r a t e  w i t h  t he  E x e c u t i v e  and 
hi s  a i ds  in de v e l o p i n g  and e f f e c t u a t i n g  i mp l e m e n t a t i o n  o f  
the t r e a t y . S e n a t o r  I r v i n g  I v e s ,  Republ i c a n  f rom New 
York ,  o f f e r e d  an amendment r e q u i r i n g  the Congr ess i ona l  
commi t tees t h a t  the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  c o n s u l t e d  to submi t  the  
i n f o r m a t i o n  to t he  f u l l  Senate and House f o r  t h e i r  a p p r o v a l .  
The I ves  amendment was d e f e a t e d  r e s u l t i n g  i n  no ga i ns  f o r
5 8 I b i  d . , PP. 3175 , 3 1 7 8 - 7 9 ,  3181 , 3190 , 3194.
" i b i d . , pp.  2661 , 2911 .
" i b i d . , p.  3013 .
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61t hose seek i ng a more f o o l p r o o f  method.
S e na t or  John M c C l e l l a n ,  Democrat  f rom Ar k a n s a s ,
s u b mi t t e d  perhaps t he  most damaging amendment ,  i f  t h e r e
was such a t h i n g ,  when he a t t e mp t e d  to f o r c e  P r e s i d e n t i a l -
Co ng r e s s i on a l  c o n s u l t a t i o n  p r i o r  to any f u r t h e r  dep l oyment
o f  t r o o p s . S e c t i o n  6 o f  the C o n n a l l y - R u s s e l l  R e s o l u t i o n s
me r e l y  asked the P r e s i d e n t  to o b t a i n  Co ng r e s s i on a l  appr ova l
when a s s i g n i n g  t roops to ■' E u r o p e - - t h e  a r t i c l e  d i d  not
s p e c i f y  t h a t  the P r e s i d e n t  had to secure  t h i s  a pp r o v a l  b e f o r e
a c t u a l l y  sending a d d i t i o n a l  t r o o p s .  The M c C l e l l a n  amendment ,
on t h e  o t h e r  hand,  sought  to add the r e s t r i c t i v e  l anguage
t h a t  ".  . . i t  i s  t he  sense o f  the Senate  t h a t  no ground
t r oops  i n  a d d i t i o n  to such f o u r  d i v i s i o n s  should be s ent  to
Western Europe in i mp l e m e n t a t i o n  o f  A r t i c l e  3 o f  t he  Nor t h
6 2A t l a n t i c  T r e a t y  w i t h o u t  f u r t h e r  congr ess i  onal  a p p r o v a l . "
I n i t i a l l y  the Senate  r e j e c t e d  the M c C l e l l a n
amendment ,  but  a f t e r  o t h e r  amendments a l s o  f a i l e d  to modi f y
S e c t i o n  6 to everyones a p p r o v a l ,  the M c C l e l l a n  amendment
6 3was r e c o n s i d e r e d  and a c c e p t e d .  Se n a t o r  Lodge made a 
f i n a l  e f f o r t  to d e f e a t  the amendment by p o i n t i n g  ou t  some 
t e c h n i c a l  d i s c r e p a n c i e s .  The M c C l e l l a n  amendment approved  
the sending of  on l y  f o u r  a d d i t i o n a l  d i v i s i o n s ;  i n  Lodge ' s
61 I b i d . , pp.  3 0 8 8 - 8 9 ,  3095.
" i b i d . , p. 3082.
6 3 l b i d . , pp.  3 0 8 2 - 8 3 ,  3 0 8 8 - 8 9 ,  3 0 9 5 - 9 6 ,  3104.
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view t h i s  d i d  not  i n c l u d e  s uppor t  t r oops  or  corps head­
q u a r t e r s .  U l t i m a t e l y ,  the l a c k  o f  t hose l a t t e r  command 
u n i t s  could mean Amer ican d i v i s i o n s  would have to be p l aced  
under  t he  a u t h o r i t y  of  f o r e i g n  corps h e a d q u a r t e r s .  Lodge 
changed few minds s i nc e  the two corps h e a d q u a r t e r s  needed
f o r  the s i x  Amer i can d i v i s i o n s  on l y  amounted to some 500 
64men.
On A p r i l  4 ,  1951 Se na t or s  o f f e r e d  t h e i r  l a s t
amendments and made t h e i r  c on c l ud i ng  p a r i i a m e n t a r y  moves
r e g a r d i n g  the t r o o p s - f o r - E u r o p e  r e s o l u t i o n s .  As the f i n a l
v ot e  came n e a r e r  Sena t or s  once more e x p l a i n e d  why t hey  were
v o t i n g  the way t hey  wer e ,  as i f  t h e i r  a s s o c i a t e s  and the
o u t s i d e  wor l d  had no i d e a .
Most  Repub l i cans  who vot ed a g a i n s t  the C o n n a l l y -
Russe l l  R e s o l u t i o n s  di d  so f o r  s i m i l a r  r easons .  The m a j o r i t y
found no v a l ue  in r e s o l u t i o n s  which were not  b i n d i n g  upon
the P r e s i d e n t .  11l i n o i s  Se n a t o r  E v e r e t t  D i r k s e n  c a l l e d  the
r e s o l u t i o n s  a "hoax" i n which the Amer i can peopl e  were be i ng
65" so l d  a b i l l  o f  goods. "  Se n a t o r  Mundt r e f u s e d  to approve
66the Truman " f a i t  a c c o m p l i " being p r e s e n t e d  to Congress.
A few demanded more new Pact  members b e f o r e  c ommi t t i ng
6 7Amer ican ground f o r c e s . A l t hough Se n a t o r  Wherry a d m i t t e d
6 4 1 b i d . , pp.  3 1 4 5 - 4 7 ,  31 54.
6 5 I b i d . , pp.  3270-71  
6 6 I b i d . ,  p. 3277 .
6 7 I b i  d . , p.  2739.
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t h a t  the r e s o l u t i o n s  p r ov i d e d  f o r  E x e c u t i v e - C o n g r e s s i o n a l
c o n s u l t a t i o n ,  he b e l i e v e d  them to be too weak- - Truman coul d
s i mpl y  i gn or e  the r e s o l u t i o n s  i f  he so d e s i r e d .  More
i m p o r t a n t l y  f o r  the Nebraska S e n a t o r ,  the measures were
a c t u a l l y  appr ov i ng  Truman' s  b a s i c  d e c i s i o n  to send t r o o p s .
" I  b e l i e v e , "  he s a i d ,  " t h a t  i f  we send any t r o o p s ,  we must
send a l l  the t roops t h a t  are  necessary  to back up those in
Western Eur ope , "  and he then embarked on a new harangue
demanding "mast ery  o f  t he  a i r . "  Sena t or  Co n n a l l y  r e t o r t e d ,
6 ft"The Se na t or  a l r e a d y  has mast e r y  o f  t he  hot  a i r . "  In
the end Wherry vot ed a g a i n s t  both of  the r e s o l u t i o n s .
Se n a t o r  J.  W i l l i a m  F u l b r i g h t  made- i t  a p p a r e n t  t h a t
the n e g a t i v e  vote  would not  be a s t r i c t l y  p a r t i s a n  v o t e .
He c o m p l e t e l y  approved the sending o f  f o u r  d i v i s i o n s  to
Europe but  would not  v o t e  f o r  e i t h e r  o f  t he  r e s o l u t i o n s
because i t  would e s t a b l i s h  a dangerous p r e c e d e n t  whereby
the Congress would c o n t i n u e  to make g r e a t e r  e f f o r t s  to
de t e r mi ne  mi 1 i t a r y  t a c t i c s  and the conduct  o f  war  i t s e l f .
As f a r  as he was concerned,  t he  P r e s i d e n t  had the power to
depl oy  the t r oops  a s ■Co mma nd e r - i n - Ch i e f  and t h e r e f o r e  no
69o t h e r  approva l  was n e c es s a r y .
The Republ i cans  who vot ed f o r  the r e s o l u t i o n s , 
e s p e c i a l l y  the more i n t e r n a t i o n a l - !  s . t - o r i  ented , made s p e c i a l
6 8 1b i d . ,  pp.  3 2 8 0 - 8 2 .
6 9 I b i d . , p.  3288.
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e f f o r t s  to j u s t i f y  t h e i r  p o s i t i o n s . Most ,  but  not  a l l ,  had
long ago been convi nced o f  the need f o r  Amer ican t roops in
Europe;  however ,  a number f e l l  back on o t h e r  r easons .
Senat or  A l e x a n d e r  Wi l ey  of  Wisconsi n was t y p i c a l  o f  those
who d e s i r e d  the depl oyment  o f  ground f o r c e s  w h i l e  a t  the
same t i me r e a s s e r t i n g  the S e n a t e ' s  r o l e  in  the j o i n t
ha n d l i n g  o f  f o r e i g n  a f f a i r s . ^  New J er sey  Senat or
H. A l e x a n d e r  Smith and Massachuset t s  Se na t or  Lodge voted f o r
t he  r e s o l u t i o n s  even though t hey  had qualms w i t h  S e c t i o n  6
as amended; however ,  the M c C l e l l a n  amendment was a maj or
reason why one of  the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s  s e v e r e s t  c r i t i c s ,
Utah S e n a t o r  A r t h u r  Wa t k i n s ,  vot ed f o r  the r e s o l u t i o n s . ^
In a n o t h e r  ca s e ,  Sena t or  Ferguson voted "yea" because he
hoped t h a t  once the House r e c e i v e d  the Russe l l  R e s o l u t i o n
i t  would i n i t i a t e  changes c r e a t i n g  a j o i n t ,  and t h e r e f o r e
72bi  ndi  ng , re solu t i  o n . U 1 t i m a t e l y , Sena to r  T a f t  voted f o r
both r e s o l u t i o n s  because they  p l aced a moral  o b l i g a t i o n
upon t he  P r e s i d e n t  to c o n s u l t  w i t h  Congress.  Should they
be voted down, he obs e r v ed ,  the P r e s i d e n t  could i n t e r p r e t
7 3t he  d e c i s i o n  as an a u t h o r i z a t i o n  to do as he p l e a s e d .
A f t e r  n e a r l y  t h r e e  months o f  r e p e t i t i o u s ,
7 0 I b i d . , pp.  3 2 7 5 - 7 6 .
71 I b i d . , pp.  3276 , 3289.
7 2 I b i d . , p. 3289.
7 3 I b i d . , p.  3273.
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u n i n s p i r i n g  debat e  the Senate voted to a l l o w  the P r e s i d e n t
t o  depl oy  Amer ican grounds f o r c e s  to Europe to i mpl ement
t h e  Nor t h A t l a n t i c  T r e a t y  O r g a n i z a t i o n .  By a v o t e  o f  69 t o
21 Senate R e s o l u t i o n  99 was passed;  Senate  Co n c u r r e n t
R e s o l u t i o n  1ft l i k e w i s e  c a r r i e d  but  by a much s m a l l e r  margin  
74o f  45 to 41.  Wi th t h e  ado pt i on  o f  Senate  R e s o l u t i o n  99
P r e s i d e n t  Truman c l a i me d  v i c t o r y  say i ng t h a t  i t  r e p r e s e n t e d
7 5
a r e a f f i r m a t i o n  o f  h i s  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y .
An a n a l y s i s  o f  t he  vot e  he l ps  to i d e n t i f y  the  
r e g i o n a l  and p a r t y  v o t i n g  p a t t e r n .  The M c C l e l l a n  amendment ,  
c o n t a i n i n g  the main i s s u e ,  passed by o n l y  a s i x - v o t e  m a r g i n ,  
49 to 43.  T w e n t y - n i n e  midwest er n  and wes t e r n  Republ i c a ns  
pr ov i ded  t he  m a j o r i t y  o f  t he  49 yes vot es  w i t h  9 n o r t h e a s t ­
ern Republ i cans  and 11 Democrats c o n t r i b u t i n g  t he  b a l a n c e .
A swi t c h  o f  e i t h e r  t he  7 sout her n  Democ r a t i c  vot es  or  t he  
9 n o r t h e a s t e r n  GOP votes coul d have e a s i l y  d e f e a t e d  t h i s  
more r e s t r i c t i v e  amendment.  Most  Democra t s ,  o t h e r  than  
t hose f rom the Sout h ,  suppor t ed  the wordi ng o f  the  
o r i g i n a l  C o n n a l l y  R e s o l u t i o n  and t h e r e f o r e  vot ed a g a i n s t  
the amendment .
The a c t u a l  t a l l y  on the C o n n a l l y  R e s o l u t i o n ,  Senate  
R e s o l u t i o n  99 ,  found 42 Democrats and 27 Re publ i c a ns  
combining f o r  a l o p s i d e d  t o t a l  o f  69 yea v o t e s .  Except
7 4 I b i d . , pp.  32 8 2 ,  3 2 9 3 - 9 4 .
U . S . ,  Truman P u b l i c  P a p e r s , 195 1 ,  pp.  2 1 7 - 1 8 .
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f o r  the South where 2 Democrats voted nay,  t he  A d m i n i s t r a ­
t i o n ' s  p a r t y  voted unani mously  f o r  the Co n n a l l y  measure.
Only i n  the N o r t h e a s t  and Mi d d l e  A t l a n t i c  s t a t e s  di d  
Republ i cans  g i v e  a m a j o r i t y  o f  t h e i r  votes to the r e s o l u t i o n ;  
n e a r l y  60 per  cent  o f  mi dwest er n  and west e r n  Re pub l i ca ns  
opposed i t .
When i t  came to the Rus se l l  R e s o l u t i o n ,  which  
i n v i t e d  the House to vot e  on the i s s u e ,  9 Democrats j o i n e d  
36 Republ i cans  to pass the r e s o l u t i o n  by on l y  a 4 vot e  
mar gi n .  Republ i can  s t r e n g t h  was f a i r l y  uni  form w i t h  GOP 
members i n  each s e c t i o n  o f  t he  c ou nt r y  g i v i n g  a p p r o x i m a t e l y  
80 per  ce nt  o f  t h e i r  p a r t y ' s  s u p p o r t .  Except  f o r  the  
Sout h ,  Democrats f o l l o w e d  the l e a d  o f  Se n a t o r  C o n n a l l y  i n  
v o t i n g  a g a i n s t  spr e ad i ng  the debat e  to the House o f  
R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s .  Had i t  not  been f o r  8 sout her n  Democrats  
the Republ i cans  could not  have c a r r i e d  the day.
In summary,  Democrats r e l i e d  upon the n o r t h e a s t e r n  
Republ i can  vote  to c a r r y  t he  C o n n a l l y  R e s o l u t i o n ,  w h i l e  
Republ i cans  n a t i o n a l l y  teamed up w i t h  a few renegade  
Democrats to pass t he  Rus se l l  R e s o l u t i o n .  Republ i can  
s t r e n g t h  i n  o p p o s i t i o n  to t he  Truman program was c o n c e n t r a t e d  
i n  the Mi dwest  and West where t hey  voted unani mousl y  f o r  
the t ougher  M c C l e l l a n  amendment ,  then r e j e c t e d  the weaker  
Co n n a l l y  R e s o l u t i o n , and f i n a l l y  gave m a j o r i t i e s  to the  
Rus se l l  R e s o l u t i o n  in  hopes the House would pr o l ong t he  
i s s u e .  On the o t h e r  hand , Republ i cans  i n the i n d u s t r i a l
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n o r t h e a s t  not  on l y  backed the Truman proposa l  to send f o u r  
a d d i t i o n a l  d i v i s i o n s  but  a l so  s u p p o r t e d ,  but  o n l y  by t he  
very  nar row margin o f  9 to 8 , t h e i r  p a r t y  c o l l e a g u e s  i n  
demanding t h a t  the Congress be i n f or med b e f o r e  t he  P r e s i ­
dent  made a n y  more commitments.  Sout hern Democrats g e n e r ­
a l l y  f a v o r e d  sendi ng t r oops  to Europe,  but  t he  few who 
voted f o r  the M c C l e l l a n  amendment and the Russel  1 Re sol  u t i  on
demonst r a t ed  t h a t  they were not  e n t i r e l y  i n  accord w i t h
76t h e i r  P r e s i d e n t .
Out s i de  the Senate the n a t i o n a l  press was h a r d l y  
e x u b e r a n t ,  f o r  the vague l y  worded r e s o l u t i o n s  coul d be 
i n t e r p r e t e d  to s u i t  ones own needs.  A v a r i e t y  o f  c o n s e r ­
v a t i v e  and l i b e r a l  e d i t o r s  were s a t i s f i e d  w i t h  t he  measures
e i t h e r  because they r e i n f o r c e d  the A t l a n t i c  A11 i ance  or
7 7
because the P r e s i d e n t  was not  g i ven a c a r t e  b l a n c h e .
The Washington Post  noted the accompl i shment s  in  i m p l e ­
ment ing t he  Pact  but  found the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s  l e a d e r s h i p
was " p a t h e t i c a l l y  weak" when i t  came to E x e c u t i v e
78c o n s u l t a t i o n  w i t h  Congress.
At  the same t i m e ,  a number o f  moderate  and l i b e r a l
76 For f u r t h e r  s t a t i s t i c s  see Appendi x .
77
E d i t o r i a l ,  D a l l a s  Morning News, A p r i l  6 , 1951 ,  
sec.  I l l ,  p. 2;  E d i t o r i a l ,  Los Angeles T i m e s , A p r i l  5 ,  1951 ,  
s e c , I I ,  p . 4;  E d i t o r i a l , New York T imes,  A p r i l  5 , 1951 , 
p. 28;  E d i t o r i a l ,  Eveninq W o r l d - H e r a l d  (Omaha) ,  A p r i l  5 ,
1951 , p. 34.
7  o
E d i t o r i a l ,  Washington Po s t ,  A p r i l  4 ,  1951 ,  p.  12 ,  
A p r i l  7 ,  1951 , p. 8 .
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p a p e r s ,  who n o r m a l l y  backed the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,  found no
reason wha t e v e r  to c l a i m  v i c t o r y .  The S t . Loui s  P o s t -
Pi  spatch blamed A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  " c l ums i nes s "  f o r  a l l o w i n g
79t he passage o f  " unr ea l  and i n c o n c l u s i v e "  r e s o l u t i o n s .
San F r a nc i s c o  C h r o n i c l e  e d i t o r s  viewed the r e s u l t s  o f  the
80debat e  as t h r owi ng  i c e w a t e r  on Western Europe ,  w h i l e  the
magaz i ne ,  N a t i o n , unhappy t h a t  the P r e s i d e n t  had swal l owed
81so many r e s t r i c t i o n s ,  c a l l e d  i t  a vo t e  o f  no c o n f i d e n c e .
The r esponse ,  or  r a t h e r  l a c k  o f  r e sp on se ,  by
Col one l  McCormick and h i s  Chicago D a i l y  T r i b u n e  was perhaps
t he most g l a r i n g .  Day a f t e r  day the T r i b u n e  had f i r e d
e d i t o r i a l  v o l l e y s  a t  Truman and h i s  p o l i c i e s , y e t  a f t e r  t he
Senate  voted the e d i t o r i a l  page was n e a r l y  devo i d  o f
comment on t h i s  i s s u e .  O t h e r  than a weak hope t h a t  the
House would stop Truman f rom sending even the f o u r  
82d i v i s i o n s ,  the e d i t o r s  c o n s p i c u ou s l y  a v o i d e d  the m a t t e r  
i n  a p p a r e n t  r e c o g n i t i o n  t h a t  the H o o v e r - T a f t - W h e r r y  f o r c e s  
had not  d e f e a t e d  the man in the Whi te  House.
McCormi ck ’ s hope f o r  House a c t i o n  never  reaped any 
r e a l  successes .  I n  the House Armed S e r v i c e s  Commi t tee
^ E d i t o r i a l i s t .  Louis  P o s t - D i s p a t c h , A p r i l  5,  1951,
p.  2B.
80 E d i t o r i a l ,  San F r a n c i s c o  C h r o n i c l e , A p r i l  4,  1951 ,
p.  18.
81 Edi t o r  i al  , N a t i o n , A p r i l  14 ,  1951 ,  p.  341.
o p
E d i t o r i a l ,  Chicago D a i l y  T r i b u n e , A p r i 1 4 ,  1951 ,  
s e c . I , p . 20.
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Democrats upset  a Rep.ubl i can a t t e m p t  to a t t a c h  a r e s t r i c t i v e
r i d e r  to a pending c o n s c r i p t i o n  b i 11 . The r i d e r  would have
f o r b i d d e n  the P r e s i d e n t  f rom sending any t roops u n t i l  both
83Houses o f  Congress gave t h e i r  express consent .  In
a d d i t i o n ,  t he  House Commi t tee on For e i gn  A f f a i r s ,  having
r e c e i v e d  Senate  Co nc ur r e n t  R e s o l u t i o n  18,  r e f u s e d  to r e p o r t
out  t he  measure.  Unhappy w i t h  the Democr a t i c  l e a d e r s h i p ,
R e p r e s e n t a t i v e  F r e d e r i c k  C o u d e r t ,  J r .  o f f e r e d  an amendment
t o  a Defense Depar t ment  a p p r o p r i a t i o n  b i l l  aga i n  a t t e m p t i n g
t o r e s t r i c t  the P r e s i d e n t ' s  power to deploy  American ground
84f o r c e s  a br oa d ,  and aga i n  he met w i t h  d e f e a t .  Thr oughout ,  
the House g e n e r a l l y  took a d i s i n t e r e s t  in the t r o o p s - f o r -  
Europe i ssue  perhaps hoping t o  avo i d  the p r o t r a c t e d  debate  
i n  which the Senate  i n d u l g e d .
Debate on the t r o o p s - f o r - E u r o p e  i ssue  cont i nue d  to 
f l a r e - u p  p e r i o d i c a l l y  in 1951 even long a f t e r  t he  Senate  
had seemi ngl y  d i sposed of  the m a t t e r .  In J u l y  1951 
S e c r e t a r y  o f  Defense M a r s h a l l  r e v e a l e d  t h a t  the Un i t e d  S t a t e s  
hoped to have some 4 0 0 , 0 0 0 '  men — 60' ,000 A i r  Force personnel  
and 3 4 0 , 0 0 0  ground f o r c e s - - i n  Europe by the end o f  1952.
Th i s  was n e a r l y  t w i c e  the number con t e mpl a t ed  a t  t he  Senate  
he a r i n g s  in the Spr i ng o f  1951 ,  and the c r i t i c s  r e a c t e d
^ New Yor k  T i m e s , March 14 ,  1951 ,  p.  7.
^ C o n g r e s s i o n a l  R e c o r d , XCVI I  , 3452,  9735 ,  9746.
148
85accor d i  ng'Vy.
Also in J u l y  1951 , members o f  t he  Senate  For e i gn
R e l a t i o n s  Commi t tee v i s i t e d  General  Ei senhower  i n  Europe
and sought  a pr ogress  r e p o r t  on European d e f e n s e s .  Senat ors
accept ed the Amer ican commitment  as a f a c t  but  were f a r
more i n t e r e s t e d  in the European response to the deployment
o f  Un i t e d  S t a t e s  f o r c e s .  They wanted to know what  the
Europeans were doing e c o n o m i c a l l y  and m i l i t a r i l y  to uphold
t h e i r  end o f  the b a r g a i n ;  i n  t u r n ,  General  Ei senhower  and
hi s  s t a f f  p r ov i d e d  a f a v o r a b l e  a n a l y s i s  in a way o n l y  the
8 6mi 1 i t a r y  coul d do.
One week a f t e r  t he  Senate vote  on the C o n n a l l y - '
Russe l l  R e s o l u t i o n s  P r e s i d e n t  Truman was f o r c e d  to remove 
General  MacAr t hur  f rom hi s  command. A l t hough t he  f i r i n g  
had no t h i ng  to do w i t h  the t r o o p s - f o r - E u r o p e  i s s u e ,  the  
r e - e x a m i n i s t s  began a new bar r age  upon the Truman f o r e i g n  
p o l i c y .  New debat e  and new hear i ngs  on . f o r e i g n . p o l i c y ; on l y  
f r u s t r a t e d  the Amer ican peopl e  more,  and as a r e s u l t ,  the  
Senate For e i gn  R e l a t i o n s  and Armed S e r v i c e s  Commit tees  
t hought  i t  necessary  to r ea s s u r e  peopl e  a t  home and abr oad .
^^New York T i m e s , J u l y  28,  1951 ,  p.  1.
SHAPE b r i e f i n g s  f o r  Senate For e i gn  R e l a t i o n s  
Commi t t ee ,  J u l y  1951 ,  Congr ess i ona l  V i s i t s  F i l e . ( 1 9 5 1 , "No.  3 ) ,  
Dwight  D. Ei senhower  Papers 1 91 6 - 52  , Eisenhower  L i b r a r y .
Par t s  o f  t h i s  have been pu b l i s h e d  i n :  U . S . ,  Congress,  S e n a t e ,
Commit tee on For e i gn  R e l a t i o n s ,  On Un i t ed  Economic and 
M i l i t a r y  A s s i s t a n c e  to Free E u r o p e , Hear i ngs  b e f o r e  a subcom­
m i t t e e  o f  the Commit tee on Fo r e i g n  R e l a t i o n s ,  82nd Cong. ,
1 s t  s e s s . , 1951.
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Re c og n i z i n g  the e f f e c t  o f  d i s s i d e n t  voi ces  i n  a democracy
the Commi t t ees ,  speaki ng j o i n t l y ,  made i t  known t h a t  the
Amer ican government  was not  t r y i n g  to a l arm the w o r l d .
"The o b j e c t i v e s  o f  the peopl e  o f  the Un i t e d  S t a t e s  are
unchanged by a n y t h i n g  t h a t  has t r a n s p i r e d  dur i ng t h i s  or dea l
o f  c o n t r o v e r s y , "  the Commi t tee r e p o r t  s t a t e d .  "We are
unshaken in our  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  to defend o u r s e l v e s  and to
c o o p e r a t e  to the l i m i t  o f  our  c a p a b i l i t i e s  w i t h  a l l  o f  those
87f r e e  n a t i o n s  de t e r mi ne d  to s u r v i v e  in  f r e e d o m . " The 
Commi t tees i ssued t h i s  s t a t e me n t  as a d i r e c t  r e s u l t  of  the  
MacAr t hur  c o n t r o v e r s y ,  but  because the p r i mar y  i ssue  was one 
o f  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y ,  i t s  i m p l i c a t i o n s  a l s o  a p p l i e d  to the  
t r o o p s - f o r - E u r o p e  i s s u e .
In r e t r o s p e c t  the p a r t i c i p a n t s  in the debate  did  
l i t t l e  to s e t t l e  the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  problems sur r oundi ng  
t he  proposed p o l i c y .  T e c h n o l o g i c a l  change and the Cold War 
did produce a s h i f t  o f  emphasis f rom Congress to the Whi te
87 U . S . ,  Congress,  S e n a t e ,  Commit tee on For e i gn  
R e l a t i o n s  and Commit tee on Armed S e r v i c e s ,  General  of  the  
Army Douglas MacAr t hur  and the Amer ican P o l i c y  i n the Far
E a s t : J o i n t  S t a t eme nt  by the Commit tee on Armed S e r v i c e s
and the Commit tee on For e i gn R e l a t i o n s ,  Un i t e d  S t a t e s
Senate , R e l a t i v e  to the Facts and Ci rcumst ances  Bear i ng on
the R e l i e f  of  General  o f  the Army Douglas MacAr t hur  and on
Amer ican P o l i c y  in the Far  E a s t , S. Doc. 50 ,  82nd Cong. ,  
1 s t  s e s s . ,  1951 ,  Senate Documents:  M i s c e l l a n e o u s ,  X, 2.
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House,  e s p e c i a l l y  i n  the use o f  Amer ican t roops abroad and 
i n  the war - maki ng powers.  P r i o r  to the Debate most  
i ns t a n c e s  i n  whi ch the P r e s i d e n t  depl oyed Arneri can f o r c e s  
abroad were cases d e a l i n g  in  some way w i t h  the p r o t e c t i o n  
o f  Amer icans or  t h e i r  p r o p e r t y ;  i n  such event s  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  
and Congr es s i ona l  approva l  were s e l f - e v i d e n t .  However ,  t he  
deployment  o f  t r oops  i n  t imes o f  peace to an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
army c r e a t e d  a new t w i s t  in the conduct  o f  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y .  
N e i t h e r  t he  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  nor  Congress had s q u a r e l y  f aced  
the i ssue  a t  t he  t ime o f  the Korean i n t e r v e n t i o n  i n  t h a t  
A r t i c l e  43 o f  the U n i t e d  Na t i ons  C h a r t e r  was never  c a r r i e d  
out .  As a r e s u l t  P r e s i d e n t  Truman l a t e r  ac t ed  in  t he  b e l i e f  
t h a t  the C o n s t i t u t i o n  and the Nor th A t l a n t i c  T r e a t y  p r o v i d e d  
him w i t h  s u f f i c i e n t  a u t h o r i t y  to cope w i t h  t he  c o u n t r y ' s  
n a t i o n a l  i n t e r e s t  i n  t he  A t l a n t i c  a r e a .
In t a k i n g  t h e . - - i n i t i . a t i  v e , however ,  Truman a l so  
accept ed  a heavy res p o n s i b i 1 i t y , a res p o n s i b i 1 i t y  he u n w i l l ­
i n g l y  shar ed .  I t  would have been to h i s  b e n e f i t  had he 
r a l l i e d  an a l r e a d y  e x i s t i n g  suppor t  be hind hi s  p l a n ,  but  in  
announcing h i s  d e c i s i o n  b e f o r e  - c o n s u l t i n g  w i t h  Congress he 
a l i e n a t e d  Republ i cans  and a smal l  segment  o f  h is  own p a r t y .  
As a r e s u l t  Sena t or s  and R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  a l i k e  renewed t h e i r  
e f f o r t s  a t  r e a s s e r t i n g  t h e i r  r o l e  i n  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y .  Many 
expressed concern t h a t  t hey  were being p r e s e n t e d  a n o t h e r  
f a i t  accompl i  and t h e r e f o r e  r i g h t l y  per f or med t h e i r  dut y  as 
a sounding board through t he  use of  debat e  and p u b l i c
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h e a r i n g s .  On the o t h e r  hand,  Truman f aced the di lemma of  
j u s t i f y i n g  a p u r e l y  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  m a t t e r  when d i s s i d e n t s  
i n  the o p p o s i t i o n  p a r t y  were undoubt ed l y  t r y i n g  to make i t  
a p a r t i s a n  i s s u e .  By s h i f t i n g  the emphasis f rom European  
def ense  to c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  i s s u e s , Republ i cans  pr o l onged  
t he  debate  hoping to reap any meager b e n e f i t s .
The C o n n a l l y - R u s s e l 1 R e s o l u t i o n s  s e t t l e d  very  
l i t t l e .  They were f a r  more p o s i t i v e  than the Wherry  
R e s o l u t i o n  in t h a t  t hey  r e c o g n i z e d  a gener a l  f e e l i n g  t h a t  
Amer ican ground f o r c e s  were indeed necessary  in Europe.  
N e i t h e r  r e s o l u t i o n ,  however ,  s e t t l e d  the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  
d i f f e r e n c e s  over  P r e s i d e n t i a l - C o n g r e s s i o n a l  c o n s u l t a t i o n  
or  f u r t h e r  i mp l e me n t a t i o n  o f  t he  Nor th A t l a n t i c  P a c t .
Al t hough t he  measures a t t e mp t e d  to so l ve  these problems  
t hey  were not  b i n d i n g  upon the P r e s i d e n t .  Had a b i l l  or  
j o i n t  r e s o l u t i o n  been enact ed an even more severe  c o n f l i c t  
would have a r i s e n  in t h a t  t he  P r e s i d e n t  would have qu e s t i o n e d  
i t s  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y  and most 1 i k e l y  would have vetoed  
i t .  I n  the f i n a l  a n a l y s i s  i t  was perhaps bes t  t h a t  the  
j o i n t  powers in f o r e i g n  a f f a i r s  were not  dec i ded in  
f i n a l i t y ,  as the d e c i s i o n  may have proved unworkable  in  
d i f f e r e n t  c i r c u ms t a n c e s .
What ever  the s i g n 1 f i c a n c e  o f  the Congr ess i ona l  
a c t i o n ,  t he  debate  did r e v e a l  s t r ong  west e r n  and midwestern  
Re p ub l i c a n  r e s i s t a n c e  to g r e a t e r  i n v o l v e me n t  in wor l d  
a f f a i r s .  As t he  e d i t o r s  o f  the S t .  Louis P o s t - D i s p a t c h
a n a l y z e d  i t ,  t he  vote  r e f l e c t e d  a r e g i o n a l  s t r o n g h o l d  o f  a
" p a r t i c u l a r  t ype  o f  Republ i can i sm which i n  some cases
88t akes  the form o f  i s o l a t i o n i s m ."
^ E d i t o r i a l ,  S t .  Louis  P o s t - P i s p a t c h : A p r i l  9 ,  1951 ,
p.  2B.
CHAPTER V
The Gr e a t  Debat e :  An A n a l y s i s
P r e s i d e n t  Truman' s  d e c i s i o n  to send Un i t e d  S t a t e s  
ground f o r c e s  to Europe and t he  r e s u l t i n g  debat e  r a i s e  
two s i g n i f i c a n t  qu es t i o ns  . F i r s t ,  were the r e - e x a m i n i s t s  
g e n u i n e l y  concerned wi th t he  d i r e c t i o n  o f  f o r e i g n  a f f a i r s  
or  was t h e i r  goal  to make p o l i t i c a l  hay f o r  p a r t i s a n  
reasons? Second,  was t he  European army as e s t a b l i s h e d  
under  the ausp i ces  o f  NATO a n e c e s s i t y ,  or  were t h e r e  
a l t e r n a t e  s o l u t i o n s  which would have produced the d e s i r e d  
r e s u 1 ts?
P l a y i n g  p o l i t i c s  w i t h  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  i s  no t h i ng  
new and t he  t r o o p s - f o r - E u r o p e  debate  d i s p l a y e d  a c o n t i n u ­
a t i o n  o f  such t a c t i c s .  Th i s  is not  to say ,  however ,  the  
r e - e x a m i n i s t s  had no i n t e r e s t  in what  would be cons i der ed  
s t r i c t l y  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y .  Hoover ,  T a f t ,  and Wherry did  
more than mer e l y  denounce the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s  f a i l u r e s ;  
t hey  o f f e r e d  t h e i r  own a l t e r n a t i v e  s o l u t i o n s  which appeared  
t o be w i t h i n  the c a p a b i l i t y  o f  t he  U n i t e d  S t a t e s .
Thi s  i n t e r e s t  i n f o r e i g n  p o l i c y ,  however ,  l e n t  
i t s e l f  to p u r e l y  p a r t i s a n  ends . The r o l e  o f  p a r t i s a n s h i p  
has a l r e a d y  been a l l u d e d  to by the f a c t  t h a t  the g r e a t e s t  
o p p o s i t i o n  to the Truman p o l i c y  came from c o n s e r v a t i v e
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R e p u b l i c a n s ,  but  i t  does not  end t h e r e .  C e r t a i n  
Republ i cans  were indeed l o o k i n g  f o r  i ssues on which t hey  
could d e f e a t  Truman,  w h i l e  o t h e r s  perhaps had personal  
l o c a l  goal s  which might  be f u l f i l l e d .
The press acknowledged t h a t  Sena t or  T a f t  was a t t e m p t ­
ing to c o n s o l i d a t e  his  l e a d e r s h i p  in the absence of  Senat or  
Vandenberg by s e a r c h i ng  f o r  an i ssue  to r a l 1y Republ i cans  
behind him,  and the t r o o p s - f o r - E u r o p e  program f i t  the b i 11 .  ^
Th i s  d e s i r e  to engage the Democra t i c  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  became 
c l e a r l y  a p p a r e n t  i n  December,  1950 ,  when Republ i cans  s e t  out  
t o f o r c e  Acheson' s  r e s i g n a t i o n .  Buoyed by Repub1 i can gai ns  
i n  the November e l e c t i o n  T a f t  adv i sed  a Republ i can Senate  
caucus a g a i n s t  f u r t h e r  c o n s u l t a t i o n  w i t h  the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n .
As r e p o r t e d  by Drew Pear son,  T a f t  t o l d  his  c o l l e a g u e s ,  111 
see no reason to c o n s u l t  as long as Har ry  Truman i s  in the
Whi te House.  Our dut y  as Republ i cans  i s  to c r i t i c i z e ,
2and I t h i n k  t h a t  ought  to be made c l e a r  . . . "
Not on l y  did T a f t  procede t o  make a maj or  f o r e i g n
p o l i c y  speech i n  J a nu a r y ;  he hoped to keep the d i s c u s s i o n
going by p l a y i n g  a d i r e c t i n g  r o l e .  A week a f t e r  E i senhower ' s
Febr uar y  1 t e s t i m o n y ,  and b e f o r e  Marsha 1 1 ' s appearance at  
the h e a r i n g s ,  T a f t  compl a ined p u b l i c l y ' t h a t  t he  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n
^ " T a f t ' s  Bid f o r  Power - - and P r e s i d e n c y , "  U.S.  News 
& World R e p o r t , January  19 ,  1951 , p. 19.
2
Drew Pearson,  " T a f t ,  Dewey Head Up GOP Groups on 
War I s s u e s , "  Denver  P o s t , December 29,  1950 ,  p. 14.
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was s t i l l  r e f u s i n g  to d i v u l g e  t he  s i z e  o f  t he  c on t e mpl a t e d
3
European army and t he  Amer ican c o n t r i b u t i o n  to i t . Ye t  on 
January  20 ,  1 951 , Genera l  B r a d l e y  had b r i e f e d  s e v e r a l  
Re p ub l i c a n  S e n a t o r s ,  i n c l u d i n g  T a f t ,  on t he  European army 
p r o j e c t .  At  t h a t  t i me Br a d l ey  made i t  c l e a r  t h a t  the p l an
4
was not  to send s e v e r a l  m i l l i o n  men but  on l y  f o u r  d i v i s i o n s .  
T a f t  o b v i o u s l y  was aware of  t he  A d m i n i s t r a t i  o n ' s p l an  we l l  
b e f o r e  the be g i nn i ng  o f  t he  he a r i n g s  but  r e f u s e d  to admi t  
i t .  A paper  f rom T a f t ' s  home s t a t e  p i c k e d  up t h i s  
i n c o n s i s t e n c y  and suggested t h a t  as a man o f  " l e g e n d a r y  
i n t e g r i t y "  the Senat or  was i n d u l g i n g  in " p o l i t i c a l  do u b l e -  
t a l  k . 1,5
From t hese  two i n c i d e n t s  i t  may be suggest ed t h a t  
Rober t  T a f t  had more than j u s t  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  i n  mind.  The 
i ssue  made him a f o r e i g n  a f f a i r s  spokesman,  but  more 
i m p o r t a n t l y ,  i t  made him the Re pub l i c an  spokesman on f o r e i g n  
p o l i c y .  He was o f f e r i n g  a Republ i c a n  a l t e r n a t i v e  to t he  
seeming Democr a t i c  quagmi r e ,  and as a r e s u l t  he was keepi ng  
hi s  P a r t y ' s  name i n  l i g h t s  f o r  the Amer ican p e o p l e .
Nor was T a f t  a l on e  i n  pi  ay i ng po1i t i c s  w i t h  f o r e i g n  
a f f a i r s .  Sen a t o r  Jenner  perhaps expr essed b e s t  the
^Congressi  onal  Record , XCVI I  , 1117.
4
Po o l e ,  " Re pub l i ca n  For e i gn  P o l i c y , "  p.  389.
^ E d i t o r i a l ,  S t .  Louis  P o s t - P i s  p a t c h , March 17,  1951 ,  
p.  4A. The e d i t o r i a l  was p r i n t e d  w i t h  t he  p e r mi s s i o n  of  
t he  Dayton D a i l y  News.
a g i t a t i o n  over  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  among the c o n s e r v a t i v e
Repub l i cans  when he s a i d ,  "We debat e  the F a i r  Deal  p o l i c i e s
we argue whet her  the pr oposa l s  are  good or  bad,  but  we
6are a l ways t a l k i n g  about  t h e i r  p o l i c i e s ."  The c o n s e r v a ­
t i v e s  who hel d p o s i t i o n s  o f  power ,  though not  n e c e s s a r i l y  
c o n t r o l ,  i n  the Republ i can  P a r t y  were se a r c h i n g  f o r  i ssues  
whereby t hey  c o u l d ' l e a d '  i nstead o f  bei ng l e d .
Al t hough he r e f r a i n e d  from making a personal  a t t a c k  
on Pres. i 'dent- .Truman'  dur i ng  t he  h e a r i n g s ,  Se n a t o r  Wherry  
doggedly  l ooked f o r  means to i n c r e a s e  Republ i can  i n f l u e n c e .  
The t r o o p s - f o r - E u r o p e  i ssue  pr ov i de d  him such a v e h i c l e ,  
but  i t  was General  M a c A r t h u r 1s removal  which provoked his  
most vehement  p a r t i s a n  o b j e c t i o n  to t he  Truman A d m i n i s t r a ­
t i o n .  Wh i l e  c a l l i n g  f o r  a renewed e x a mi n a t i o n  o f  Truman' s  
f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  he made i t  a p o i n t  to denounce p o l i t i c a l  
mot i ves  by say i ng t h a t  to i n j e c t  p a r t i s a n s h i p  was 
" c o m p l e t e l y  i n  c o n t r a d i c t i o n  w i t h  t he  Amer ican way. "  
However ,  a f t e r  t a k i n g  t h i s  s t ep  f o r wa r d  in  b e h a l f  o f  b i p a r t  
i s a n s h i p  he took two st eps backward w i t h  a comment c o n s i d ­
e r a b l y  l ess  v e i l e d :  "Compare the monumental  r ecor d  of
General  MacAr t hur  w i t h  t h a t  o f  h i s  accusers , w i t h  t h e i r  
r e c o r d  o f  moral  decay,  g r e e d ,  c o r r u p t i o n  and con f u s i on  . .
Beyond n a t i o n a l  h e a d l i n e s  f o r  t he  Re publ i can  Pa r t y
^Congressi  ona 1 Record , XCV I I ,  2594.
^S t .  Louis  P o s t - D i s p a t c h , A p r i l  13,  19 51,  p . ID.
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t he t r o o p s - f o r - E u r o p e  debat e  p r ov i d e d  Se n a t o r  Wherry a
chance to plug his  own i n t e r e s t s  and t h a t  o f  his  s t a t e ,
t h a t  be i ng a i r  power .  Nebraska c o n t a i n e d  no maj or  a i r c r a f t
i n d u s t r y ,  but  t he  r e t e n t i o n  of  S t r a t e g i c  A i r  Command
h e a d q u a r t e r s  i n  the s t a t e  was i m p o r t a n t  to the S e n a t o r .
His i n t e n s e  i n t e r e s t  i n  a growing a i r  f o r c e  dur i ng  t he
debat e  i s  e x e m p l i f i e d  not  on l y  by his  con t i n ue d  l e c t u r i n g
on a i r  power but  a l so  by the f a c t  t h a t  two o f  hi s  w i t n e s s e s ,
A l e x a n d e r  de Sever sky  and General  George,  were i n  some way
8a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  maj or  a i r c r a f t  companies.  In r eg a r d  to
t he  f o r e i g n  a f f a i r s  i m p l i c a t i o n s  of  t he  Wherry R e s o l u t i o n ,
General  George a d m i t t e d  to the Commit tees he had not  even
9read t he  r e s o l u t i o n .  F i n a l l y ,  Wherry got  wind of  a s t o r y  
t h a t  a new Nor t h  A t l a n t i c  Bombardment Command would be 
e s t a b l i s h e d  as p a r t  o f  NATO and asked General  Eisenhower  
about  t he  p o s s i b i l i t y  of  l o c a t i n g  t h a t  command i n  Omaha 
under  General  LeMay.  To the Nebr askan ' s  dismay,  no such 
command e v e r  d e v e l o p e d . ^
Whi l e  the c o n s e r v a t i v e  Republ i cans  were hoping to 
make gai ns  a t  the expense o f  t he  Democra t i c  P a r t y  they
8De Seversky  had been a c o n s u l t a n t  to t he  Re pub l i c  
A v i a t i o n  Company w h i l e  George,  a f t e r  r e t i r i n g  f rom the  
m i l i t a r y ,  became v i c e - p r e s i d e n t  of  Hughes Tool  Company 
which owned Hughes A i r c r a f t  Company.
9S e n a t e ,  Hea r i  n g s , S . Con. Res . 8 , p.  410.
^ K e n n e t h  S. Wherry to Dwight  D. E i senhower ,  March 20,  
1951 , Mi seel  1aneous Correspondence F i 1e , Eisenhower  Papers  
1 9 1 6 - 1 9 5 2 ,  Dwight  D. Ei senhower  L i b r a r y .
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found themselves i n v o l v e d  i n  something c l o s e  to a c i v i l
war w i t h i n  t h e i r  own p a r t y .  As one a n a l y s t  put  i t ,  the
" Republ i cans  f a i l e d  to harmonize t h e i r  f o r e i g n  and domest ic
l e a d e r s h i p "  and t h i s  r e s u l t e d  in  s h i f t i n g  a l l i a n c e s  i n v o l v i n g
a t  one t ime or  a no t h e r  T a f t ,  Vandenberg,  Dewey,  and
e v e n t u a l l y  John Fo s t e r  Du-l l -es;.—.' When the Gr ea t  Debate
began Se na t or  Vandenberg was no l on g e r  a b l e  to e x e r t  h i s
i n f l u e n c e  over  m a t t e r s  o f  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  because o f  h is
h e a l t h ,  and f o r  a p e r i o d  no one was sure who spoke as the
Re p ub l i c a n  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  e x p e r t . At  t he  t i me  P r e s i d e n t
Truman announced his  t r oop d e c i s i o n  i n  September ,  1950,  the
New York Times r e p o r t e d  t h a t  Senat or  Lodge had become t he
12Re p ub l i c a n  spokesman on f o r e i g n  a f f a i r s .
On trie one hand,  the c o n s e r v a t i v e s  and l i b e r a l s  
w i t h i n  the Re publ i can  P a r t y  were a t  odds w i t h  each o t h e r .
The c o n s e r v a t i v e s  saw no f u t u r e  in a "me- too"  approach to 
f o r e i g n  p o l i c y ,  y e t  Thomas Dewey stood hi s  ground when 
c h a l l e n g e d  by t he  c o n s e r v a t i v e s .  As one c o l u m n i s t  expressed  
i t ,  Dewey's t e s t i mo n y  and exchange w i t h  Wherry a t  the  
h e a r i n g s  was a f o o t n o t e  to t he  1948 campaign.  "Dewey could  
not  expr ess  h i s  t r u e  c o n v i c t i o n s  i n  t h a t  campaign because  
i n  s t a t e  a f t e r  s t a t e  were found Republ i can c on gr e s s i on a l  
c a n d i d a t e s  who were d i a m e t r i c a l l y  opposed to the views of
^ P o o l e ,  " Republ  i can Fore i  gn Pol i cy ," pp. 2 - 3 .
^ New York T i m e s , September  9 ,  1950 ,  p.  5.
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1 3the Re p u b l i c a n  p r e s i d e n t i a l  c a n d i d a t e . "  His f o r t h r i g h t
s t a t e m e n t  on t he  t r o o p s - f o r - E u r o p e  i ssue  i ndeed a l i e n a t e d
t he c o n s e r v a t i v e  f a c t i o n  o f  t he  p a r t y .  Nor was Dewey the
on l y  l i b e r a l  who was a problem to the r i g h t  wing o f  the
p a r t y ;  the Chicago Da i T y  T r i b u n e  suggested t h a t  Senators
M a r g a r e t  Chase Smi th of  Ma i ne ,  Wayne Morse o f  Oregon,
A l e x a n d e r  Wi l e y  o f  W i s c o n s i n , H. A l e x a n d e r  Smi th o f  New
J e r s e y ,  I r v i n g  I ves o f  New Yo r k ,  L e v e r e t t  S a l t o n s t a l l  and
Henry Cabot  Lodge o f  M a s s a c h u s e t t s , George Aiken and Ralph
F l a n de r s  o f  Vermont ,  Ch a r l e s  Tobey o f  New Hampshi re ,  and
James D u f f  o f  Pe n nsy l va n i a  a l l  " t a k e  a wa l k"  as they  would
14make b e t t e r  Democrats than Re p u b l i c a n s .
On the o t h e r  hand,  the c o n s e r v a t i v e s  w i t h i n  the
Re publ i ca n  P a r t y  a l s o  were not  u n i t e d  i n  t h e i r  e f f o r t .  The
f a c t  t h a t  T a f t  had P r e s i d e n t i a l  a s p i r a t i o n s  has a l r e a d y
been me n t i o ne d ,  but  i t  should be added t h a t  Sena t or  Wherry
15had l i k e  i n t e r e s t s .  E a r l y  i n  the debate  the New York  
Times r e c o g n i z e d  t h a t  Wherry was t a k i n g  i ssue  w i t h  T a f t ' s  
more moderate  s t a n d . ^  Th i s  d i f f e r e n c e  i s  more r e c o g n i z ­
ab l e  in  t he  f i n a l  vote  i n  which the two men did not  stand
^ M a r q u i  s Chi 1 ds , " For e i gn  Pol i cy and 195 2 , "  
Washington P o s t , Febr uar y  28,  1951 ,  p. 9.
14 E d i t o r i a l ,  Chicago Dai  l.y T r i  bune , March 6 , 1951,  
sec . I , p . 16.
^ D a l s t r o m ,  "Kenneth S. Wher r y , "  p. 751.
^ New York  T i m e s , J a n u a r y  30,  1951,  p.  11.
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t o g e t h e r .  Accor d i ng  to one h i s t o r i a n  i t  was John F o s t e r
D u l l e s  who was i n s t r u m e n t a l  in wooing T a f t  away from the
17ext reme p o s i t i o n s  o f  Hoover  and Wherry.
As much as a n y t h i n g  the Gr e a t  Debate exposed a
s t a n d i  ng d i v i s i o n  w i t h i n  the -Re pu'b Vi can P a r t y  . Except  f o r
John McC1 el  1 an and his  amendment to the C o n n a l l y - R u s s e l 1
r e s o l u t i o n s  and a few o t h e r  sout her n  Democrat s ,  no such
schism deve l oped in P r e s i d e n t  Truman' s p a r t y .
The u l t i m a t e  goal  i n  making the t r o o p s - f o r - E u r o p e
program a p a r t i s a n  i ssue  was t he  Pr e s i de n c y  i n  1952.  T a f t
was e s p e c i a l l y  i n t e r e s t e d  i n  the Repub l i can  nomi nat i on  and
l e t  i t  be known he would f i g h t  t o o t h - a n d - n a i 1 to p r e v e n t  a
18"me- t oo"  Re p ub l i c a n  f rom g e t t i n g  i t .  I n a d d i t i o n ,  the
Ohio Sena t or  was being c o n f r o n t e d  w i t h  a new c h a l l e n g e r  f rom
a n o t h e r  q u a r t e r — General  E i senhower .  Al t hough Eisenhower
had not  p u b l i c l y  announced hi s  p a r t y  p r e f e r e n c e  or  h is
i n t e n t i o n  to r un ,  the press c o n t i n ue d  to s p e c u l a t e  about
t he  growi ng Re publ i can  suppor t  f o r  the General  and i t s
19a f f e c t  on T a f t .  Even though the e l e c t i o n  was n e a r l y  two 
y e a r s  away a number of  Republ i cans  began g i v i n g  p u b l i c  
suppor t  to an Eisenhower  campaign.  Governor  Dewey,
17 P o o l e ,  " Repub l i can  Fo r e i g n  P o l i c y , 1' p.  377.
18 E d i t o r i a l ,  Evening Wor1d - H e r a 1d (Omaha) ,
December 4 ,  1950 ,  p.  18.
1 9James Rest on ,  "Ei senhower  or  T a f t ?  A Quest i on  
Looms f o r  ' 52  , " New York Ti  mes , February  18,  1951,  s e c . IV , 
p . 3.
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C a l i f o r n i a  Governor  Ear l  War ren,  Sena t or  James D u f f  and
Har ol d  St assen a l l  r e j e c t e d  T a f t  because o f  h i s  f o r e i g n  
20p o l i c y .  Dewey and D u f f  were both p u b l i c l y  commi t ted
21to Eisenhower  be f o r e  the end o f  March,  1951.
T a f t  v iewed the chance to beat  Eisenhower  as
s i g n i f i c a n t  as b e a t i n g  Truman in t h a t  the General  was in
f u l l  agreement  w i t h  the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s  p o l i c y .  In e f f e c t ,
T a f t  saw t h a t  e i t h e r  a Truman or  Ei senhower  v i c t o r y  in
195 2 would b r i n g  no change o f  p o l i c y .  The Chicago D a i l y
T r i b u n e  warned c o n s e r v a t i v e  Republ i cans  t o  look i n s i d e
the Eisenhower  p o l i t i c a l  T r o j a n  horse as i t  appeared t h a t
the "New D e a l e r s "  were " us i ng  Eisenhower  to k i l l  o f f  a r e a l
22Repub! i  can o p p o s i t i o n . "
The Ei senhower  c h a l l e n g e ,  announced or  n o t ,  was
ve r y  genui ne  as r e v e a l e d  by an A p r i l , 1951 Ga l l u p  p o l l .
Th a t  survey  showed Ei senhower  l e a d i n g  T a f t  by s i x t e e n
23pe r c e n t age  p o i n t s  w i t h i n  t he  GOP. Si x  months l a t e r ,  
w h i l e  Eisenhower  was in  Eur ope ,  he asked W. A v e r e l l  Har r i man  
to secur e  f o r  him t he  v o t i n g  r ec or d  o f  Sena t or
on
Thomas L.  S t o k e s ,  "Four  Men A g a i n s t  Sen.  T a f t , "  
A t l a n t a  C o n s t i t u t i o n , March 6 , 1951 ,  p.  10.
21 F u l t o n  Lewis , J r . ,  " Freshman Se n a t o r  D u f f  Readies  
B l a s t  a t  H o o v e r - T a f t - W h e r r y ,"  Evening World He r a l d  
(Omaha) , March 1 5 , 1 9 5 1 ,  p. 30 ; Drew Pearson , " E i s e n h o w e r ' s 
Snubs Anger  Dewey," Washington P o s t , March 18 ,  1951,  p. 5B.
22 E d i t o r i a l ,  Chicago D a i l y  T r i bune.  Fe b r u a r y  24,  
19 5 1 ,  sec .  I ,  p.  8 .
^ Washington P o s t , A p r i l  15 ,  1951 ,  p.  I B .
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24T a f t .  A l t hough the General  asked o n l y  f o r  t he  votes  on 
European a i d ,  i t  can be s p e c u l a t e d  t h a t  Ei senhower  was as 
much i n t e r e s t e d  in f u t u r e  p o l i t i c a l  e ve nt s  as i n  a s s i s t a n c e  
to Europe.  By May,  1952 ,  the c o n s e r v a t i v e s  were up i n  arms 
a t  the Ei senhower  movement w i t h i n  the Re p ub l i c a n  P a r t y .  
Mi ch i gan  Se n a t o r  Homer Ferguson he l ped p r e p a r e  a s t udy  
which concl uded t h a t  a "Mi 1 i t a r y - I n t e r n a t i o n a l i s t - N e w  Dea l "  
c o a l i t i o n  was promot i ng Eisenhower  as a Re pub l i c an  
c a n d i d a t e .  The c o n s e r v a t i v e s  r e a l i z e d  t h a t  i f  both p a r t i e s  
nominated a f i r m  i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s t  the Truman p o l i c i e s  
would be " s a f e . " ^
From a l l  o f  t h i s  i t  can be surmi sed t h a t  the G r e a t  
Debate was i ndeed c o l o r e d  w i t h  p a r t i s a n s h i p .  The R e p u b l i ­
can r e - e x a m i n i s t s  were out  t o  make p o l i t i c a l  hay and a 
n a t i o n  f r u s t r a t e d  w i t h  e x i s t i n g  f o r e i g n  problems p r o v i d e d  
f e r t i l e  ground.  I f  Se n a t o r  T a f t  was s i n c e r e l y  i n t e r e s t e d  
i n  f o r e i g n  a f f a i r s  and hi s  b e l i e f s ,  why d i d  he vote  f o r  the  
two p a t h e t i c a l l y  weak r e s o l u t i o n s ?  Perhaps he r e a l i z e d  the  
p r e s s ,  t he  Congress ,  and t he  p u b l i c  were not  r a l l y i n g  behind  
Hoover  and Wher ry .  In such a case he coul d s a l va ge  hi s  
chance f o r  the 1952 Re publ i c a n  nomi na t i on  on l y  by
24 W, A v e r e l l  Har r i man to Dwight  D. E i senhower ,  
September  14 ,  1951 ,  W. A v e r e l l  Har r i man F i l e  ( # 2 ) ,
Ei senhower  Papers 1 9 1 6 - 1 9 5 2 ,  Dwight  D. Eisenhower  L i b r a r y .
2 5Homer Ferguson to H e r b e r t  Hoover ,  May 8 , 1952 ,
D. D. Ei senhower  F i l e  (1 948-1 953)  , P o s t - P r e s i d e n t i a l  
Paper s ,  H e r b e r t  Hoover P r e s i d e n t i a l  L i b r a r y .
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moder a t i ng  hi s  s t a n d - - t h e  Hoover  and Wherry p o s i t i o n s  were  
too ext reme and t he  Eisenhower  c h a l l e n g e  was o n l y  more o f  
the  e x i s t i n g  m e d i c i n e . His p o s i t i o n  had to be an a l t e r n a t i v e  
to the Truman D o c t r i n e  y e t  command the s uppor t  o f  a m a j o r i t y  
o f  t he  v o t e r s .
Having c on s i de r e d  the domest i c  s i de  o f  t he  i s sue  i t  
i s  now necessar y  to l ook  a t  t he  i m p l i c a t i o n s  i n  f o r e i g n  
a f f a i r s .  Th i s  s t udy  was not  done f o r  t he  purpose o f  making  
a b l a n k e t  g e n e r a l i z a t i o n  about  the Admi ni  s t r a  t i  o n ' s Cold  
War p o l i c y ;  however ,  one can i n d u l g e  in a degree o f  
s p e c u l a t i o n .  Whether  Truman' s  d e c i s i o n  was c o r r e c t  o r  not  
was d e b a t a b l e  not  on l y  then but  c o n t i n u e s  to be so.
Throughout  the debat e  both Truman and h i s  c r i t i c s  
accept ed  t he  premi se t h a t  a S o v i e t  m i l i t a r y  t h r e a t  d i d  
e x i s t .  I t  can be conceded t h a t  the mere e x i s t e n c e  o f  a 
r e l a t i v e l y  l a r g e  Red Army c o n s t i t u t e d  a t h r e a t  when compared 
to the meager f o r c e s  a v a i l a b l e  in  Western Europe.  The 
apprehens i  on i n c r e a s e d  wi th t he  a gg r e s s i  on i n Korea , and 
as a r e s u l t  i t  awoke Europe and the U n i t e d  S t a t e s  to the  
p o s s i b i l i t i e s  o f  a S o v i e t  march across Europe.  I n 1951 the  
a l t e r n a t i v e s  f o r  a European def ense  appeared to be e i t h e r  
a l l - o u t  n u c l e a r  r e t a l i a t i o n  w i t h  a i r  power or  c r e a t i n g  a 
mixed f o r c e  capab l e  o f  a f l e x i b l e  r esponse .  The A d m i n i s t r a ­
t i o n ,  f i n d i n g  d e f e c t s  i n  the a i r  power t h e s i s  and a n u c l e a r  
h o l o c a u s t  u n a c c e p t a b l e  f o r  European m o r a l e ,  opt ed f o r  a 
def ense  which hopef u l  1y would keep most o f  Western Europe
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f r e e  and t h e r e b y  p r e v e n t  the n e c e s s i t y  o f  a n o t h e r  D-Day  
l a n d i n g .  The immediate  goal  was to s t r e n g t h e n  a p i t i f u l l y  
weak Europe as q u i c k l y  as p o s s i b l e .
The q u e s t i o n  then a r i s e s  why did S t a l i n  not  a t t a c k  
Western Europe b e f o r e  or  dur i ng  t he  f o r m a t i o n  o f  t he  
European Army? One answer g i ven was the Amer ican possess i on
o c
o f  the a t omi c  bomb and her  long range bombers;  however ,
i f  the J o i n t  Ch i e f s  o f  S t a f f  were c o r r e c t  t hese weapons
a l one  would have not  stopped the Red Army.  A number of
o t h e r  obs e r ve r s  found the answer ,  i n  p a r t ,  to spr i n g  f rom
i n t e r n a l  problems w i t h  non- Russi an n a t i o n a l i t i e s  w i t h i n  the
27
S o v i e t  Union and the s a t e l l i t e s .  As one w r i t e r  put  i t ,
"The i r r e c o n c i 1 a b i 1 i t y  o f  East  Germany w i t h  the o t h e r
s a t e l l i t e s  i s  one o f  t he  maj or  problems f a c i n g  the
28Russians . . . 1 S t e w a r t  and Joseph Alsop saw the t r o o p
b u i l d - u p s  in  the s a t e l l i t e s  as aimed a t  subduing T i t o  and
29hi s  Y u g o s l a v i a  r a t h e r  than a t  Western Europe.  John 
Kennedy f e l t  S t a l i n  would not  make a move because the b e s t  
the Russians could hope f o r  was a s t a l e m a t e  as r e s u l t  o f
^ S e n a t e ,  H e a r i n g s ,  S. Con. Res.  8 , p. 755.
2 7 I b i d . , pp.  255 ,  4 9 4 ,  749.
28 Drew M i d d l e t o n ,  The Defense o f  Western Europe  
(New York:  Appl  e t on-Cen t u r y - C  r o f  ts , T n c . ,  1 9 5 2 ) ,  p~. 8T.
90
S t e w a r t  and Joseph A l s o p ,  "Chance o f  Peace Rests  
on West ' s  A l l - O u t  Rearming and Meet i ng S o v i e t  E f f o r t s  to 
Block B u i l d - u p , "  S t .  Louis  P o s t - D i s p a t c h , January  26,  1951 ,  
p . 1C.
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30o v e r e x t e n d i n g  the Red Army.  The m i l i t a r y ,  p o l i t i c a l ,  and
economic weakness o f  Western Europe)  accor d i ng  to Hans
Mor gent hau ,  was not  a t h r e a t  to the Russian p o s i t i o n  in
c e n t r a l  and Ea s t e r n  Europe and t h e r e f o r e  made the a c q u i s i -
31t i o n  of  Western Europe u n a t t r a c t i v e  f o r  the moment.
Ot hers  viewed the Nor th A t l a n t i c  A l l i a n c e  and the plans f o r
an army as an e f f e c t i v e  d e t e r r e n t  causi ng t he  S o v i e t
32l e a d e r s  t o  be c o n t e n t  t e m p o r a r i l y .  General  E i senhower ,
however ,  contended the Russians could f i n d  an excuse f o r
33marching w i t h  or  w i t h o u t  t he  e x i s t e n c e  o f  t he  p a c t .
3 4
There  were o t h e r  ana l y s e s  , some qui  t e  de ba t ab l  e,, but  the  
m a j o r i t y  c on t i n ue d  t o  f a l l  back upon the a i r  power and 
n u c l e a r  bomb t h e s i s .
Whether  i t  was a i r  power ,  NATO, or  some o t h e r  reason
30 S e n a t e ,  H e a r i n g s ,  S. C o n . R e s .  8 , p.  429.
31
Morgent hau ,  Defense of  N a t i o n a l  I n t e r e s t , p. 161.
32 Dan i e l  DeLuce and Ri char d  O' Regan,  "Odds Favor  
Anot her  Year  o f  Peace in Europe,  in Ca ut i ous  View of  
Obser vers  i n  Germany, A u s t r i a , "  S t .  Louis Pos t - D i S D a t c h , 
March 25 ,  1951 ,  p. 3B.
33 S e n a t e , Hear i ngs  , S. Con. Res.  8 , p.  21.
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The e d i t o r  o f  t he  Chicago D a i l y  T r i b u n e  came up 
w i t h  t he  t h e s i s  t h a t  Russia would not  a t t a c k  the na t i on s  o f  
Western Europe because they  were a l l  c o l o n i a l  powers.  The 
argument  was to the e f f e c t  t h a t ,  i f  i n t a k i n g  over  Europe 
t he  S o v i e t s  a l so  kept  the c o l o n i a l  po s s e s s i o n s ,  Communism 
would l os e  i t s  appeal  to the c o l o n i a l  p o p u l a t i o n s .  On the  
o t h e r  hand,  i f  Russia gave the c o l o n i e s  t h e i r  independence  
she would a l s o  l ose  the "source of  w e a l t h  and income f rom 
over seas  t h a t  l a r g e l y  s u s t a i n s "  the West European powers.
In a l l  , the t h e s i s  was a b i t  u n b e l i e v a b l e .  ( E d i t o r i a l ,  
Chicago D a i l y  T r i b u n e , December 25,  1950 ,  sec ,  I ,  p.  1 8 . )
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t h a t  p r e v e n t e d  t he  Red Army f rom a t t a c k i n g ,  a c o n s i d e r a b l e  
p o r t i o n  o f  t he  Amer ican peopl e  agreed w i t h  Truman t h a t  t he  
S o v i e t  t h r e a t  was a m i l i t a r y  one.  However ,  t h e r e  was a 
smal l  group headed by George Kennan who viewed t he  t h r e a t  
as more p o l i t i c a l  than m i l i t a r y .  Kennan had f i r s t - h a n d  
e x p e r i e n c e  w i t h  t he  S o v i e t  l e a d e r s  du r i n g  h i s  ass i gnment  as 
a F o r e i g n  S e r v i c e  O f f i c e r  i n  Moscow dur i ng  t he  y e a r s  1945  
and 1946 and was among t he  f i r s t  to warn o f  Russi an  
i n t r a n s  i g e n c e .
In  a n a l y z i n g  S o v i e t  p o l i c y  i n  1945 Kennan p r e d i c t e d
t h a t  o t h e r  than a “ b a r i n g  o f  t he  f angs"  Russi a had “ no
f u r t h e r  means w i t h  which to a s s a i l  t he  Western W o r l d . ' 1 He
f u r t h e r  acknowledged t h a t  the Red Army would not  be
d e m o b i l i z e d  because S t a l i n  needed i t  to c o n s o l i d a t e  h i s
power i n  the n e w l y - a c q u i r e d  a r e a s .  " F u r t h e r  mi 1 i t a r y
advances i n  the West cou l d  o n l y  i n c r e a s e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s
3 5a l r e a d y  beyond the Russian c a p a c i t y  to m e e t . "
Two y ea r s  l a t e r  i n  w r i t i n g  h i s  Mr .  X a r t i c l e ,  "The 
Sources o f  S o v i e t  Conduct , "  he c o n t i n u e d  to v iew t he  t h r e a t  
as more p o l i t i c a l  than mi 1 i t a r y . Communist  i d e o l o g y  saw 
a c o n t i n u i n g  ant agoni sm between c a p i t a l i s m  and s o c i a l i s m ,  
but  in Kennan's view t h i s  d i d  not  mean the S o v i e t s  were  
bent  upon a d o - o r - d i e  p r o g r a m - - t h e y  were i n  no h u r r y .  When 
he asked f o r  a " f i r m  and v i g i l a n t  c o n t a i n me n t  o f  Russi an
35 Kennan,  Memo i rs , pp.  533 ,  546.
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ex pans i ve  t e n d e n c i e s , "  he s a i d  not h i ng  about  a m i l i t a r y
36t h r e a t  or  mi 1 i t a r y  c o n t a i n me n t .  Many,  i n c l u d i n g  W a l t e r  
Lippmann,  i m m e d i a t e l y  read a m i l i t a r y  c o n n o t a t i o n  i n t o  the  
passage,  and s h o r t l y  t h e r e a f t e r  Kennan a t t e mpt e d  to c o r r e c t  
Li  ppmann1s f a l s e  i n t e r p r e t a t i  on by p o i n t i n g  out
The Russians d o n ' t  want  to i nvade anyone.  I t  
i s  not  in t h e i r  t r a d i t i o n .  They t r i e d  i t  once in  
F i n l a n d  and got  t h e i r  f i n g e r s  burned.  They d o n ' t  
want  war o f  any k i n d .  Above a l l ,  t hey  d o n ' t  want  
the open respons- ibi  1-i t y - ' t h a t ,  o f f i c i a l  i n v a s i o n  
br i ng s  w i t h  i t .  They f a r  p r e f e r  to do the j ob  
p o l i t i c a l l y  w i t h  stooge f o r c e s .  Note w e l l :  when
I say p o l i t i c a l l y ,  t h a t  does not  mean w i t h o u t  
v i o l e n c e .  But  i t  means t h a t  the v i o l e n c e  is 27 
n o m i n a l l y  d o me s t i c ,  not  i n t e r n a t i o n a l ,  v i o l e n c e .
U n l i k e  Acheson,  Kennan a t t e mpt e d  to put  the brakes
on t he  growing hard l i n e  o f  con t a i nment  as t ime passed.
Th i s  was e s p e c i a l l y  t r u e  when as a member o f  the S t a t e
Depar t ment  s t a f f  he worked on t he  Nor th A t l a n t i c  T r e a t y .
Recogn i z i ng  the i n t e n t  o f  the pac t  he p r o t e s t e d  to his
s u p e r i o r ,  S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e  Marshal  1.  A l t hough he accept ed
t he  need to b o l s t e r  European mora l e  he was f e a r f u l  t h a t  a
p r e o c c u p a t i o n  w i t h  m i l i t a r y  a f f a i r s  would be d e t r i m e n t a l  to
t he  more i m p o r t a n t  f u l f i 11 ment o f  economic r e c o v e r y .  "The
danger  t h a t  European NATO p a r t n e r s  f aced in the p o l i t i c a l
f i e l d , "  he wr ot e  to M a r s h a l l ,  "was s t i l l  g r e a t e r  . . . than
38any m i l i t a r y  danger  t h a t  c o n f r o n t e d  t hem."  Somewhat l a t e r
3 6 "x» [George F.  Kennan] ,  "The Sources o f  S o v i e t  
Conduc t , "  F o r e i g n  A f f a i r s , XXV ( J u l y ,  1 9 4 7 ) ,  pp.  5 7 2 - 7 3 ,  575.
37 Kennan , Memo i rs , pp.  3 5 8 - 6 1 .
3 8 I b i d . , pp.  409-1 0.
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he ob s e r v e d ,  " I  have never  seen any e v i de nc e  t h a t  the S o v i e t
l e a d e r s  have a t  any t i me s i nce  World War I I  . . . d e s i r e d  a
gener a l  war between the S o v i e t  Union and the maj or
39c a p i t a l i s t  powers . "
Th r oughout ,  Kennan c o n s i s t e n t l y  warned a g a i n s t  
over emphas i z i ng  m i l i t a r y  c on t a i n me n t  a t  t he  expense o f  
European economic r e c o v e r y .  The S o v i e t  t h r e a t  i n  h i s  v iew  
could best  be met by a p o l i t i c a l l y  and e c o n o m i c a l l y  s t a b l e
40
Western Europe.  Ten y e a r s  a f t e r  h i s  Mr.  X a r t i c l e  Kennan
moved e v e r  f u r t h e r  away f rom t he  m i l i t a n t  c o n t a i n me n t  l i n e
and t ur ned  towards Lippmann 1 s e a r l i e r  proposal  o f  gr a dua l
di sengagement  i n  Europe.  By then he and Acheson were f a r
a p a r t ,  w i t h  Acheson c o n t i n u i n g  to demand a c t i o n  based on
41p o s i t i o n s  o f  m i l i t a r y  s t r e n g t h .
In t a l k i n g  about  the c on t a i nme nt  p o l i c y  Kennan l a t e r
s a i d
The f a i l u r e  c o n s i s t e d  in the f a c t  t h a t  our  own 
government ,  f i n d i n g  i t  d i f f i c u l t  to unde r s t and  a 
p o l i t i c a l  t h r e a t  as such and to deal  w i t h  i t  in  
o t h e r  than mi 1 i t a r y  t e r m s , and g r i  e v ou s l y  m i s l e d ,  
i n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  by i t s  own f a u l t y  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  
o f  t he  s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  t he  Korean War,  f a i l e d  to 
t a k e  advantage of  the o p p o r t u n i t i e s  f o r  us e f u l
39 George F. Kennan,  R e a l i t i e s  o f  Amer ican For e i gn  
P o l i  cy ( P r i  nee t o n : P r i n c e t o n  Uni vers i t y  P r e s s , 1 954)  ,
pp.  6 9 - 7 0 .
40 George F. K e n n a n , R u s s i a ,  the Atom and t h e Wes t  
(New York:  Harper  & Br o t h e r s  Publ  is her  s^ j 1 958)  , p p . 8 8 - 9 1 .
^ W a l t e r  L a F e b e r , Ameri  ca , Russi  a , and the Cold  
War,  1945 - 1966  (New York:  John Wi l ey  and Sons,  I n c . ,  1 9 6 8 ) ,
p. 209.
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p o l i t i c a l  d i s c u s s i o n  when,  in  l a t e r  y e a r s ,  such 
o p p o r t u n i t i e s  began to open up,  and e x e r t e d  i t s e l f ,  
i n i t s  m i l i t a r y  p r e o c c u p a t i o n s ,  to seal  and to 
p e r p e t u a t e  the very  d i v i s i o n s  o f  Europe which i t  
should have been concerned to r e mo v e . 42
I f  Kennan's a n a l y s i s  t h a t  the t h r e a t  had always been 
more p o l i t i c a l  than m i l i t a r y  i s  c o r r e c t ,  then the d e c i s i o n  
to form a European Army and Truman' s sending Amer ican  
ground f o r c e s  to Europe on l y  c o n t r i b u t e d  to the i n t e n s i t y  
of  the Cold War.  I f  t he  m i l i t a r y  t h r e a t  was not  as g r e a t  
as p e r c e i v e d  by the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  then perhaps the s o l u t i o n  
was to encourage a degree o f  rearmament  w h i l e  p l a y i n g  down 
the c r e a t i o n  o f  a European army aimed a t  the S o v i e t  
f r o n t i e r s .  Due to the c o n f 1 i c t i n g  views o f  the S o v i e t  
t h r e a t  t he  G r e a t  Deba t e ,  in a sense,  has never  ended.  The 
q u e s t i o n s  grow more encompassing and r e q u i r e  f u r t h e r  
a n a l y s i s  o f  the o r i g i n s  o f  the Cold War,  S o v i e t  g o a l s ,  and 
the Amer ican un de r s t a n d i n g  o f  the Russian mind.  The 
qu e s t i o ns  perhaps can never  f u l l y  be answer ed,  but  a r e ­
e x a m i n a t i o n  o f  the Cold War deserves more a t t e n t i o n .
I t  has been sa i d  t h a t  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  cannot  be 
s e p a r a t e d  f rom domest i c  i n f l u e n c e s - - t h e  Gr e a t  Debate i s  a 
m a n i f e s t a t i o n  o f  t h a t  pr e mi s e .  B i p a r t i s a n s h i p  i n v o l v e s  a 
number o f  c o n d i t i o n s  i n c l u d i n g  the n e c e s s i t y  o f  the
42 Kennan,  Memo i r s , p.  365.
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E x e c u t i v e  c o n s u l t i n g  Congress p r i o r  to the p u b l i c  announce­
ment o f  a d e c i s i o n  or  p o l i c y .  P r e s i d e n t  Truman,  even though 
his  p l an had a . l e g i t i m a t e  b a s i s ,  acted h a s t i l y  and w i t h  a 
d e t e r m i n a t i o n  to shou l de r  the e n t i r e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .  Aware 
t h a t  Congress con t a i n e d  a m a j o r i t y  of  i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s t s  he 
f e l t  he could move u n r e s t r i c t e d ,  y e t  a smal l  but  v i g i l a n t  
group o f  c o n s e r v a t i v e s  a c t i n g  out  o f  f r u s t r a t i o n  and the  
d e s i r e  f o r  p a r t i s a n  ga i n  f i r e d  br oads i de  i n t o  the P r e s i d e n t ' s  
conduct  and his e n t i r e  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y .
The p a r t i s a n  t a c t i c s ,  w h i l e  draped w i t h  l e g i t i m a t e  
argument s ,  i n c l u d e d  both a c o n s e r v a t i v e  Republ i can a l t e r n a ­
t i v e  in  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  and c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  h a g g l i n g .  That  
i s  not  to say the a l t e r n a t i v e  p o l i c y  was,an e n t i r e l y  
unworkable o n e - - t h e  i n t e n t  was to c a p i t a l i z e  on the p u b l i c  
f r u s t r a t i o n  w i t h  the Truman p o l i c y .  A f t e r  f i n d i n g  t hemselves  
outnumbered the c o n s e r v a t i v e s  r e s o r t e d  to c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  
arguments to deny the P r e s i d e n t  compl e t i on  o f  h is  p o l i c y .  
U l t i m a t e l y  the goal  was to e l e c t  someone in  1952 who was 
something l ess  than a l i b e r a l  and i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s t .
Of  the m i l i t a r y  s e r v i c e s ,  the a i r  power advocates
had the most to ga i n  f rom the deba t e .  The A i r  Force was
expandi ng and hoped to e s t a b l i s h  i t s e l f  f i r m l y  as the f i r s t  .
among e q u a l s .  A we l l - known m i l i t a r y  h i s t o r i a n  a d mi t t e d  t h a t
the A i r  Force " o v e r p l a y e d "  i t s  hand somewhat ,  which i s  "normal
43i n  the f i g h t  f o r  a l a r g e r  s l i c e  of  p i e . "
43 S . L .  A. Mar sha l l  to a u t h o r ,  December 28 ,  1970.
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The r e - e x a m i n i s t s  asked some p e r t i n e n t  ques t i ons  
when i t  came to the conduct  o f  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y .  C a l l i n g  the  
Truman p o l i c y  one o f  spr ead i ng  the U n i t e d  S t a t e s  t h i n  
e verywher e  and s t r ong nowhere t hey  found a glamorous and 
seemi ng l y  e f f e c t i v e  s o l u t i o n  in a i r  power.  I nde e d ,  the  
U n i t e d  S t a t e s  could not  be the w o r l d ' s  pol i ceman w i t h  
t r o op s  e v e r y wh e r e ,  but  what  a number o f  r e - e x a m i n i s t s  f a i l e d  
t o  r e a l i z e  was t h a t  Amer ican i n t e r e s t s  were not  n e c e s s a r i l y  
t he  same i n  a l l  p a r t s  o f  the w o r l d .  On the o t h e r  hand,  
Truman by h i s  l i m i t e d  response i n  Korea and his  deployment  
o f  t r oops  to Europe acknowledged t h a t  t h e r e  was more a t  
s t a k e  i n  the A t l a n t i c  community than in  A s i a .
The a i r  power s o l u t i o n  t o  t he  argument  t h a t  the  
U n i t e d  S t a t e s  was o v e r e x t e n de d  was perhaps not  the bes t  
answer .  I t  deni ed a f l e x i b l e  r esponse ,  l e f t  no room f o r  
1 i m i t e d  c o n f 1 i c t s , and demanded a t o t a l  v i c t o r y  which in  
i t s e l f  meant  a n o t h e r  wor l d  war .  The r e - e x a m i n i s t s  argued  
t h a t  i t  was a d e t e r r e n t ,  but  as a means to peace i t  was 
a d e t e r r e n t  o n l y  so long as i t  d i d  not  have to be used.  In  
r e t r o s p e c t  t he  r e - e x a m i n i s t s  were ask i ng some p e n e t r a t i n g  
q u e s t i o n s  about  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  but  o f f e r i n g  an o v e r s i m p l i ­
f i e d  s o l u t i o n .
The a i r  power advocates  di d make some advances a t
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44t h i s  t i m e ,  but  t hey  r e c e i v e d  g r e a t e r  a t t e n t i o n  du r i n g  the
Ei senhower  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n .  Once i n  o f f i c e  Ei senhower  was
f o r c e d  to compromise w i t h  the f i s c a l  c o n s e r v a t i v e s  who
45wanted to ba l ance  the budge t ,  and as a r e s u l t  the  
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  a t t empt ed  to s t r e t c h  out  the Amer ican  
b u i l d - u p  o f  f o r c e s  i n  Europe.  By the be g i nn i ng  o f  1954 
the new S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e ,  John F o s t e r  D u l l e s ,  had f or mu­
l a t e d  what  became known as the massive r e t a l i a t i o n  p o l i c y .
Al t hough i t  a l l e g e d l y  c on t i n ue d  a s t r a t e g y  aimed a t
46p r e v e n t i n g  Europe f rom being o v e r r u n ,  t h e r e  was a deci ded
emphasis t h a t  "Communism could best  be handled f rom a h e i g h t
o f  5 0 , 0 0 0  f e e t . "  The o v e r a l l  e f f e c t  was to c u t  the t o t a l
number o f  Amer ican armed f o r c e s  and p l ace  g r e a t e r  r e l i a n c e
47
upon a i r  power.  Th i s  amounted to an accept ance  of  the  
r e - e x a m i n i s t  arguments even though Amer ican f o r c e s  were not  
wi t hdr awn f rom Europe.
From the be g i nn i ng  the European Army never  met the  
i n t e n d e d  goal  o f  the p l a n n e r s .  I t  had been hoped t h a t  by
44 Har r y  S. Truman,  "Na t i on  1s Progress  i n  A i r  Power:  
The Goal i s  Worth the P r i c e , "  V i t a l  Speeches o f  the Da y , 
X V I I I  (June 15 ,  1 9 5 2 ) ,  5 2 1 - 2 2 .  Truman noted t h a t  by June 
1952 the A i r  Force had been i nc r e a s e d  to n i n e t y - o n e  wings
w i t h  a f u t u r e  goal  o f  143 wi ngs .
4 5
L a F e be r ,  Ame r i c a ,  Ru s s i a ,  and the Cold War,
p.  169.
A £
Paul  P e e t e r s ,  Massive R e t a l i a t i o n ;  The P o l i c y  and 
i t s  C r i t i c s  ( Ch i c a go ,  Henry Regnery Company, 1 959 ) ,  p p j 1 ,
17 ,  4 6 - 4 7 ,  126.
^ L a F e b e r ,  Ame r i c a ,  Ru s s i a ,  and the Cold War , 
p p . 169 ,  178.
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the end o f  1 954 NATO would have n i n e t y - s e v e n  d i v i  s i o n . s b u t
t he  quota was never  f i l l e d  "because the European powers
were unimpressed by the immediacy o f  any t h r e a t  and were
c o n t e n t  to r e l y  on the U.S.  d e t e r r e n t  i f  any should a r i  se.
The NATO command was e s t a b l i s h e d ,  but  n e a r l y  s i x  y e a r s
passed be f o r e  German p a r t i c i p a t i o n  was a f a c t ;  in t he  mean
t ime Greece and Turkey j o i n e d  the A l l i a n c e .  As Acheson
obs er v e d ,  "Dur i ng t h a t  [ s i x - y e a r ]  pe r i o d  t he  European Army
4 9
was conce i ved  and m i s c a r r i e d ."
At  home t he  r e - e x a m i n i s t s ,  w h i l e  p l a y i n g  upon the  
n a t i o n ' s  f r u s t r a t i o n ,  found t h a t  n e i t h e r  t hey  nor Truman 
were i n  f u l l  accord w i t h  the p u b l i c .  In Ga l l u p  p o l l s  t aken  
r e g a r d i n g  the t r o o p s - f o r - E u r o p e  i ssue  t he  p u b l i c  r e a d i l y  
agreed t h a t  Congress should have more v o i c e  i n  t he  d e t e r m i n ­
a t i o n  o f  f o r e i g n  . p o l i c y . On the o t h e r  hand,  when asked i f  
more t r oops  were necessary  i n  Europe,  t h e  p u b l i c  responded,
both i n  January  and A p r i l ,  1951 ,  w i t h  a f i v e - t o - t h r e e  margi n
50i n  f a v o r  o f  the Truman p l a n .  Whatever  the goa l s  o f  the  
r e - e x a m i n i s t  s - - p o s s i b1e re s u r re c t  i o n o f  Hoover ' s  p r e s t i g e ,  
p a r t i s a n  gai ns  f o r  T a f t ,  Wher r y ,  and o t h e r s ,  or  a t r u e  
r e v e r s a l  o f  p o l i c y - - t h e  m a j o r i t y  o f  peopl e  were not  about  
to i n i t i a t e  d r a s t i c  changes.
48 David H o r o w i t z ,  The Free World Colossus:  A C r i t i ­
que o f  Amer ican Fore i gn P o l i c y  in the Cold War , Amer ican  
Cent ur y  S e r i e s  (New York:  H i l l  and Wang, 19 71 ) , p.  263.
49 Acheson,  P r e s e n t  a t  the C r e a t i o n , p.  440.
^ Was hi ng ton P o s t , A p r i l  8 ,  1 9 5 1 ,  p. 3B.
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The Senate r e s o l u t i o n s  were weak and d i d  l i t t l e  to  
a l t e r  the P r e s i d e n t ' s  p l a n .  Whi l e  i t  mi ght  be contended  
t h a t  the Gr e a t  Debate accompl i  shed very  l i t t l e ,  i t  d i d  
r e v e a l  a c o n s i s t e n c y  i n  the Amer ican p e o p l e .  The f r u s t r a ­
t i o n s  o f  t he  Cold War cannot  be deni ed and,  i n  f a c t ,  r e g e n ­
e r a t e d  an i s o l a t i o n i s t  s p i r i t ;  however ,  t he  n a t i o n  d i d  not  
suddenl y  disavow i t s  p o s i t i o n  o f  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .  What ever  
the weaknesses o f  t he  Truman f o r e i g n  p o l i c y ,  the Amer ican  
p u b ! i c  r e a l i z e d  t hey  coul d no l on g e r  d e p a r t  f rom the wor l d  
about  them.
APPENDIX A
Senate C o n c u r r e n t  R e s o l u t i o n  8 : The
Wherry R e s o l u t i o n *
Re s o l v e d ,  t h a t  the Commi t tee on Armed S e r v i c e s  and 
the Commi t tee on Fo r e i g n  R e l a t i o n s  are  a u t h o r i z e d  and d i ­
r e c t e d  to meet  j o i n t l y  to c o n s i d e r  and r e p o r t  recommendat ions  
on whet her  or  not  t he  Senat e  should d e c l a r e  i t  to be t he  
sense o f  the Senate t h a t  no ground f o r c e s  o f  t he  U n i t e d  
S t a t e s  shoul d be as s i gne d  to dut y  i n  the European a r e a  f o r  
t he purposes o f  the Nor th A t l a n t i c  T r e a t y  pending t he  
a dopt i on  of  a p o l i c y  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t h e r e t o  by the Congress.  
Such re p o r t , . w h i c h ' ■ s h a l l  be approved by a m a j o r i t y  o f  t he  
combined membership o f  the Commi t tee on Armed S e r v i c e s ,  and 
the Commi t tee on F o r e i g n  R e l a t i o n s ,  sha 11 be 1 imi  t ed  to the  
s u b j e c t  m a t t e r  o f  t h i s  r e s o l u t i o n a n d  shal  l  not  c o n t a i n  
any recommendat ion ,on any m a t t e r  which i s  not  germane 
t h e r e t o ,  or  which i s  i n  s u b s t a n t i a l  c o n t r a v e n t i o n  t h e r e o f ,  
or  any recommendat ion e i t h e r  a pp r o v i ng  or  d i s a p p r o v i n g  
t he  ass i gnment  o f  ground f o r c e s  o f  the U n i t e d  S t a t e s  to 
duty i n  t he  European ar ea  f o r  purposes o f  t he  Nor t h A t l a n t i c  
T r e a t y ,  and to be made on or  b e f o r e  Fe br uar y  2,  1951.
* S e n a t e ,  H e a r i n g s ,  S. Con.  Res.  8 , p.  38.
APPENDIX B
Senate  R e s o l u t i o n  99:  The C o n n a l l y
★
R e s o l u t i o n  as O r i g i n a l l y . - I n t r o d u c e d -
Whereas the f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  and mi 1 i t a r y  s t r e n g t h  o f  
the U n i t e d  S t a t e s  a r e  d e d i c a t e d  to t he  p r o t e c t i o n  o f  our  
n a t i o n a l  s e c u r i t y ,  the p r e s e r v a t i o n  o f  the l i b e r t i e s  o f  t he  
American p e o p l e ,  and t he  mai n t enance  o f  wo r l d  peace;  and
Whereas the Nor th A t l a n t i c  T r e a t y ,  approved by the  
Senate  by a vot e  o f  8 2 - 1 3 ,  i s  a ma j or  and h i s t o r i c  a c t  
desi gned to b u i l d  up t he  c o l l e c t i v e  s t r e n g t h  o f  t he  f r e e  
peopl es of  t he  e a r t h  to r e s i s t  a g g r e s s i o n , and to p r e s e r v e  
wor l d  peace ; and
Whereas the s e c u r i t y  o f  t he  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  and i t s  
c i t i z e n s  i s  i n v o l v e d  w i t h  the s e c u r i t y  o f  i t s  p a r t n e r s  
under  the Nor th A t l a n t i c  T r e a t y ,  ana t he  commitments o f  
t h a t  t r e a t y  are t h e r e f o r e  an e s s e n t i a l  p a r t  o f  t he  f o r e i g n  
p o l i c y  o f  t he  Uni t ed S t a t e s ; and
Whereas a r t i c l e  3 o f  t he  Nor t h  A t l a n t i c  T r e a t y  
pl edges t h a t  the U n i t e d  S t a t e s  and the o t h e r  p a r t i e s  t h e r e t o  
" s e p a r a t e l y  and j o i n t l y ,  by means o f  c on t i nuous  and e f f e c ­
t i v e  s e l f - h e l p  and mutua 1 a i d , w i 11 m a i n t a i n  and deve l op  
t h e i r  i n d i v i d u a l  and c o l l e c t i v e  c a p a c i t y  to r e s i s t  armed 
a t t a c k " ;  and
Whereas r e c e n t  event s  have t h r e a t e n e d  wo r l d  peace  
and as a r e s u l t  a l l  p a r t i e s  to t he  Nor t h  A t l a n t i c  T r e a t y  
are-  i n d i v i d u a l  l y -and'  c o 11e c t i v e l y  mobi 1 i z i n g  t h e i r  p r od uc ­
t i v e  c a p a c i t i e s  and manpower f o r  t h e i r  s e l f - d e f e n s e ;  and
Whereas the f r e e  n a t i o n s  o f  Europe are  v i t a l  c e n t e r s  
o f  c i v i 1 i z a t i o n , f r e e d o m , and p r o d u c t i o n ,  and t h e i r  s u b j u g a ­
t i o n  by t o t a l i t a r i a n  f o r c e s  would weaken and endanger  the  
d e f e n s i v e  c a p a c i t y  o f  the U n i t e d  S t a t e s  and the o t h e r  f r e e  
n a t i o n s ;  and
Whereas t he  success of  our  common de f e ns e  e f f o r t  
under  a u n i f i e d  command r e q u i r e s  t he  v i go r o us  a c t i o n  and 
the f u l l  c o o p e r a t i o n  o f  a l l  t r e a t y  p a r t n e r s  i n  the
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s u p p l y i n g  o f  m a t e r i a l s  and men on a f a i r  and e q u i t a b l e  b a s i s ,  
and General  Eisenhower  has t e s t i f i e d  t h a t  the "bu l k"  o f  
the l and f o r c e s  should be s u p p l i e d  by our  European a l l i e s  
and t h a t  such numbers s u p p l i e d  should be the "major  f r a c t i o n "  
o f  the t o t a l  number:  Now, t h e r e f o r e ,  be i t
R e s o l v e d , T h a t - -
1.  the Senate approves the a c t i o n  o f  t he  P r e s i d e n t  
o f  t he  Un i t e d  S t a t e s  in  c o o p e r a t i n g  i n  the common d e f e n s i v e  
e f f o r t  o f  the Nor th A t l a n t i c  T r e a t y  na t i on s  by d e s i g n a t i n g ,  
a t  t h e i r  unanimous r e q u e s t ,  General  o f  the Army Dwight  D. 
Eisenhower  as Supreme A11 ied-  Commander, Europe,  and in  
p l a c i n g  Armed Forces o f  the U n i t e d  S t a t e s  in  Europe under  
hi s  command;
2.  i t  i s  the be 1 i e f ,  o f  . the ' .Senate t h a t  the t h r e a t  
t o  t he  s e c u r i  t y  o f  the Un i t e d  S t a t e s  and our  Nor t h  A t l a n t i c  
T r e a t y  p a r t n e r s  makes i t  necessary  f o r  the U n i t e d  S t a t e s  to 
s t a t i o n  abroad such u n i t s  o f  our  Armed Forces as may be 
ne cessar y  and a p p r o p r i a t e  to c o n t r i b u t e  our  f a i r  share of  
t he  f o r c e s  needed f o r  the j o i n t  defense o f  t he  Nor th  
A t l a n t i c  a r e a ;
3.  i t  i s  the sense of  the Senate t h a t  the P r e s i d e n t  
o f  the U n i t e d  S t a t e s  as Commander in C h i e f  o f  t he  Armed 
Fo r c e s ,  b e f o r e  t a k i n g  a c t i o n  to send u n i t s  o f  ground t roops  
t o  Europe under  a r t i c l e  3 of  the Nor th A t l a n t i c  T r e a t y ,  
should c o n s u l t  the S e c r e t a r y  o f  Defense and the J o i n t  Ch i e f s  
o f  S t a f f ,  the Commit tee on For e i gn  R e l a t i o n s  of  the Sena t e ,  
t he  Commit tee on For e i gn  A f f a i r s  o f  the House of  Re p r e s e n t a ­
t i v e s ,  and the Armed S e r v i c e s  Commit tees o f  the Senate and 
the House o f  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s , and t h a t  he should l i k e w i s e  
c o n s u l t  t he  Supreme A l l i e d  Commander,  Europe;
4.  i t  is the sense o f  the Senate t h a t  be f o r e  sending  
u n i t s  o f  ground t roops to Europe under a r t i c l e  3 o f  the  
Nor t h  A t l a n t i c  T r e a t y ,  the J o i n t  Ch i e f s  o f  S t a f f  s h a l l  
c e r t i f y  to the S e c r e t a r y  o f  Defense t h a t  in t h e i r  o p i n i o n
the p a r t i e s  to the Nor th A t l a n t i c  T r e a t y  are  g i v i n g ,  and 
have agreed to g i ve  f u l l ,  r e a l i s t i c  f o r c e  and e f f e c t  to 
the  r e q u i r e m e n t  o f  a r t i c l e  3 o f  sa i d  t r e a t y  t h a t  "by means 
o f  c on t i nuous  and e f f e c t i v e  s e l f - h e l p  and mutual  a i d"  they  
w i l l  " m a i n t a i n  and deve l op t h e i r  i n d i v i d u a 1 and c o l l e c t i v e  
c a p a c i t y  t o  r e s i s t  armed a t t a c k , "  s p e c i f i c a l l y  i n s o f a r  as 
the  c r e a t i o n  o f  combat u n i t s  i s  concerned;
5.  the Senate h e r e w i t h  approves the un de r s t a n d i n g  
t h a t  the maj or  c o n t r i b u t i o n  to the ground f o r c e s  under  
General  E i s e n ho we r ' s  command should be made by the European
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members o f  the Nor th A t l a n t i c  T r e a t y ,  and t h a t  such u n i t s  
o f  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  ground f o r c e s  as may be ass i gned to the  
above command s h a l l  be so ass i gned on l y  a f t e r  the J o i n t  
C h i e f s  o f  S t a f f  c e r t i f y  to the S e c r e t a r y  o f  Defense t h a t  in  
t h e i r  o p i n i o n  such assi gnment  i s  a necessary  step in  
s t r e n g t h e n i n g  the s e c u r i t y  o f  the U n i t e d  S t a t e s ;  and the  
c e r t i f i e d  o p i n i o n s  r e f e r r e d  to in paragraphs 4 and 5 s h a l l  
be t r a n s m i t t e d  by the S e c r e t a r y  o f  Defense to the P r e s i d e n t  
o f  t he  U n i t e d  S t a t e s , and t o  the Senate  Commit tees on 
For e i gn  R e l a t i o n s  and Armed S e r v i c e s ,  and to the House 
Commi t tees on For e i gn  A f f a i r s  and Armed S e r v i c e s  as soon as 
t h e y  are  r e c e i v e d ;
6 . i t  i s  the sense o f  t he  Senate  t h a t ,  i n  the  
i n t e r e s t s  o f  sound c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  p r o c es s e s ,  and o f  n a t i o n a l  
u n i t y  and u n d e r s t a n d i n g ,  c o n g r e s s i o n a l  approva l  should be 
o b t a i n e d  o f  any p o l i c y  r e q u i r i n g  the assi gnment  o f  Amer ican  
t r oops  abroad when such ass i gnment  is i n  i mp l e me n t a t i o n  of  
a r t i c l e  3 of -  t he  Nor th A t l a n t i c  T r e a t y ;  and the Senate  
hereby  approves the p r e s e n t  plans o f  the P r e s i d e n t  and the  
J o i n t  C h i e f s  o f  S t a f f  to send f o u r  a d d i t i o n a l  d i v i s i o n s  o f  
ground f o r c e s  to Western Europe;
7.  i t  i s the sense o f  the Senate t h a t  the P r e s i d e n t  
should submi t  to t he  Congress a t  i n t e r v a l s  o f  not  more than  
6 mont hs  r e p o r t s  on the i mp l e me n t a t i o n  o f  the Nor th A t l a n t i c  
T r e a t y ,  i n c l u d i n g  such i n f o r m a t i o n  as may be made a v a i l a b l e  
f o r  t h i s  purpose by the. -Supreme/A' l  1 i ed Commander,  Europe.
* Co nq r e s s i on a l  R e c o r d , X C V I I ,  2 3 6 3 - 6 4 .  Senate  
Co n c u r r e n t  Reso1u t i o n  18,  the Russe l l  R e s o l u t i o n ,  i s  
i d e n t i c a l  e x c e p t  t h a t  t he  word "Congress"  was s u b s t i t u t e d  
i n  p l a c e  o f  " S e n a t e ."
APPENDIX C
Senate R e s o l u t i o n  99:  The Co n n a l l y
■k
R e s o l u t i o n  as Adopted
Whereas the f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  and m i l i t a r y  s t r e n g t h  of  
t he U n i t e d  S t a t e s  are  d e d i c a t e d  to the p r o t e c t i o n  o f  our  
n a t i o n a l  s e c u r i t y ,  the p r e s e r v a t i o n  of  the l i b e r t i e s  o f  the  
Amer ican p e o p l e ,  and t he  mai ntenance o f  wor l d  peace;  and
Whereas the Nor t h  A t l a n t i c  T r e a t y ,  approved by the  
Senate  by a .vote o f  8 2 - 1 3 ,  i s  a maj or  and h i s t o r i c  a c t  
desi gned to b u i l d  up the c o l l e c t i v e  s t r e n g t h  o f  the f r e e  
peopl es  o f  the e a r t h  t o  r e s i s t  a g g r e s s i o n ,  and to pr e s er v e  
wor l d  peace;  and
Whereas the s e c u r i t y  o f  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  and i t s  
c i t i z e n s  i s  i n v o l v e d  w i t h  the s e c u r i t y  o f  i t s  p a r t n e r s  
under  t he  Nor t h  A t l a n t i c  T r e a t y ,  ana the commitments of  
t h a t  t r e a t y  are  t h e r e f o r e  an e s s e n t i a l  p a r t  o f  the.  f o r e i g n  
p o l i c y  o f  the U n i t e d  S t a t e s ;  and
Whereas a r t i c l e  3 o f  the Nor th A t l a n t i c  T r e a t y  
pl edges t h a t  the Un i t e d  S t a t e s  and the o t h e r  p a r t i e s  t h e r e t o  
" s e p a r a t e l y  and j o i n t l y ,  by means o f  con t i nuous  and e f f e c ­
t i v e  s e l f - h e l p  and mutual  a i d ,  w i l l  m a i n t a i n  and devel op  
t h e i r  i n d i v i d u a l  and c o l l e c t i v e  c a p a c i t y  to r e s i s t  armed 
a t t a c k "  ; and
Whereas r e c e n t  event s  have t h r e a t e n e d  wor l d  peace 
and as a r e s u l t  a l l  p a r t i e s  to the Nor th A t l a n t i c  T r e a t y  
are i n d i v i d u a l l y  and col  1e c t i v e l y  m o b i l i z i n g  t h e i r  pr oduc­
t i v e  c a p a c i t i e s  and manpower f o r  t h e i r  s e l f - d e f e n s e ;  and
Whereas the f r e e  n a t i o n s  o f  Europe are  v i t a l  c e n t e r s  
of  c i v i l i z a t i o n ,  f r eedom,  and p r o d u c t i o n ,  and t h e i r  s u b j u g a ­
t i o n  by t o t a l i t a r i a n . f o r c e s  would weaken and endanger  the  
d e f e n s i v e  c a p a c i t y  o f  t he  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  and the o t h e r  f r e e  
n a t i o n s  ; and
Whereas the success of  our  common def ense e f f o r t  
under  a u n i f i e d  command r e q u i r e s  the v i gor ous  a c t i o n  and 
t he f u l l  c o o p e r a t i o n  o f  a l l  t r e a t y  p a r t n e r s  i n  the
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s u p p l y i n g  o f  m a t e r i a l s  and men on a f a i r  and e q u i t a b l e  b a s i s ,  
and General  Eisenhower  has t e s t i f i e d  t h a t  the "bu l k"  o f  
t he  l and f o r c e s  should be s u p p l i e d  by our  European a l l i e s  
and t h a t  such numbers s u p p l i e d  should be the "maj or  f r a c t i o n "  
o f  t he  t o t a l  number:  Now, t h e r e f o r e  be i t
Resol  ved , T h a t - -
1.  the Senate approved the a c t i o n  o f  t he  P r e s i d e n t  
o f  t he  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  i n  c o o p e r a t i n g  in the common d e f e n s i v e  
e f f o r t  o f  the Nor t h A t l a n t i c  T r e a t y  n a t i o n s  by d e s i g n a t i n g ,  
a t  t h e i r  unanimous r e q u e s t ,  General  o f  the Army DWight  D. 
Ei senhower  as Supreme A1 1 i ed Commander, Europe,  and in  
p l a c i n g  Armed Forces o f  t he  Un i t e d  S t a t e s  in Europe under  
hi s  command;
2.  i t  i s  t he  b e l i e f  o f  t he  Senate t h a t  the t h r e a t  
to the s e c u r i t y  o f  the U n i t e d  S t a t e s  and our  Nor t h A t l a n t i c  
T r e a t y  p a r t n e r s  makes i t  necessary  f o r  the Uni t ed'  S t a t e s  to 
s t a t i o n  abroad such u n i t s  of  our  Armed Forces as may be 
necessar y  and a p p r o p r i a t e  to c o n t r i b u t e  our  f a i r  share of  
t he  f o r c e s  needed f o r  the j o i n t  def ense of  the Nor th
A t ! a n t i  c a r e a ;
3.  i t  i s  the sense o f  t he  Senate t h a t  the P r e s i d e n t  
o f  the U n i t e d  S t a t e s  as Commander in C h i e f  o f  t he  Armed 
F o r c e s ,  b e f o r e  t a k i n g  a c t i o n  to send u n i t s  o f  ground t roops  
t o  Europe under  a r t i c l e  3 o f  the Nor th A t l a n t i c  T r e a t y ,  
should ' . consul  t  the S e c r e t a r y  o f  Defense and the J o i n t  Ch i e f s  
o f  S t a f f ,  the Commit tee on For e i gn  R e l a t i o n s  o f  the Sena t e ,  
t he  Commi t tee on Fore i gn A f f a i r s  of  t he  House o f  R e p r e s e n t a ­
t i v e s ,  and the Armed S e r v i c e s  Commit tees o f  the Senate and 
t he  House o f  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ,  and t h a t  he should l i k e w i s e  
c o n s u l t  the Supreme A l l i e d  Commander, Europe;
4.  i t  i s t he  sense o f  the Senate  t h a t  b e f o r e  sendi ng  
u n i t s  o f  ground t roops to Europe under  a r t i c l e  3 o f  the  
Nor t h  A t l a n t i c  T r e a t y ,  the J o i n t  Ch i e f s  of  S t a f f  s h a l l  c e r ­
t i f y  to t he  S e c r e t a r y  o f  Defense t h a t  in t h e i r  o p i n i o n  the  
p a r t i e s  to the Nor th A t l a n t i c  T r e a t y  are  g i v i n g ,  and have 
agreed to g i v e  f u l l ,  r e a l i s t i c  f o r c e  and e f f e c t  to the  
r e q u i r e m e n t  of  a r t i c l e  3 o f  sa i d  t r e a t y  t h a t  "by means of  
c ont i nuous  and e f f e c t i v e  s e l f - h e l p  and mutual  a i d "  t hey  w i l l  
" m a i n t a i n  an d - d e v e l o p  . t h e i r - : - i n d i v i d u a l  and c o l l e c t i v e  
c a p a c i t y  to r e s i s t  armed a t t a c k , "  s p e c i f i c a l l y  i n s o f a r  as
t he  c r e a t i o n  o f  combat u n i t s  i s  concerned;
5.  the Senate h e r e w i t h  approves the unde r s t an d i n g  
t h a t  the maj or  c o n t r i b u t i o n  to the ground f o r c e s  under  
Gener a l  E i s e n ho wer ' s  command should be made by the European 
members o f  the Nor th A t l a n t i c  T r e a t y ,  and t h a t  such u n i t s
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of  Un i t ed  S t a t e s  ground f o r c e s  as may be assi gned to the  
above command s h a l l  be so ass i gned on l y  a f t e r  the J o i n t  
Chi e f s  of  S t a f f  c e r t i f y  to t he  S e c r e t a r y  of  Defense t h a t  
i n  t h e i r  o p i n i o n  such assi gnment  i s  a necessar y  s t ep in 
s t r e n g t h e n i n g  t he  s e c u r i t y  of  t he  Un i t e d  S t a t e s ;  and the  
c e r t i f i e d  o p i n i o n s  r e f e r r e d  to i n  par agr aphs 4 and 5 s h a l l  
be t r a n s m i t t e d  by the S e c r e t a r y  of  Defense to the P r e s i d e n t  
of  the Uni ted S t a t e s , and to t he  Senate Commit tees on 
Fore i gn R e l a t i o n s  and Armed S e r v i c e s ,  and to t he  House 
Committees on For e i gn  A f f a i r s  and Armed S e r v i c e s  as soon 
as they  are  r e c e i v e d ;
6 . i t  i s t he  sense o f  the Senate t h a t ,  i n  the  
i n t e r e s t s  o f  sound c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  p r o c es s e s ,  and o f  n a t i o n a l  
u n i t y  and u n d e r s t a n d i n g ,  c on g r e s s i o n a l  approva l  should be 
o b t a i n e d  o f  any p o l i c y  r e q u i r i n g  the assignment  o f  American  
t roops abroad when such assi gnment  i s  in i mp l e me n t a t i o n  of  
a r t i c l e  3 o f  t he  Nor th A t l a n t i c  T r e a t y ;  and the Senate h e r e ­
by approves t he  p r e s e n t  plans of  the P r e s i d e n t  and the  
J o i n t  Ch i e f s  o f  S t a f f  to send f o u r  a d d i t i o n a l  d i v i s i o n s  of  
ground f o r c e s  to Western Europe,  but  i t  i s the sense o f  the  
Senate t h a t  no ground t roops i n  a d d i t i o n  to such f o u r  
d i v i s i o n s  should be se nt  to Western Europe in i mp l e me n t a t i on  
of  a r t i c l e  3 of  t he  Nor th A t l a n t i c  T r e a t y  w i t h o u t  f u r t h e r  
c on gr e s s i on a l  approval  ;
7.  i t  i s the sense of  the Senate t h a t  the P r e s i d e n t  
should submi t  to the Congress a t  i n t e r v a l s  o f  not  more than  
6 months r e p o r t s  on the i mp l e me n t a t i o n  o f  the Nor th A t l a n t i c  
T r e a t y ,  i n c l u d i n g  such i n f o r m a t i o n  as may be made a v a i l a b l e  
f o r  t h i s  purpose by the. -Supreme/Al l  i ed Commander,  Europe;
8 . i t  i s  the sense of  the Senate  t h a t  the Un i t e d  
St a t e s  should seek to e l i m i n a t e  a l l  p r o v i s i o n s  o f  the  
e x i s t i n g  t r e a t y  w i t h  I t a l y  which impose 1 imi  t a t i o n s '  upon the  
m i l i t a r y  s t r e n g t h  of  I t a l y  and p r e v e n t  the per f ormance by 
I t a l y  of  her  o b l i g a t i o n s  under  t he  Nor th A t l a n t i c  T r e a t y  to 
c o n t r i b u t e  to the f u l l  e x t e n t  o f  her  c a p a c i t y  to the def ense  
of  Western Europe;
9.  i t  i s  the sense o f  the Senate  t h a t  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  
should be g i ven  to t he  r e v i s i o n  o f  p l ans f o r  the def ense  o f  
Europe as soon as p o s s i b l e  so as to p r o v i d e  f o r  u t i l i z a t i o n  
on a v o l u n t a r y  basi s  of  the m i l i t a r y  and o t h e r  r esour ces  of  
Western Germany and Spa i n ,  b u t  not  excl  us i ve  o f  the m i l i t a r y  
and o t h e r  r esour ces  of  o t h e r  n a t i o n s .
* Congr ess i ona4 R e c o r d , X C V I I ,  3 2 8 2 - 8 3 .  Senate  Con­
c u r r e n t  R e s o l u t i o n  18,  the Russe l l  R e s o l u t i o n ,  i s  i d e n t i c a l  
except  t h a t  the word "Congress" was s u b s t i t u t e d  in p l ace  of
" S e n a t e , "  and s e c t i o n  9 i n c l u d e d  Tur key  and Greece  
a d d i t o n  to Western Germany and Spa i n .
APPENDIX D
V o t i  ng P a t t e r n s by Region and P a r t y
McClel  1 an 
Amendment S. R. 99 s. c. R. U
Yea - Nay Yea - Nay Yea - Na^
N o r t h e a s t s  Mi dd l e A t ! a n t i  c S t a t e s
Democrats 2 - 9 9 - 0 0 -  8
Republ i cans 9 -  8 15 - 2 13 - 3
To ta 1 11 -  17 24 - 2 13 - 11
South & South A t l a n t i c  S t a t e s
Democrats 7 - 16 22 - 2 8 -  16
T o' tal 7 -  16 22 - 2 8 - 16
Mi dwes t
Democrats 0 - 4 3 - 0 0 - 3
Republ i cans 17 - 0 7 - 10 13 - 4
To t  a 1 17 -  4 10 - 10 13 - 7
Sout hwest ,  Mounta in & P a c i f i c  S t a t e s
Democrats 2 -  6 8 - 0 1 -  5
Republ i  cans 12 -  0 5 - 7 10 - 2
T o t a l 14 - 6 13 - 7 11 - 7
TOTAL 49 - 43 69 - 21 45 - 41
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  Addresses Upon the American Road: 1 9 4 5 - 1 9 4 8 .
New York:  D. Van Nost rand Company,  I n c . ,  1949.
  Addresses Upon the American Road: 1 950-1 9 5 5 .
S t a n f o r d :  S t a n f o r d  U n i v e r s i t y  Pr ess ,  1955.
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Amer ican For e i gn  P o l i c y  in  the Co Id War . Amer ican  
Ce nt ur y  S e r i e s .  New York:  H i l l  and Wang, 1971.
A r e v i s i o n i s t ' s argument  t h a t  c on t a i nme nt  
has n e i t h e r  stopped Communism nor  come to g r i p s  
w i t h  Europe and t he  under deve l oped w o r l d .
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a f a v o r a b l e ,  v iew of  t he  o r g a n i z a t i o n  1s 
accompl i shment s .
Kennan,  George F. Amer ican Diplomacy 1 9 0 0 - 1 9 5 0 . Chicago:
The U n i v e r s i t y  o f  Chicago P r e s s ,  1951.
Necessary  r e a d i n g  f o r  p e r s p e c t i v e  and 
a l t e r n a t i v e  approaches in the conduct  o f  Amer ican  
f o r e i g n  p o l i c y .
 _____ . Memoi rs , 19 25-1 9 5 0 . Bos ton : L i t t l  e , Brown a nd
Company, 1967.
M o r a l i t y  and r e a l i s m  combined in  a s ea r c h i ng  
a u t o b i o g r a p h y  o f  h i s  y e a r s  w i t h  the S t a t e  Depar t ment .
__________. R e a l i t i e s  o f  Amer ican Fore i gn P o l i c y . P r i n c e t o n :
P r i n c e t o n  U n i v e r s i t y  Pr e s s ,  1954.
Renewed emphasis on the goal s  o f  con t a i n me n t :  
f r u i t f u l  n e g o t i a t i o n s  r a t h e r  than d i r e c t  m i l i t a r y  
c l a s h e s .
______ . R u s s i a ,  the Atom and the West . New York:
Har per  & Br o t her s  P u b l i s h e r s ,  1958.
Deemphasiz i ng t he  va l ue  o f  m i l i t a r y  c o n t a i n ­
ment ,  he s t i l l  has hope f o r  n e g o t i a t e d  s e t t l e m e n t s  
l e a d i n g  to e v e n t u a l  d i sengagement  by both the  
U n i t e d  S t a t e s  and Russia in Europe.
K i s s i n g e r ,  Henry A . The T r o u b l e d  P a r t n e r s h i p :  A Re­
a p p r a i s a l  o f  the A t l a n t i c  A l l i a n c e . New York:  
Mc Gr a w- H i l l  Book Company f o r  the Counci l  on Fore i gn  
R e l a t i o n s ,  1965.
A r e c e n t  r e a p p r a i s a l  o f  the A t l a n t i c  
A l l i a n c e  w i t h  emphasis on c o n d i t i o n s  c o n t r i b u t i n g  
to i t s  d i s i n t e g r a t i o n .
L aF ebe r ,  W a l t e r .  Ame r i c a ,  R u s s i a ,  and the Cold War,  1 94 5 - 
1 9 6 6 . New York:  John Wi l ey  and Sons,  I n c . ,  1968.
The i n t e l 1e c t u a l  c o n t r i b u t i o n  to t he  Cold 
War d i s c u s s i o n  adds to t h i s  r e v i s i o n i s t  s t udy .
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C i t y ,  New York:  Doubleday & Company, I n c . ,  1965.
Co n t i n u i n g  hi s  b a t t l e  f o r  manned bombers,  
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A s t udy  o f  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  change in m i l i t a r y  
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t he  Nor th A t l a n t i c  A l l i a n c e .
Mor gent hau ,  Hans J.  In Defense o f  the N a t i o n a l  I n t e r e s t :
A C r i t i c a l  Exami nat i on  of  Ameri  can For e i gn  P o l i c y . 
New York:  A l f r e d  A. Knopf ,  1951.
The r e a l i  s t  c a l 1 f o r  a n a l y z i  ng t he  n a t i o n a l  
i n t e r e s t  in terms of  power and a r e j e c t i o n  of  
ut o p i a n i s m , 1e g a 1 i s m , s e n t i m e n t a l i s m ,  and neo-  
i s o l a t i o n i s m .
North A t l a n t i c  T r e a t y  O r g a n i z a t i o n .  NATO Facts and F i g u r e s . 
B r u s s e l s :  NATO I n f o r m a t i o n  S e r v i c e ,  1969.
An o f f i c i a l  p u b l i c a t i o n  devoi d- ' o f  
p e n e t r a t i n g  a n a l y s i s  a l t hough  i t  does pr ov i d e  some 
use f u l  s t a t i s t i c s .
Osgood,  Rober t  E n d i c o t t .  NATO: The E n t a n g l i n g  A l l i a n c e .
Chi cago:  The U n i v e r s i t y  o f  Chicago Pr e s s ,  1962.
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P a r k e s H e n r y  Bamford,  and Car osso,  V i n c e n t  P. Recent
Amer i ca:  A H i s t o r y . Book Two: Since 19 3 3 . New 
York:  Thomas Y. Crowel l  Company, 1969.
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o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  and i n s t i t u t i o n a l  i n f l u e n c e s  i n  the  
f o r ma t i o n  o f  Amer ican f o r e i g n  p o l i c y .
S t e e l ,  Ronal d.  Pax A m e r i c a n a . New York:  The V i k i n g  Press.
1967.
Whi l e  emphasi z ing the l a s t  decade,  i t  i s  a 
d e n u n c i a t i o n  o f  American i n t e r v e n t i o n i s m  during^ 
the e n t i r e  Cold War e r a .
S t i l l m a n ,  Edmund, and P f a f f ,  W i l l i a m .  Power and I mp ot e nc e : 
The F a i l u r e  o f  Ame r i c a ' s  Fore i gn P o l i c y . New York:  
Random House,  1966.
Takes the a r g u m e n t , t h a t  the U n i t e d  St a t e s  
has been f r u s t r a t e d  and i s o l a t e d  due to i l l u s i o n s  
and l a ck  o f  v i s i o n  in  the Cold War.
S t r o m e r , M a r v i n  E. The Making of  a P o l i t i c a l  L e a d e r :
Kenneth S. Wherry and the Un i t e d  S t a t es  S e n a t e .
L i n c o l n :  U n i v e r s i t y  o f  Nebraska Pr es s ,  1969.
Based on Wher r y ' s  p u b l i c  and p r i v a t e
papers the study is  s h o r t  and l acks p e n e t r a t i n g
a n a l y s i  s .
T a f t ,  Rober t  A. A Fore i gn P o l i c y  f o r  Ame r i c a ns . Garden 
C i t y ,  New York:  Doubleday & Company, I n c . ,  1951.
The Ohio S e n a t o r ' s  a l t e r n a t i v e s  to the  
Truman D o c t r i n e  based upon p o s i t i o n s  which are not  
always easy to d e t e r mi n e .
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Company, 1952.
Al t hough the Senat or  was not  a major  
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t h e o r y  o f  c o n t a i n me n t .
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A m i l i t a r y  view o f  NATO by a B r i t i s h  
o f f i c e r  who had been assi gned to the Supreme 
He adqua r t e r s  A11 i ed Powers Eu r o p e .
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Al t hough not  a d e f i n i t i v e  b i ogr aphy  o f  the  
Ohio Se n a t o r  i t  does r e v e a l  T a f t ' s  c o n t i n u i n g  
i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s  in f o r e i g n  . p o l i c y .
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S p a a t z ,  C a r l .  "Atomic Monopoly Ends. "  Newsweek, 
Oct ober  3 ,  1949 ,  p.  22.
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S t o k e s ,  Thomas L.  “ Four  Men A g a i n s t  Sen.  T a f t . "  A t l a n t a  
C o n s t i t u t i o n , March 6 , 1951 ,  p . 10.
Stoneman,  W i l l i a m  H. " Hoover ' s  Speech Tends to Shade
Eur ope ' s  F a i t h  i n  Uni  ted'  S t a t e s ." S t . Louis-  P o s t -  
Pi spatch , December 22 , 1 950 ,  p . 2B.
S t r a i g h t , M i c h a e l . "Can the A t l a n t i c  C o u n t r i e s  Un i t e ?"
New R e p u b l i c , August  21,  1950,  pp.  1 0 - 1 2 .
" T a f t ' s  Bid f o r  Power - - and P r e s i d e n c y . "  U.S.  News & World 
R e p o r t , January  19 ,  1951,  p.  19.
Truman,  Ha r r y  S. " N a t i o n ' s  Progress in A i r  Power:  The Goal
I s  Worth the P r i c e . "  V i t a l  Speeches o f  the Day ,
X V I I  (June 15,  1 9 5 2 ) ,  5 2 0 - 2 3 .
D. P e r i o d i c a l s
N a t i o n . 1 9 5 0 - 1 9 5 1 .
S a t u r d a y  Evening P o s t . 1 9 5 0 - 1 9 5 1 .
E. Newspapers
A t l a n t a  C o n s t i t u t i o n . December 1,  1 9 5 0 - A p r i l  30,  1951.
Chicago •■■Daily- T r i b u n e . December 1 , 1 9 5 0 - A p r i l  30 ,  1951.
D a l l a s  Morni ng News. December 1 ,  1 9 5 0 - A p r i l  30,  1951.
Denver  P o s t . December 1,  1 9 5 0 - A p r i l  30 ,  1951.
Evening Wor l d - Her a  I d  (Omaha) .  December 1 , 1950-  
A p r i 1 3 0 , 1 9 5 1 .
Los Angeles T i m e s . December 1,  1 9 5 0 - A p r i l  30,  1951.
New York T i m e s . 1 949-1 951.
S t .  Louis Pos t  - D„i s p a t  c h , December l p 1 9 5 0 - A p r i l  30 ,  1951.
San F r a n c i s c o  C h r o n i c l e . December 1,  1 9 5 0 - A p r i l  30,  1951.
S e a t t l e  Post  I n t e l l i g e n c e r . December 1,  1 9 5 0 - A p r i l  30,  1951.
The  T i me s  ( L o n d o n ) .  Dec e mbe r  1 ,  1 9 5 0 - A p r i 1 3 0 ,  1 9 5 1 .
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Wal l  S t r e e t  J o u r n a l . December 1,  1 9 5 0 - A p r i l  30 ,  1951.  
Washington P o s t . December 1,  1 9 5 0 - A p r i l  30 ,  1951.
F. M a n u s c r i p t  C o l l e c t i o n s
Hugh A l f r e d  R u t l e r  P a p e r s , 1 8 7 8 - 1 9 5 4 .  Nebraska S t a t e
H i s t o r i c a l  S o c i e t y ,  M a n u s c r i p t  D i v i s i o n .  L i n c o l n ,  
N e b r a s k a .
Dwight  D. Ei senhower  Papers , 1 91 6-1 952.  Dwight  D. 
Ei senhower  L i b r a r y .  A b i l e n e ,  Kansas.
H e r b e r t  Hoover  P o s t - P r e s i d e n t i a l  Papers .  H e r b e r t  Hoover  
P r e s i d e n t i a l  L i b r a r y .  West Branch,  Iowa.
David D. L l oy d  Pa pe r s ,  1 9 4 9 - 1 9 6 3 .  Har r y  S. Truman L i b r a r y  
I n d e p e n d e n c e , M i s s o u r i .
Har r y  S. Truman Paper s ,  Har ry  S. Truman L i b r a r y .  I ndepen­
dence , M i s s o u r i .
Kenneth S . Wherry Papers , 1 943-1 951.  Nebraska S t a t e
H i s t o r i c a l  S o c i e t y ,  Ma n u s c r i p t  D i v i s i o n . L i n c o l n ,  
Nebraska .
Henry M. Wr i s t on  Memorandum. Dwight  D. Eisenhower  L i b r a r y  
Abi l ene . ,  Kansas.
G. Unpubl i shed M a t e r i a l s
Cr oss ,  Claude Byram. "The Un i t e d  S t a t e s  and The North
A t l a n t i c  T r e a t y . "  Unpubl i shed Ph.D.  d i s s e r t a t i o n ,  
S t a t e  U n i v e r s i t y  o f  I owa,  1953.
D a l s t r o m ,  Har l  Adams. "Kenneth S. Wher r y . "  2 Vo l s .
Unpubl i shed Ph. D. d i s s e r t a t i o n , U n i v e r s i t y  of  
Nebr a s ka ,  1965.
Gu s t a f s o n ,  M i l t o n  0 .  "The Vandenberg R e s o l u t i o n :  A Study
i n  B i p a r t i s a n s h i p . "  Unpubl i shed M. A. T h e s i s ,  
U n i v e r s i t y  o f  Nebraska ,  1963.
M o l l ,  Kenneth L.  " N u c l e a r  S t r a t e g y ,  1 9 4 5 - 1 9 49 :  Ame r i c a ' s
F i r s t  Four  Y e a r s . "  Unpubl i shed M. A. T h e s i s ,  
M u n i c i p a l  U n i v e r s i t y  o f  Omaha, 1965.
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Moore,  O t i s  C. " Un i t e d  S t a t e s  For e i gn  P o l i c y  w i t h  the
Union o f  S o v i e t  Socia 1 i s t  Republ i cs  , 1 9 4 5 - 1 9 5 9 . "  
Unpubl i shed M. A. T h e s i s ,  Mun i c i p a l  U n i v e r s i t y  
o f  Omaha, 1966.
P o o l e ,  Wa l t e r  S l oan.  "The Quest  f o r  a Re publ i can  For e i gn  
P o l i c y :  1 9 4 1 - 1 9 5 1 . "  Unpubl i shed Ph.D.
d i s s e r t a t i o n ,  U n i v e r s i t y  o f  P e n n s y l v a n i a ,  1968.
H. Personal  L e t t e r s
Lucius D. Cl ay  to a u t h o r ,  November 30,  1970.
Paul  H. Douglas to a u t h o r ,  December 13,  1970.
Henry Cabot  Lodge to a u t h o r ,  December 15,  1970.
Russe l l  B. Long to a u t h o r ,  December 7 ,  1970.
S. L.  A. Ma r sha l l  to a u t h o r ,  December 28,  1970.
Wayne L.  Morse to a u t h o r ,  December 3 ,  1970.
Ri char d  B. Russe l l  to a u t h o r ,  November 25,  1970,
L e v e r e t t  S a l t o n s t a l l  to a u t h o r ,  November 25,  1970.
Twent y - t wo o t h e r  i n q u i r i e s  were sent  to o t h e r  Senat ors  and
p u b l i c  o f f i c i a  1s but  r e c e i v e d  1 i t t l e  or  no r esponse .
